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W ater Stress: Some Symptoms and Causes: A Case Study o f T a’iz, Yemen
Abstract:
This study claims that to develop water resources sustainably in areas facing water shortage 
an understanding o f the factors leading to scarcity require an integrated, interdisciplinary and 
holistic approach. This hypothesis has been tested in the context o f a water shortage crisis in 
the Yemeni city o f Ta’iz (population 400,000) that peaked in 1995.
The crisis was triggered by the demise o f  the main aquifer supplying the city. Numerical 
assessment o f the aquifer’s water resources permits an historical reconstruction o f  its 
degradation. The environmental cost o f its demise, were irrigated agriculture to cease so that 
the aquifer could recover, is modelled. The returns to water from agriculture and industry are 
estimated in economic and livelihood provision terms, and contrasted. Sectoral contribution 
to water resource pollution is also contrasted. The area’s dependence on grain imports is 
evaluated in terms o f ‘virtual w ater’ (Allan, 1998). Adaptation to water shortage o f  individual 
households and water-related businesses is assessed quantitatively (through questionnaires) 
and that o f political actors qualitatively through interviews. An assessment o f the influence o f 
the legal and institutional frameworks to the adaptive process utilises secondary data and 
interviews.
These data and analysis suggest that the reality o f water allocation in the T a’iz area reflects 
politcal rather than economic factors, and economic rather than water resource criteria. The 
data are also used to examine critically the causes o f the crisis in terms o f political ecology 
and environmental reconstructionist models o f sustainable development. An alternative model 
is proposed which incorporates economic progress, environmental protection and equity 
provision. Northern hydropolitical theoiy is found inadequate to encompass the allocative 
process o f  a Southern weak state (Migdal, 1988).
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Chapter 1 Introduction
A meeting was held in T a’iz, Yemen, in observance o f the World Day for Water, 1998. The 
meeting was attended by representatives from major organisations associated with foreign aid 
and development, local community and local and central government representatives, N G O ’s 
involved in environmental protection, and, in the name of public awareness, several hundred 
noisy school children. The meeting was hosted by the relatively newly established national 
body responsible for water resources. After the meeting, a group o f smartly dressed people 
representing most o f  these organisations went on a brief field trip in a rather new and 
luxurious Layla ‘alawi (Totyota Landcruiser status symbol, named after a Yemeni politician’s 
daughter who acquired one). The chosen destination was a 400m deep borehole in Habir 
being tested to determine its safe yield with a view to connecting it to the main pipeline 
supplying the city o f  T a’iz 25 km to the South. After a brief conversation with the engineer 
responsible for the test, a nearby shallow well dug into the wadi gravels was visited, from 
which its owner happened to be irrigating a field o f tomatoes. Standing in his farm-soiled 
local dress he informed the group with great conviction regarding the detrimental effect the 
pumping test was having on his water supply. The group then returned to the Governor’s 
lunch awaiting them in the city o f T a’iz, the 400,000 inhabitants o f  which, received poor 
quality water once every 3 weeks from the public utility.
On the way from field to city the plight o f  the (assumedly) poor farmer was discussed by the 
eminent experts. Depending on the background o f the speaker, discussion topics ranged 
around how soon the well could be on-line, the need to compensate locals for derogation, the 
role o f appropriate stakeholder representative local institutions, the need to understand the 
locals’ perceptions and social water uses, the application o f Islamic law to the situation and 
many others. However, the discussion seemed to miss the reality. Actually, monitoring o f the 
farm er’s well indicated no effect after extended pumping from the test well in terms o f water 
level or hydrochemistry. He was simply being opportunistic. Although the visitors had failed 
to determine this information, vital as it was to their grand strategising, it was not the central 
issue. More importantly, the visiting actors managed to reach the wrong conclusion by 
following the scripts and narratives their disciplines had taught them, resulting in their 
missing the ‘big picture’ o f the links the common subject o f water must form between those 
disciplines if water resources management is to be effective. The incident described above not 
only contains in microcosm some of the multi-faceted aspects o f  water resources management 
involved in the area o f T a’iz, but also, and, more importantly, the need for the managers to 
have a multi-faceted grasp o f their task.
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1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Thesis
A central hypothesis to this study is that an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to water use 
is needed if determinants o f allocation are to be understood and sustainable measures 
introduced. The water stressed situation which has evolved in T a’iz between 1965 and 1995 
provides an example with which to test that hypothesis. The T a’iz data are also used to 
examine critically:
a) the relevance o f demand management,
b) the role o f social adaptive capacity,
c) the relative importance o f economic and political factors,
d) the contribution o f plural legal and institutional frameworks
e) the significance o f virtual water and population growth, and
f) the potential for sustainable development in the allocation o f  water in the context o f 
severe water stress in a Southern state.
The water resources o f a specific area (Wadi AI Hayma, 16 km2) are evaluated within the 
context o f the record o f abstraction for domestic use and, using satellite imagery and water
balance modelling, for agricultural use as well. The environmental cost o f the depletion o f the
main aquifer in AI Hayma is evaluated in terms o f projected lost agricultural production that 
would be incurred in enabling aquifer recovery. The returns to water from industrial use are 
analysed numerically and contrasted with those from agricultural use for the wider (930 km2) 
Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment. [The locations and areas of Wadi AI Hayma and Upper Wadi 
Rasyan included in this study are indicated in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2.] The environmental impact o f 
industrial and urban domestic water use is also qualitatively assessed. The politicisation of 
water allocation between agricultural and urban domestic users and the potential for conflict 
are critically examined. The dependence on virtual water to meet the food needs o f the 
increasing population is quantified. The plural institutional and legal frameworks are 
appraised from the perspective o f whether they contribute to providing or preventing 
equitable water allocation. The efficiency o f the water markets and whether their provision is 
equitable are critically examined and the volume o f water transacted on the market, and its 
quality and price are evaluated quantitatively. The capacity to adapt to water shortage across 
the spectrum o f  social scale from individual households and businesses to the government is 
portrayed statistically and through an examination o f specific allocative issues respectively. A 
review o f past and present economic development efforts permits a critical assessment o f
15
sustainable development models and the potential for environmental protection and equity 
provision.
1.2 Thesis Outline
No doubt the literature would be more replete with the useful lessons learnt from failures if 
professionals were not so economically and politically insecure. In many fields the study o f 
failures offers the greatest opportunity for understanding processes. T a’iz is an example o f 
failed water resources management. The author o f this study was privileged to be able to 
observe the consequences o f that failure. The fieldwork spanned the period 1995 to the end o f 
1998. Although the ‘water crisis’ peaked in the summer o f  1995, it continues to this day and 
yet higher peaks may lie ahead. Some causes o f the crisis are traced from 1960’s roots, 
although an earlier beginning is explored to explain some of the deeper causes.
Many factors have contributed to the water problems o f T a’iz and the ‘knock-on’ effects o f 
those problems have been numerous and diverse. An analysis o f the problems, their causes 
and effects demands an integrated, holistic examination o f their linkages. The locals and the 
passing observer view the ‘whole picture’ as it faces them. Specialists from the disciplines o f 
hydrogeology, agriculture, development, economics, politics, environmental and any other 
field involved notice the colour o f their discipline that contributes to the painting. The policy 
maker also wants to see the whole ‘water colour’ and needs to understand the linkages 
between the various aspects o f  it that would traditionally belong in different academic 
pigeon-holes. The thesis attempts to examine the nature, extent and origins o f the shortage. 
Attempting to integrate the different fields which contribute to the T a’iz water crisis provides 
a unique opportunity to examine the linkages between many diverse physical and human 
aspects o f water resources management in the context o f extreme water shortage.
After a review o f related literature, the physical water environment that T a’iz impacts, and 
affects T a’iz, is investigated in terms o f water availability and quality in chapter three. The 
development o f the most important aquifer to T a’iz is examined in detail and a reconstruction 
of the causes o f  its demise is attempted. The social response to water availability and use is 
considered against the underlying economic realities in chapter four. These two chapters 
provide physical and socio-economic ‘m aps’ o f the shortage. Because different 
methodologies were used to create the ‘m aps’ o f  the shortage, each methodology is described 
in its relevant section, and there is no single ‘methodology’ section. In chapter five, the
16
concepts and principles discussed in the literature are used as filters for looking at the T a’iz 
‘m aps’. The ‘m aps’ are also used as a means o f testing and revising the concepts and 
principles. Chapter five is structured on the basis o f the proposed causative sequence 
described below, but in the direction o f symptom to cause rather than vice versa. The T a’iz 
experience is considered in the context o f the apparent contradiction o f sustainable 
development. Chapter six concludes the study by considering the appropriateness o f the 
integrated approach and asking whether the lessons learnt from T a’iz could be o f value to 
other population centres facing similar crises.
1.3 Initial Concepts
The lateral and vertical distribution o f people vis-a-vis water provides a means o f attempting 
the contradictory; the compartmentalising o f something which is inherently holistic, that is, 
water.
The Lateral Distribution o f W ater and Humans: Urban -  Rural Distinctions
At the most basic level, homo sapiens interacts with the environment extracting needs and
returning waste:
Air, Water, Food
Man Environment
--------------
Waste Products
Human communities, seeking to enhance their comfort, shelter, convenience and security, 
tend to concentrate in settlements. These settlements must look to ever increasingly 
technological means to provide man’s needs (and wants). The location supplying the basic 
needs typically lies outside the settlement, and the ‘footprint’ o f  supply and environmental 
impact spreads as the settlement grows. In terms o f water this is probably better termed a 
maldistribution o f people than o f rainfall (Turton, 1999a) and results in a rural -  urban (and 
even North South) distinction:
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Urban
Resource Demand Centre 
Waste Supply Centre 
Industrial Activity
Rural
Resource Supply Footprint
Waste Disposal Area* 
Agricultural Activity 
Rural Domestic SupplyUrban Domestic Supply 
Increasing Livelihood Provision Declining Livelihood Provision
Result: Population Pull Population Push ^Urbanisation
* The urban area can also be one o f waste disposal, but the ‘ footprint’ o f  environmental 
impact by waste may spread beyond the area occupied by the urban waste producers 
(Serageldin, 1994;5).
Lundqvist (1998;Table 1) makes a similar urban-rural distinction using the terminology o f 
industrial-mechanical and biological-landscape, differentiating waste disposal (externalities) 
as being diffuse and concentrated respectively.
The Vertical Distribution o f W ater and Humans:
Since water is unbreathable for humans, when they need water they have to lift it. The 
movement o f resources and waste, for example o f  air, water and food is largely determined by 
their physical state, thus gaseous fresh air and Chernobyl clouds are at the mercy o f  the 
weather to drift where they will. Solid food products and waste tend to stay where they are 
put, but liquid water supplies and polluted waste-water flow down-hill under gravity unless 
impounded by technologically adequate means.
The primary dynamic acting on water is the physical one o f gravity. However, ‘water flows 
up-hill to money and power’ (Reisner,1986). In attempting to reverse gravity-flow, human 
demand (an ‘anthropocentric’ dynamic, or ‘egocentric’ dynamic when want exceeds need) is 
met by technological innovation. As well as a preference to be upwind, upstream and as far as 
possible from a landfill site, Yemeni settlements, unlike temperate climate settlements, tend 
to be located in mountainous areas and are often on the mountain ridges. This may be for 
defence reasons and also to keep away from the dangerous flash floods o f the wadis. The 
result is the need for a lot o f  water to be lifted. (Allan, 1994a notes a similar population / 
water elevation separation on a larger scale in the Jordan catchment). The rainfall distribution 
also results in communities on the mountains being nearer to the ultimate source, that is the 
rain, and enjoying the economic advantages associated with being upstream users rather than
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downstream users (Varisco, 1983). The poor, who often seem to be located at the downstream 
end and are missed out by the ethnocentric dynamic, are sometimes provided for by religious 
or areligious equity-driven do-gooding. This third, least evident, and therefore weakest 
dynamic perhaps could be called ‘good’ or ‘theocentric’.
Dissecting the Holistic for the Purpose o f Analysis
For water resources management to contribute constructively to the establishment o f an 
economy developing in a sustainable manner, the unenviable task o f policy formulation and 
decision making must weigh a host o f  variables, some o f which are inherently in tension. The 
need for holism in determining those weights is self-evident, but the variables still have to be 
isolated to be weighed. As a starting point primary aims must be distinguished from 
secondary and ends from means. The following table summarises some basic aims in 
providing water:
P roblem s / Aims
Adequate Provision Environmentally Sustainable 
Provision
Equitable Provision
In providing water there are two ways o f making it go further. One is to make it produce more 
o f the same (productive efficiency) and the other to produce something else o f greater value 
(allocative efficiency). ‘The sam e’ is typically defined as within the same broad sector, 
agriculture, for example, rather than the same item, potatoes, for example.
O verall M ethods / M eans: Increased  W ater Use Efficiency
Productive Efficiency Allocative Efficiency
Various mechanisms contribute to both allocative and productive efficiency, though 
engineering ones tend to be directed more at the latter and fall in the category o f supply 
management measures (that is, which increase the supply). The dynamics acting on water 
provision are depicted as:
Determining
Dynamic
Gravity Money Power vs. Equity 
Coercion vs. Co-operation
Context Physical Economic Cultural / Socio-Political
Mechanisms Engineering Signals Legal Framework -  ‘R ules’
Enablers Projects Markets Institutions -  ‘Players’
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These forces operate within, and help to shape, a context which is not static and in which 
various allocative trends or processes are taking place. The removal o f  water subsidies, 
creation o f water markets and establishment o f reallocative water transfers are economic 
measures which can help reduce demand, but which all require political facilitation. Political 
enabling, in turn, is conducted by institutions directed and supported by a legal framework. 
This sequence may be depicted as:
Political => Legal => Institutional => Economic => <= Social => <~ Physical
For example, the outer layer o f this sequence, the environment, is perhaps the easiest to 
observe and measure. Abstracting resources from it and returning waste to it is the sphere of 
human activity, which is in turn influenced by underlying economic realities. In a 
democratised society, such as the UK, the economic realities o f water transactions, for 
instance the magnitude o f one’s water bill, are meant to reflect rates set by the relevant 
institution, for instance the water authority or water company. Thus the institutional layer 
underlies the economic. That institution has a legal mandate, for instance from OFWAT, 
which is in turn established by a legal framework (the next layer), which itself came into 
existence through the deliberations o f an elected political body (the core). The extent to 
which this sequence o f causation allocates water, and thereby the benefits o f water use, 
equitably or for the perpetuation o f power asymmetries is a key issue.
The sequence is used here merely to provide a means o f examining a whole. Some of these 
categories are rather loose, may overlap to an extent, and may be short-circuited. In some 
instances the occurrence o f feedback suggests the relationships between them are interactive 
(such as those in power responding to the needs o f the electorate). For the purpose o f this 
discussion ‘physical’ refers to the quantity and quality o f water, that is, the water 
environment, with which communities interact. Together with economic signals, or their 
absence, these environmental constraints largely determine the hydraulic activity limits o f 
those communities (for instance limiting the extent to which the desert can be made to 
bloom).
When compared with other rather unidirectionally changing trends and processes that typify 
the South, some o f which are listed below, the mechanisms and contexts in which the 
compartments o f the sequence operate are much more static :
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Trends / Processes
Population Increase 
Urbanisation 
Technology / Communication
These trends have been evident in Yemen, particularly during the past thirty years. During 
this period economic development has entered a water resources management arena in which 
the various contexts, mechanisms and trends mentioned above are already operating. As a 
consequence, economic development which seeks to modify the status quo is itself modified 
by the limitations o f that arena.
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Chapter 2 Hot Water Topics: What the Papers Say
This chapter examines the thinking o f those who publish their thoughts on water resources 
management within the various traditional academic compartments or epistemic groups. As 
discussed in the introduction, this method is put forward as a basis for examining the situation 
in T a’iz, Yemen. Since there is overlap between the compartments, the headings are not 
intended to be water-tight. After considering the need for an integrated, holistic approach and 
a brief look at the ‘global water issues picture’, the discussion moves from an examination o f 
the role economic principles play in the allocation o f water resources, to the political. The 
contribution o f  political ecology, beliefs and knowledge to the political debate is considered. 
Between the economic and the political are the ‘transmission gears’ o f institutions 
empowered by a legal framework. The discussion then looks at the sustainable development 
contradiction. Each facet presents some ‘current thinking’ amongst the international 
community which provides both a context against which to compare the Yemeni data in 
chapter 5.
2.1 Holism, Interdisciplinarity and Integration
A review o f the literature suggests the need for a holistic approach when considering water 
resources management issues is not new. Since 1990 the term integrated has replaced 
‘holistic’ in water resource studies, however integration o f a partial analysis is inadequate and 
both terms are necessary. M cSweeney (1998) describes water as “a transient resource” which 
“transcends the boundaries o f every living thing on the planet”, and disparages the tools o f 
“our ‘atom istic’, fragmented and departmentalised academic disciplines” with which we 
analyse water and water management. One example o f discipline myopia is the tendency for 
some to emphasise water volumes and water quality, whilst others focus on water quantity 
and price. Reality is a combination o f all three. As Berkoff (1994;xvi), after mentioning its 
economic value, completes the vital trio stating, “water quality should be considered 
simultaneously with water quantity” .
Significant problems arise when holism and integrated are omitted. Allan (1996b; 117), citing 
the example o f the international legal community’s tendency to base their rules on principles 
o f hydrology and environmental science, that is, closed watersheds, rather than on the 
political realities o f open problemsheds, points out that hydrological systems are subordinate 
to national political economies. He suggests that this very stance o f the legal community
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contributes to the problem o f not solving water allocation in the Jordan basin. Another 
example is that o f the technical modifications intended to solve problems o f efficient 
operation o f irrigation systems in the Nile Delta. Radwan (1994;57) suggests the technical 
interventions not only may not achieve the desired improvement, but may even impair it. The 
reason, he suggests, is that the efficiency problems are related to the social mechanisms 
governing the irrigation system.
Although not explicitly mentioned in the conference statements o f New Delhi, Dublin and 
Rio, their scope assumes an holistic approach. Participants call for a ‘comprehensive’ 
framework and analysis encompassing the relationships between the (physical) ecosystem and 
(human) socio-economic activities (World Bank 1993; 10), or the integration o f  social equity 
as well as economic efficiency (McSweeney,1998). In the light o f water’s ‘unitary’ nature, 
the need for integrated resource management in order to meet national economic, social, 
security and environmental objectives (Berkoff, 1994;xi) is clearly stated. The holistic 
hypothesis is therefore not new and integrated approaches to water are at least paid lip- 
service throughout the literature (eg Keenan, 1991 ;34, Delft Declaration, 1991 ;Annex Point 2). 
However, in practice, other situations may occur:
a) To simply ignore the interdisciplinary nature o f water resources management 
planning:
in particular, ignoring the non-engineering aspects o f the plans (Therkildsen, 1988; 15) was 
the traditional stance.
b) Omitting disciplines from an ‘interdisciplinary study’:
such as the absence o f team members with expertise in physical aspects o f water management 
from ‘interdisciplinary’ field studies o f urban water and sanitation utilities (Cowen,1994;27).
c) To have the wrong discipline tackling the wrong aspect:
such as engineers busy constructing water supply schemes but ignoring the fact that intrigues 
and conflicts over water rights will determine whether those schemes will ever be operable 
(Morris, 1991 ;75), or sociologists choosing drilling materials which resulted in the water 
supplied becoming saline (Carl Bro International, 1988;5.2.2).
d) To conduct an ‘integrated’ study which is not interdisciplinary, when 
interdisciplinarity was called for:
such as omitting the water resources assessment in an ‘integrated’ rural development plan 
(CPO et al 1976 in MacMillan, 1976).
e) To fail to distinguish between interdisciplinary and integrated.
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The latter is, perhaps, the most common mistake and can result in a “series o f largely 
unconnected reports or studies” achieved by “long, drawn-out multidisciplinary research in 
which each discipline wanders o ff into the minutae o f its specialized by-ways, leaving gaps, 
and rendering more difficult tight integrating analysis needed to generate good 
recommendations for action”(Chambers and Carruthers, 1986; 10,1, see also Therkildsen,
1988,15 and 82). The Wadi Rima project, Yemen may well fit this category. 20 professionals 
worked for 2 years to make recommendations to increase water capture. The implementation 
resulted in a reduction o f cropped areas downstream, up to 2/3 sharecroppers being driven off 
the land and only slightly more water being captured (Morton, 1994;35).
Why should we be blind to our lack o f interdisciplinarity and integration? Some are quite 
disparaging about the trespassing o f experts into fields other than their own (Uphoff, 1986;2). 
Others think that this is precisely the problem, suggesting “a balanced pluralist approach, 
empirically based and with a wide span in both political economy and physical ecology is 
more likely to fit the reality” where “pluralism recognises multiple causation” (Chambers, 
1983;44). Similarly: “It became clear that the poor performance o f many irrigation systems in 
terms o f productivity and equity was .... due to the tunnel vision o f traditional irrigation 
science” (Oorthuizen & Wester 1994;i). Chambers identifies U phoff s trespassers as a 
solution: "Narrow specialists can be a liability, and the ideal are multidisciplinary individuals 
whose horizons are not limited by their own original disciplines." (Chambers and Carruthers,
1986; 10).
Perhaps the field o f irrigation was one o f the first to graduate from the single cause (typically 
technical, Jurriens & de Jong, 1989;35) to the multiple cause concept o f water management 
problems. Irrigation was then recognised as a physical, human and socio-technical process in 
which social relations o f power and technological development mutually influence each other 
(M ollinga, 1998; 12-14, M anzungu,1999;7,l 1,14). We need to get the engineering, prices and 
process right (Uphoff 1986;1). Jurriens & de Jong (1989;35 et seq.) also trace a shift in the 
meaning o f O & M from operation and maintenance to organisation and management, 
reflecting the underlying shift in emphasis towards institutional matters.
The more recent 'arena1 model o f irrigation planning described by DISWC (1993;4) parallels 
the broad scope o f integrated interdisciplinarity needed in any area o f water resources 
management which:
“seeks to develop an interdisciplinary perspective by considering the
relationship between technology and management... and the integration o f
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rural development issues” in which “water management is a form o f social 
interaction o f different actors employing different methods, resources and 
strategies around the issue o f water distribution.,., in a socio-technical 
system., with a spatial hydraulic/social element and a time element that is 
embedded in the agrarian structure, the institutional infrastructure o f  the state 
and state-like institutions and the material infrastructure., o f ecology and 
technology”(ibid;7)
Beyond the mono-sectoral irrigation literature, in the broader field o f water resources 
management, this multi-faceted arena has been categorised by Van Beek (quoted in Hansma 
and Hermans, 1997; 11) into three systems, natural resources, socio-economic and 
administrative/institutional systems; a broad grouping o f the facets o f  this thesis.
2.2 The Global Position
2.2.1 Global water statistics indicate the size of the problem
Allan (1994a;4) points out the huge differences in annual human water needs: for drinking, 
lm 3; for domestic purposes, 100m3; and in food, 1000m3. To meet those needs plus industrial 
demand, Ohlsson (1995;5) estimates that around one third of the world’s 12-14 thousand 
km3/yr o f non-soil, renewable freshwater resources are withdrawn. He breaks down these 
withdrawals as 69% to agriculture, industry 21%, and municipal 6%, however, sector 
consumption is 89% to agriculture, industry 5% and municipal 2%. The huge consumption by 
agriculture is exacerbated by irrigation. However, 36% of agricultural yields come from the 
16% o f farmland which is irrigated.
There are really only two ways o f ‘losing’ water, either through evaporation (from which 
state it will rain on someone else) or through contamination. Seepage o f aquifers to the sea 
and the flow of rivers to the sea are the equivalent o f loss through contamination. The 
assessment o f  soil-water in global water statistics is referred to by Allan (in prep.). Its under­
utilisation can only occur if evaporation is taking place instead o f evapotranspiration. Fallow 
ground therefore is a source o f water loss to an area. If the soil cannot retain enough water to 
support the crop for the full season and there is no potential to supplement the water supply 
then it is difficult to see how the soil water could be utilised. Some water will inevitably be 
Tost’ to evaporation from the soil. That which is ‘lost’ through seepage to the aquifer could 
be reclaimed but only with energy input for lift.
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In 1991, Vincent (1991; 197) stated that only 1.3Bn o f the world population had clean water 
and 700m sanitation, noting that coverage was especially poor in the M iddle East. Serageldin 
(1994;3) suggested that IBn people lacked an adequate water supply and that 1.7Bn were 
without sanitation. Lundqvist (1998) states that IBn are without access to safe water and 
800m are without a secure food supply. Although many global water statistics are bandied 
about, some o f which are contradictory, whilst others do not compare like with like, the 
overall picture o f  water shortage and an increasing drain on the resource base is consistent. 
The consequences o f shortages are literally a matter o f life and death. W ithin the MENA area 
(W orld Bank designation for the Middle East and North Africa) Berkoff (1994; 14) considers 
that the provision o f uncontaminated water supplies could reduce death in rural and urban 
areas by 30%, and another 20% if sanitation were to be provided. Most o f  the deaths are 
amongst the 0-14 year age range who account for 43% of the area’s population.
Population growth is the single most important factor affecting the above estimates. Ohlsson 
(1995;28) estimates a world population o f over lOBn by 2050, 96% o f  whom will be in the 
South. Allan (1994b;66) bemoans the emphasis by regional leaders on the water supply 
deficiency whilst de-emphasising the demographic explosion that is its cause. However, the 
global picture is not all gloom. Despite a population increase o f 23% in the developing world 
between 1.980 and 1990, access to safe water increased from 77 to 82% and from 30 to 63% 
in urban and rural areas respectively and sanitation coverage increased from 69 to 72% and 
from 37 to 49% in urban and rural areas respectively (World Bank, 1993;36).
2.2.2 Some attempt to solve the problem
The reason for such increases in safe water and sanitation provision in the 80’s was partly due 
to the efforts o f the global development community in response to the ‘W ater Decade’. The 
declaration that the 1980’s should be designated as the International W ater Supply and 
Sanitation Decade occurred at the UN Water Conference in Mar Del Plata, Argentina in 1977. 
The conference was described as ‘the first o f its kind ever held in the area o f water’ which 
‘sensitised the world community on the importance o f water for development’ (Thanh and 
Biswas, 1990;xiii). This was followed by the UNDP Global Consultation on Safe Water and 
Sanitation for the 1990's in New Delhi at which participating musketeers aimed at “some” 
safe water “for all rather than all for some” by the year 2000. Four parts o f the conference 
statement (quoted in Vincent, 1991 ;212) reflect the state o f play in water debates:
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1: "Protection o f  the environment and safeguarding o f health through the
integrated management o f water resources and liquid and solid wastes".
2: "Institutional reforms promoting an integrated approach and including
changes in procedures, attitudes and behaviour, and the full participation o f 
women at all levels in sector institutions"
3: "Community management o f services, backed by measures to strengthen local
institutions in implementing and sustaining water and sanitation programmes"
4: "Sound financial practices, achieved through better management o f  existing
assets and widespread use o f appropriate technologies"
Vincent is particularly critical that the statement suffers from "confusing and contradictory 
rhetoric" and anticipated that it would have no impact. She cites the ‘mixed bag” o f item 2 
measures as “confusing” and item 4 as “contradictory and controversial”. However, the points 
did focus on the main water issues o f our times, or at least on those o f the changing agenda o f 
the aid fraternity. According to Serageldin (1994;1), the previous ‘old agenda’ had been about 
providing household services, whilst this ‘new agenda’ emphasises environmentally 
sustainable development.
Other international conferences have also influenced the ‘new agenda’. In 1991, the UNDP 
held the Delft conference entitled A Strategy for Water Sector Capacity Building which dealt 
primarily with the need for reform in water institutions. The International Conference on 
W ater and the Environment held by the UN in Dublin in 1992 felt that "it is vital to recognise 
first the basic right o f all human beings to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price" 
(quoted in Lundqvist, 1998;9) and stated the new agenda rather more clearly in what are 
widely referred to as the Dublin principles:
a) Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment.
b) W ater development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels.
c) Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding o f 
water.
d) Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognised as an economic good.
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The water resources policy measures o f Delft and Dublin were endorsed by world leaders at 
1992 UNCED in Rio de Janeiro and were included in the Earth Summit o f 1993 (Le Moigne 
et al, 1994;3). McSweeney (1998;10), summarises Dublin as identifying that water is “to be 
treated as a scarce valuable resource” and that the conference marked the “ introduction o f 
demand management mechanisms” . He also describes Rio as “the most comprehensive 
international environmental and social declaration to date” and as having “equity at its heart”, 
by which he means * intergenerational equity’: that is, not dumping the consequences o f our 
environmental misuse on future generations. Although Rio diluted Dublin it did identify the 
fundamental dilemma in the regulation o f competitive water use: conservation o f water as a 
prerequisite for development versus development threatening water availability (Du Bois, 
1992;1).
Briscoe (1994) succinctly describes the ‘new agenda’ o f the international conferences as “no 
more than the application, to water, o f the great ideas o f our time, namely democracy and the 
market” (quoted in Davies and Sahooly, 1996;9). However, whether the slippery concept o f 
equity at the heart o f  Rio will become the “greatest good to the greatest number o f people” 
(McSweeney, 1998) is questioned in Orwellian style by Allan (1994a;3) when he asks “equity 
for whom” and “on what scale”?
2.3 The Value of Water
2.3.1 The value of water
The value o f water to a man dying o f thirst in the desert is very different to the large negative 
value o f water to the engineer trying to dewater foundations. McSweeney (1998) asserts that 
“things only have a value when their existence affords a utility to some person”. The potential 
for ownership imparts value and value arouses the desire to own. The capacity o f water to 
flow and to dissolve substances which pollute it make it respectively difficult to own and 
urgent to use. Classical (Rogers, 1992;7.14) and neo-classical (Burrill, 1998) economics equate 
value with price. Apart from the simple model o f water having different values to different 
individuals, Burrill distinguishes a societal value for water (ibid.). She discusses many 
‘difficult to price’ aspects o f water. These include the health, sustenance and pleasure aspects 
enjoyed by society as a whole, the ‘knock-on / trickle-down’ value o f water to those 
associated in a secondary way to water (such as food provision, water tanker mechanics etc), 
the future value o f  water and the value to non-users. Allan (1994b;99) comments on the 
failings o f leaders, legislators, officials and engineers to understand the value o f water. Our
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value systems are based on our perceptions, and Rogers (1992;7.27) points out the different 
perceptions o f  water by individuals, as opposed to groups who collectively make decisions 
about future uses o f water. The latter, he suggests, adopt the common social misconception 
that water is a pure public good, whilst the former are more likely to understand water as an 
economic or private good.
Distinguishing between public and private goods (Pearce, 1993;3) is related to their 
subtractability and excludability (World Bank, 1993;81). Subtractability means that if one 
person consumes the good another person cannot, and excludability means how easy or 
difficult it is to prohibit access to the good. Drinking water o f essence is subtractable within 
quality constraints in that it cannot be drunk again without treatment. Similarly, a tanker of 
water is more subtractable and easier to exclude people from than an urban water supply and 
is thus considered more private and less public. The subtractability/ excludability aspect is 
directly related to the natural monopoly (and hence greater economies o f scale) characteristic 
(World Bank, 1993;83, Berkoff, 1994;23) o f  infrastructure-rich, and hence capital 
investment-rich, pieces o f plumbing such as urban water supplies and sewerage systems. This 
lends the plumbing a certain predetermining allocative logic (Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 
1995;204).
Some have said that “water is no longer free anymore” (Delft 1991; 19). O f course, it never 
was, as water auctions in Oman going back to pre-Islamic times (W ilkinson, 1977; 113), and 
many other situations, testify. However, the rainfall-rich, traditionally engineering-orientated, 
North (Ohlsson, 1995;5) is waking up to the fact that water is an economic good (Berkoff, 
1994;21). Its value must also include its opportunity cost (Winpenny, 1994;83, Rogers 
1992;7.15, Berkoff, 1994;21). That is, its price must reflect the lost opportunity for use by 
one potential user when it is used by another. Ideally, the incorporation o f opportunity cost 
should ensure that water gravitates to the highest value use, and, according to Rogers 
(1992;7.15) should reflect ‘willingness-to-pay’(WTP). For many in low-income countries, 
their WTP is a trade off between time spent collecting water and money (Pearce, 1993;78). 
Allan (in prep;5.21) contrasts users’ willingness-to-pay and their capacity-to-afford, where 
“affordable means the price acceptable to current users which, if left unchanged, brings a 
political dividend, and if exceeded generates opposition and dangerous political stress” .
How demand is expressed by users and how it is determined by providers are other major 
questions with which economists and sociologists grapple. Although 2%  o f  disposable 
household income is the rule o f thumb maximum limit for water supply and 5% is
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unacceptable (World Bank quoted in Allan,in prep;5.22), W TP’s o f 8% (Ukundu) or even 10- 
18% (Nigeria) can occur, especially if  bought from vendors (Rogers, 1992;7.20,
Pearce, 1993;78, World Bank, 1993;49), with poorer sectors often paying higher proportions of 
their incomes. The switch to vendors typically reflects the declining reliability o f the piped 
supply (Littlefair,1998), Not that the consumers are willing buyers but are trapped into 
market participation by their predicament (Allan,in prep;5.30). The fact that agencies have 
noted consum ers’ willingness to pay a high price for water and are promoting private sector 
participation in water supply may prove unfortunate for the consumer in the near future 
(Allan,in prep;5.33). In areas o f water shortage, such as Ta’iz, it is argued, principles of 
‘suppressed dem and’ apply, that is people do not purchase simply according to price. 
Similarly, the study o f Mu et al (1990, quoted in Rogers, 1992;7.20) in Kenya demonstrated 
that price and income had little effect on consumption but did reflect the source (which 
usually reflects quality) chosen. Roger’s claim that demand is specified by two numbers; 
quantity and price (1992;7.20) needs correcting to three, so that quality, at least, is included.
2.3.2 D em and m anagem ent
Before discussing demand management, it is worth asking what demand is. M errett (1997;55) 
contrasts the engineer’s concept o f consumption, the economist’s effective demand and the 
user’s concept o f need. Lundqvist (1998), equates demand with purchasing power, suggesting 
demand can be changed by changing the price o f water (price elasticity o f demand, 
Winpenny,1994;76). Rogers (1992;7.20) and Lundqvist (1998) also contrast demand with 
need, asserting that need is “a requirement for water which exists independently o f economic 
or political status and...cannot be manipulated” (ibid.). The more ‘need status’ a product, such 
as water has, the less price elastic and less amenable to demand management it becomes.
Following in the footsteps o f the power industry (Brooks, 1995;46), part o f the water 
industry’s ‘new agenda’ is summarised under the heading ‘demand management’. The ‘old 
agenda’ was perceived as centred on engineering measures to increase supply for anticipated 
future demand driven by changes in population, standard o f living (and expectations), sectoral 
allocation and distribution efficiency (Allan, 1994b;87). Increasing supply to cope with future 
demand is termed ‘supply management’. Demand management, on the other hand is the 
manipulation o f the forces driving demand by “the use o f price, quantitative restrictions, and 
other devices to limit the demand for water” (World Bank, 1993;5). Brooks describes this 
change in approach as an emphasis on end-use rather than on sources o f supply (1995;47). 
Berkoff (1994; 37) defines supply management as activities required to locate, develop and 
manage new sources, and as actions that affect the quantity and quality at the entry point of
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the distribution system. He sees demand management as comprising actions that influence the 
use or wastage o f  water after this point which, ideally, should promote more desirable levels 
and patterns o f  water use.
Although Berkoff (ibid.) points out that supply and demand management roughly separate 
engineering from social and behavioural sciences, there is a problem with the technological 
innovations and distribution efficiency measures as at least some o f these effectively tend to 
increase supply rather than reduce demand, and, as Merrett points out, the estimate o f demand 
is increased if distribution losses are included as part o f  consumption (1997; 12). A solution 
for the urban supply instance is to move B erkoffs supply/demand divide from the entry point 
to the distribution system to the entry point to the private property it serves, which is also the 
public/private watershed on the clean water side.
Other demand management anomalies include the farmer with more land than water. Any 
increases in water use efficiency simply increase the land area he can cultivate, and, 
providing there is a market for his produce, the efficiency measures have effectively 
increased his supply, not reduced his demand. Also, despite Lundqvist’s observation that 
demand management is particularly needed where low efficiency and low-value production 
prevail (1998) there is a greater need to reallocate water from low to high value uses even 
where efficiency is high if we are to avoid being efficiently unsustainable (ibid;9,
Pearce, 1993 ;47).
An assortment o f  demand management devices appear in the literature (W inpenny,1994;42 et 
seq., Lundqvist, 1998, Merrett, 1997;64-65) and may be grouped in various ways e.g.:
a) water market creation and water reallocation to facilitate transfer to higher value 
uses;
b) market incentives such as tariff structures and disposal/pollution charges aimed at 
‘responsible water use’;
c) technological innovations designed to reduce consumption, and related distribution 
efficiency and re-use measures such as leak detection;
d) educational methods such as public awareness campaigns;
e) birth control, or at least, children by choice.
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O f these devices, a) is an allocative efficiency method, whilst the others, in the sense of 
resulting in less demand by the same sector are productive efficiency measures. Aspects o f a) 
and b) are discussed below.
i) Water M arket Creation, Reallocation and Virtual Water
A major facet o f  the demand management portfolio is the development o f water markets 
(W orld Bank, 1993 ;47). Although some deny the significance o f water markets and others 
question their legal viability (Dellapenna,1995;153,Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1995; 178), 
they do exist, and often dw arf their public counterparts (Serageldin,1994;15,
Wilkinson, 1977; 113, Crane, 1994;71). It is not inconceivable that they will, with appropriate 
technological and institutional arrangements, one day operate on an international scale 
(Becker et al, 1996; 19), as the market responds to reallocate from abundance to shortage and 
from low to high value use. Many types o f water market are envisaged (Winpenny,1994;54- 
65, Berkoff, 1994;37), however there are problems involved in establishing them:
a) economic - overcoming the natural monopoly and economies o f scale aspects (World 
Bank 1993;27);
b) physical - moving this bulky material over physical relief;
c) legal - legitimising the transfers; and
d) political and institutional - having the will, and capacity to permit, monitor and 
regulate (Berkoff, 1994;37).
At the institutional level, ‘private sector participation’ (PSP) initiatives in running, or 
becoming, water utilities (Brook-Cowen,1997) may help overcome the failure to see water as 
an economic good which has resulted in the utilities’ “vicious circle o f poor quality and 
unreliable services that result in customers’ unwillingness-to-pay, which, in turn, generates 
inadequate operating funds and a further deterioration in services” (World Bank,1993;9).
Another major method o f demand management is the reallocation o f resources to higher value 
uses, which W inpenny (1994;27) argues reflects a shift in demand (ibid;83). Traditional 
views, based on the tangible evidence to the individual user o f  increased commodity 
production, focus on efficiency o f production. In contrast, Allan (1994a;7) points out that 
efforts should not ju st be made to increase production within a particular use, but that it be 
ascertained as to whether some other use might yield greater returns (measured in monetary 
or livelihood terms). Efficiency gained through reallocation o f water to a higher value use is 
called ‘allocative efficiency’, or ‘more jobs per drop’ as opposed to the traditional
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‘productive efficiency’ or ‘more crop per drop’ (Allan,in prep;5.15). Morton (1994;20) sees 
the only possibility o f allocative efficiency if there is “perfect competition in an undistorted 
market”. He points out that markets are usually distorted. Also, reallocations accrue high 
‘transaction costs’, that is, the time and effort required to inform and establish contracts for 
actors (Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1995;204) and the time and effort used in information 
gathering, bargaining, decision making, monitoring, enforcement and collecting (World Bank, 
1993;47 and Easter, 1991;9). In contrast, supply management measures incur low transaction 
costs, but high production costs (ibid.). For there to be a net gain from any transfer the 
marginal cost o f the water, plus the opportunity costs to the loser plus the transaction costs in 
the new activity must not exceed the costs in the existing use, where costs are measured in 
economic and livelihood terms.
Most significant in terms o f the volume o f water used and the returns to it, is a shift in 
allocation from agriculture to industry (Coopers and Lybrand, 1992; 214). Some might argue 
that the decline in per capita grain production and irrigated areas (Ohlsson, 1995;8) should 
not be exacerbated further by water transfers to industry. However, even the transfer o f at 
least a few percent, o f the 90% o f water currently consumed by agriculture, to industry would 
help countries to earn hard currencies with which they could replace food deficits by 
purchasing staples. Food staples have been termed ‘virtual w ater’ because o f  the water 
needed to grow them. For instance, 1000 tonnes o f  water are required to grow one tonne o f 
wheat (Allan, 1996a; 113). He argues that a country with a water deficit but which uses a 
significant amount o f water in growing food can import the food instead and thus meet its 
water-for-agriculture needs with the virtual water embedded in the imported food. Local 
water is then freed up to be reallocated to higher value uses. Higher value uses can then 
generate the capital needed to buy the food from outside. The low price o f world staples 
means that grain importers have been advantaged. The practical problem o f reallocating bulky 
water (Ohlsson, 1995; 17, World Bank, 1993;84) is thus overcome in the case o f virtual water 
imported in staples, although it remains in the local inter-sectoral water reallocation. One 
problem with depending on virtual water is the lack o f guarantee that virtual water will 
remain cheap. The subsidies on staples exported from the USA and EU, particularly enjoyed 
by Middle Eastern importers for the past 25 years (Allan, 1996a;96,l 13-114) may not last for 
ever, a scenario which haunts the politicians and the consumer. There are already signs o f 
them becoming more expensive.
The main barrier to reallocation policies is political because they fly in the face of:
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a) the food self-sufficiency dogma (Allan, 199212,9,10, and 1994a;6, Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1992;227),
b) entrenched politics (ibid;253, Allan, 1996a;88) and
c) the 'cultural embedment’, symbolism and strategic significance o f agriculture and 
land ownership (Naff, 1991; 116).
The actors subscribing to these attitudes tend to subscribe to all o f them and comprise those 
who stand to loose by reallocation. The actors also tend to be the politically powerful 
(Allan, 1994b; 100), and the attitudes are part o f the ‘social construction o f reality’ which is so 
enduring (Thompson, 1995;27,32). Thus, although policies leading to efficient water use and 
re-use may be lauded by the politicians, allocative means are not discussed because they are 
politically stressful, and the relationship between food and water deficits cannot be debated at 
all (Allan,in prep). Rajeswary (1992) comments that the Yemeni “government strategy is to 
optimise the use o f  limited resources in irrigation and protect aquifers while maximising 
agricultural production”. Yemeni politics both in the North and South before and after 
unification have laid great stress on agricultural self-sufficiency whilst becoming more reliant 
on imported foodstuffs (Varisco, 1991). The ‘simple truth’ o f virtual water meeting the food 
needs and the ‘vital lie’ o f food self-sufficiency, or put another way that water both ‘is’ and 
‘is no t’ an economic good (Allan,in prep;6.1,5.5) are simultaneously faithfully maintained in 
Yemen. Undiscerning listeners and even certain groups (Patai,1976) may swallow the rhetoric 
o f two opposing principles, but to hold to them both at the policy implementation stage is 
impossible. Yemeni reality is the effective subsidy o f irrigation through low diesel prices to 
power the pumps (Ward, 1998). Tariffs on urban water supplies also reflect political and 
equity priorities and are also effectively subsidies. Sound prices send constructive signals and 
subsidised prices destructive signals. The difference between the ‘full’ value o f water, 
economic and environmental and the price paid by the user is a subsidy (Allan,in prep;5.16). 
If difficult decisions about the allocation and management of scarce environmental capital are 
to be made, then the political economy has to be flexible and strong to endure the 
uncomfortable restructuring associated with it (Allan and Karshenas,1996;131, Allan, 1996a; 
77). The potential for reallocation is made more feasible by a diverse and strong economy 
(Allan, in prep;5.19,6.5). Like the fear o f  virtual water drying up or rather getting too 
expensive, the issue o f returns to water may continue to haunt politicians (Allan, 1994b;88).
ii) M arket Incentives and Pollution
M arket incentives to reduce demand for water include the concept o f  marginal cost pricing, 
Rogers gives the classical definition; “marginal cost pricing is the pricing o f water at the cost
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o f supplying an additional unit o f water” (1992;7.28), but he contrasts this with the traditional 
method o f  pricing water, which is to use the historical cost (or average cost, Winpenny,1994; 
89) that is the cost o f  water provision up to this point. The difference can be considerable.
The provision o f the next unit may entail significant capital costs in developing new sources 
and may be therefore much higher than the historical or average cost. Marginal cost pricing is 
seen as providing a mechanism for water conservation and generating revenue where price 
elasticities o f demand are less than one, as they usually are (W inpenny,1994;49,89).
Related to the value o f both water and the environment is pollution. A groundwater or surface 
water pollutant has been defined as any substance whose concentration reaches a level at 
which it interferes with the intended use o f the water (Deason,1991;53). Toxins building up 
in the food chain and water-borne diseases are o f particular concern for health reasons 
(Lundqvist, 1998). Falkenmark and Lundqvist suggest water carries out two functions with 
regard to pollutants; as a diluter and as a transporter (1995; 185). W ater may also react with 
pollutants to produce other forms o f pollutant or break them down into non-polluting 
substances.
When discussing the economics o f water, pollution, almost euphemistically, seems to be 
equated with ‘externalities’ (Rogers, 1992;7.2 1&32, Karshenas,1992;2,6, Pearce, 1993;40). 
The term means that “the unintended real (non-monetary) side effect o f one party's actions on 
another” (in polluting a common resource) “ is ignored in decisions made by the” polluter and 
is thus ‘external’ to him and ‘not his problem ’ (World Bank,1993;6).
The introduction o f water quality standards is a step towards establishing the ‘polluter-pays- 
principle’ (PPP). However, in practice, rather than charging for damages caused, standards 
are set according to the technology o f water treatment methods available. Two problems 
emerge:
a) polluters are allowed to pollute up to a level, that is, pollution has been sanctioned, and
b) there are no mechanisms for reimbursing the damaged party (Pearce, 1993; 107,
Rogers, 1992;7.21).
Although marketable pollution permits have been suggested, the pervasiveness o f this 
‘missing m arket’ and the absence o f the necessary legal and institutional frameworks in the 
Middle East (Karshenas,1992;7, Berkoff, 1994;37) result in the PPP primarily existing in 
rhetoric only (Lundqvist, 1998). Were industries to face pollution charges, however, owners
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would be given an incentive to decrease their water consumption per unit o f  production 
(W orld Bank, 1993; 12) and industrial water re-use (Ohlsson,!995;9) would be encouraged.
Table 2.1 summarises the relevance and application o f the main aspects o f demand 
management at various scales. The aspects are listed in approximate order o f increasing 
contribution to efficient water use:
Type o f 
Provision
Private Community State International
Example Tanker, bottled,
treatment
company
Rural supply /
irrigation
scheme
Urban piped supply Trade in grain
Water Market 
Creation
M O ST
RELEV A N T
Relevant, but 
does not 
necessarily 
reduce 
consumption
Most Relevant but 
Larger Political, 
Legal and 
Institutional 
Problems
In the future?
M arket
Incentives
RELEV A N T Partial
Relevance
Relevant but some 
Monopoly, Legal 
and Institutional 
Problems
Reallocation Partial
Relevance
Relevant M OST
RELEVANT,
M O RE
PRO BLEM S
In the future?
Virtual W ater Least Relevant M OST
PRO BLEM S
M O ST
RELEV A N T
Family
Planning
Least Relevant Can be 
Provided
M OST
RELEVA N T BUT 
UNSANCTIONED
BOLD = Areas most amenable to change
The table suggests that the most relevant water demand management measures lie on a top- 
left to bottom-right axis. As the scale increases (from left to right) the measures which would 
have greater potential impact are more relevant. However, the problems in implementing 
them also increases and their degree o f political acceptability decreases.
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2.4 Politically Deep W ater
M oilinga (1998;30, after Kerkvliet,1990;l 1) identifies the water control aspects o f  irrigation 
practices as examples o f politically contested resource use. Where the capability to secure 
control over water depends on the agency o f  others, this power over others becomes 
domination (Giddens,1976;l 11). In a water-scarce region such as Yemen, control o f water, in 
terms o f its allocation, is open to political contest, and is not simply a matter o f allocation to 
the highest economic bidder. Allan contrasts the opinions o f those who think ‘water is an 
economic resource’ with those who think it is not (in prep). Those who are supposed to 
promote a rational view o f the simple truth o f  reliance on virtual water (including economists 
and scientists) are placed in the former category (ibid.;chapter 5). Those who are more 
vulnerable to the opinions o f their electorate and/or their party (politicians) and who, for food 
security reasons, pursue the irrational, ideological (Manzungu,1999;13) vital lie o f  self- 
sufficiency are placed in the latter (Allan in prep;chapter 6). Allan (ibid.) concludes that 
although ‘water flows up-hill to money’, it will flow further up-hill to power (Reisner,1986) 
and that economic concepts do not have a significant input to the discourse and are only o f 
potential rather than immediate significance (Allan, in prep;5.26,5.32),
2.4.1 Environmental Politics
Redclift (1987;37) identifies a third group who also deny that water is an economic resource: 
the environmental moralists. On a ‘green basis’ they argue the protection o f the environment 
for its own sake, irrespective o f its elusive economic valuation.
Political ecology, the politics o f ecological change (Bryant, 1991) or the analysis o f how 
unequal power relations are often linked to conflicts over access to, and the use of, diverse 
environmental resources (Bryant, 1998) combines the concerns o f ecology and political 
economy (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). Eckersley analyses green concerns as ranging from 
anthropocentric to ecocentric emphases (1992;8). He traces the shift in attitude from one o f 
pursuit o f  equity in the distribution o f environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’. Next, the 
survivalists see the existence o f humanity threatened (Atkinson’s starting point o f political 
ecology (1991 ;4)), and prescribe the surrender o f individual choice to a powerful external 
decision maker. Finally, those who promote the abandonment o f the necessity o f standard o f 
living improvements at the expense o f the environment are termed emancipationists 
(Eckersley,1992;9-17). The need to do something about declining environmental quality is 
assumed, and the key issue appears to be whether authoritarianism from above or self­
limitation from below are the appropriate mechanism (ibid,24).
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M ost theorists point out the new political coalitions which specific environmental issues have 
brought together (eg.Hajer,1995;12) however the political left give more emphasis to the 
social issues affected by the loss o f environmental quality (Atkinson, 1991;6) and to 
causation, including, in the developing world, the legacy o f colonialism (Bryant, 1998;9), than 
do others. In the area o f North Yemen being considered, the colonial impact on water 
resources is negligible, however the role o f sub-politics, viz. the non-political realms o f 
decision-making, combined with the effects o f local micro-powers are highly significant 
(Hajer,1995;39). Although these local Yemeni politics have been described as the ‘local 
anarchy preventing 'rational' development interventions’, Vincent goes on to suggest that 
‘politics is not anarchy but the art o f  the possible in the cultures, economies and environments 
concerned’ (1990).
Atkinson asserts that all greens focus on manufacturing industry as the target for 
‘disarmament’ but that ecosocialists see industry more as a symptom o f the greater disease: 
capitalism (1991 ;5). In either case the call for the Middle East to focus on industrial 
production to overcome its water crisis by Allan and Karshenas, and the environmental 
Kuznets curve theorists (discussed in section 5.6) contrasts with the green philosophy. Allan 
(in prep;6.17) observes that the sectoral reallocation of water involved in industrial 
production is indeed a highly political act carrying a political price which the policy makers, 
whatever their political hue, may not be willing to pay. The inherent tension between 
environmental sustainability and economic development is explored in the conceptual 
frameworks described in section 2.7.6,
2.4.2 The Role of Knowledge or Information
The problem with environmental knowledge is that it has for too long been solely the domain 
o f scientific (or economic) experts (Hajer,1995;10) to the exclusion o f the affected layman 
and the political decision-maker. Scientists see themselves as the guardians o f objective truth 
(Atkinson, 1991;51). Since difficult decisions regarding the allocation o f environmental 
resources have to be made, and power and knowledge are synonymous (Bryant, 1998; 13 and 
Foucault in Atkinson, 1991;61) the position scientists find themselves in represents a shift in 
power from those ‘in the dark’ - the politicians, to those ‘in the know’ -  the experts. The 
users o f knowledge are left to contend over scientific interpretations and meanings. Vincent 
(1990) identifies four groups o f water knowledge monopolisers and manipulators in Yemen: 
oral historians, water users, those who allocate and those who adjudicate. The last three are 
the actors in the study o f T a’iz,
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‘One-and-only-Truth’ science causes us to re-examine ‘how we know’, particularly in the 
context o f  the North-South dialectic. Benton and Redclift (in H ajer,1995; 14) ask ‘do we share 
an understanding o f the global environment in the same way as we ‘share’ the globe?’. 
Atkinson (1991 ;89) questions whether our methods o f observation and evaluation yield 
correct models and suggests that science is a ‘cultural project’ (ibid.;51), that is, is influenced 
by the cultural and social filters o f those who ask the questions, determine the methodologies, 
select the observations, interpret the results and frame the conclusions for culturally filtered 
taskmasters, - all with an eye on where the money for the next research project will come 
from (Bryant, 1998; 13). The importance o f Southern indigenous knowledge and the need for 
‘hybridity’ with Western scientific knowledge is noted by Bryant (1998; 14).
In a very different context to the Yemen (acid rain in the UK and the Netherlands) Hajer 
(1995) traces the route o f an environmental issue from awareness o f it to policy intervention. 
He notes the initial need for an environmental emblem or rallying point that should preferably 
be observable, although most recent ones (such as acid rain) are not. He then notes how the 
observations have to be perceived as a calamity, and get reported, though the interpretation 
may be undermined by nagging doubts o f  scientific controversy. At this stage the problem has 
left the locality, left the oral medium (probably to a written one) and possibly been converted 
into a different language. Unless we are careful, the interests o f the illiterate, Arabic speaking 
local farmer who is most affected by the calamity may have been lost in technically accurate, 
socially insensitive reporting (ibid;23) and his power to correct the interpretation is nil. If  the 
report o f  the calamity suits the mileage-seeking o f both the current political ‘discourse’ 
(Foucault, 1971), whose contributors may not have the free will to take a stand, and the whims 
o f the media, a press conference may follow and a political issue may be created 
(Hajer, 1995;20). The emblem may not be the most important and it may not survive the 
passage to political issue status. If  it did, however, there are also hurdles to policy 
implementation, since policies may not be designed to address problems but rather vice versa 
(ibid; 15). Atkinson should not be surprised to note the fatal procrastination between 
observation and corrective measure considering the pitfalls o f this faltering sequence 
(1991;7), though non-applied knowledge is certainly useless if it remains so.
2.4.3 Belief Systems
Those sets o f  shared beliefs and convictions about how the universe is that sustain and justify 
moral judgem ents have been dubbed ‘cultural biases’ by the cultural theory school 
(Douglas, 1978, Thompson, 1988;62 and 1995;27) and ‘belief systems’ by Allan (in prep). The
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latter (ibid;5.18) suggests that traditional perceptions determine both the value o f water and 
its cultural significance. For Middle Eastern societies with a rich religious heritage, the 
‘inspired w ord’ holds great power over their adherents. With 482 references to water and 215 
to rivers or streams in the Bible and also 60 and 50 references respectively in the Q ur’an, 
strong traditional views should be expected. Many also point out the centrality o f  water in the 
economic and ritualistic senses in the desert-derived shari’a (Mallat,1995;3). Irrespective o f 
the position o f the shari’a amongst Islamic legal scholars, the man-in-the mosque (and many 
other societies) expects:
a) water, like rainfall, to be free
b) water to be provided by the state, but to have no obligation regarding its efficient use 
or good neighbourliness regarding its disposal
c) national food self-sufficiency
d) to procreate and, finances permitting, increase the potential to procreate by having 
more wives
e) his heart to remain in the soil (Dresch,1989)
Despite A llan’s comments to the contrary (in prep;6.14), there is a prioritisation o f water 
allocation in the shari’a, and partly because o f this he is correct in concluding that Yemeni 
political leadership will not be able to address environmentalist or economist calls for 
reallocation o f water. This call is weakened by the influence o f traditional belief systems o f 
the land-owning power base o f that leadership.
2.5 Water Rights and Legal Frameworks
The rules of the game of water allocation may be divided into two aspects; the rules o f the 
game and the players (Johnson, 1996; 1,2). This section discusses the former and the next the 
latter.
2.5.1 What is law for?
Although water law has the task o f clarifying and protecting water rights, viz. the right to 
returns to water and the right to change the w ater’s form, substance and location, Lundqvist 
(1998) also identifies two contradictory purposes in those rights: one o f commercial concern 
and one o f social equity (including third party interests, World Bank, 1993;48). Other 
purposes o f water law might include: encouragement o f efficiency o f use and, related to it,
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environmental protection, (Du Bois,1992;7 and Karshenas,1992;18). Legislation is also 
meant to provide the basis for the operational and regulatory activities o f government 
(B erkoff, 1994;40).
2.5.2 Who owns the water; Private, Common or State?
To address these different roles demanded from the legal framework, Dellapenna gives a 
helpful model (1995). From the history o f American water law development he distinguishes 
private, common and public property. Initially American law treated water as private property 
under the principle o f ‘natural flow ’ theory whereby any riparian could use flowing water so 
long as it did not affect downstream users. In order to encourage resource development in mid 
19th century in the Eastern USA, the law began to treat water as common property under the 
principle o f ‘reasonable use’. More recently, the California drought o f 1987-1992 resulted in 
the establishment o f  a water bank, which, rather than being a market for water, Dellapenna 
asserts, was state intervention effectively transferring ownership to the state as the sole buyer 
and seller.
Each system has its drawbacks. The private system easily results in a redistribution o f wealth 
and rigidity o f  use and allocation (ibid; 155). The communal system can also lead to a 
redistribution o f wealth (Du Bois, 1992; 11) and makes sources particularly vulnerable to over­
exploitation. Because excluding people from access lies between difficult and prohibited, 
each user seeks’to maximise his benefit (for instance by digging a well), with minimum cost 
to him self (e.g. dropping the water level as a result o f his pumping only). As use expands to 
the limit o f the resource, failure results. This is termed a ‘Tragedy o f the Commons’ after the 
work o f Hardin (1968) in which “everyone’s property is no one’s property” (Rogers, 1992;3.1) 
and certainly, no one’s responsibility.
Dellapenna (1995; 159) considers putting one’s trust in the state to administer water allocation 
justly through its, admittedly imperfect, experts to be a better model than a market system due 
to the general absence o f the latter (in his perception, though this last assumption will be 
questioned later). However, Du Bois (1992;11) questions whether state allocation o f water 
might be vulnerable to the powerful, which could result in a similar redistribution o f wealth 
as in the other models. Although Dellapenna seems to downplay this possibility (1995; 160) 
there is perhaps a difference in its likelihood, or extent, between his perspective o f the USA 
and the situation in other countries where the elected are less accountable to their electorate 
(or at least to the media). The literature is replete with examples o f  nepotism and other forms 
o f corruption in the government’s allocation and management o f  water resources in other
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countries such as Nepal (McSweeny,1998), Egypt (Radwan,1994;3), Iran 
(M cLachlan,1988;71), Africa (Du Bois, 1992; 11) and indeed Yemen (Vincent, 1991;209).
2,5.3 Water Laws of Islamic Countries - Shari’a, Custom or State?
The existence o f three sources o f water law in Arab countries (shari’a, customary and state 
laws) demonstrates an interesting parallel with Dellapenna’s private, common or state water 
ownership trichotomy.
M allat (1995;4) summarises the main tenets o f the shari’a (Islamic law) regarding water:
a) Shafa (drink) - Water is a gift o f God and is therefore communal for humans and 
livestock.
b) Shirb (drink) - Retention, containment or distribution o f water creates private 
ownership rights.
c) Rights o f  prior appropriation and distribution o f surplus.
d) Liability attaching to misuse (e.g. pollution) or withholding water.
W ater resources are collective and only when contained, mobilised or conveyed can they 
become private (ibid.), but for most Yemeni applications, it is only at the point o f acquisition 
that water takes on any value. Thus the communal aspect o f the shari’a has been pointed out 
to be rather minimalistic (Vincent, 1990), Also, the shari’a, or more accurately the 
inventiveness o f its interpreters, cannot handle the innovations in the means o f access to 
water (ibid.). The current interpretation on boreholes and dug wells is that they are 
receptacles. That is, sink a well and the water is yours. However, groundwater does flow, 
hence a well is not a receptacle but simply a window on the resource. Only when a means o f 
removing the water is in place is there the potential for water moving from the communal to 
the private domain. The result in Yemen is that valuable resources become private and less 
useful/inaccessible resources become common or open access (ibid.). A complication with 
interpretation o f the shari’a alluded to above is the existence of different Islamic schools o f 
law. There are several for each religious sect. Two main ones recognise ijma' (consensus) but 
not qiya (deduction by analogy) Vincent (1991).
Mallat (1995;4) and Coopers and Lybrand (1992;240) note the incorporation o f shari’a 
principles in the Ottoman M ajalla o f 1858 which still applies in many Arab countries. British, 
and particularly French, colonialism brought additional water laws to many countries in the 
MENA region. These sources o f law all invest the state with original right (Mallat, 1995;4, 
Berkoff 1994;41). The original right o f the state to water is known as ‘m ubah’ or free 
property which cannot be appropriated, and musha’ is a similar category belonging
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communally to a village or tribe (Mallat, 1995;6). W aqf is a category o f land and water 
ownership which is the Islamic equivalent o f mortmain or inalienable tenure, designating the 
property to the specific use it was designated (Wilkinson, 1977; 113). It is often bequested to 
the mosque, sometimes for education or the poor, and sometimes may become state owned. 
The allocative methodologies o f water measurement are usually by time, and, on the basis of 
a hadith, sometimes by volume (ibid; 109, 103).
Customary law (*urf) has operated alongside the shari’a (Mallat, 1995; 11) and, at least in 
Oman, is aimed at protecting the essential needs o f the community where customary law often 
supersedes the shari’a (Wilkinson, 1977; 121). In countries where the ability o f the state to 
control water allocation is weak and where there is such a rich heritage o f existing shari’a and 
‘urf ,the legal position o f state intervention may be rather tenuous (Mallat, 1995;7~8). Vincent 
goes so far as to assert that the shari’a does not include the concept o f public domain (1990).
The French cadastre system, the application o f Islamic inheritance laws and local custom all 
permit and may even lead to a tendency to separate water ownership from land ownership 
(Coopers and Lybrand,1992;242, Wilkinson, 1977; 105, 212), as it also does in non-Islamic 
countries (Du Bois,1992;9). The divorce o f land and water may result in more efficient use o f 
water, allowing the water to gravitate to higher value uses (ibid., 7).
Iran provides an example o f the three types o f ownership. M cLachlan (1988;90) points out 
that the technological intervention o f the well and pump led to water becoming private 
whereas the qanat had always been communally owned, and the development o f major water 
undertakings such as dams and irrigation schemes were state owned. The importance o f 
customary water rights in Yemen are brought out by Caponera (1973) and Al-Eryani et al 
(1995). The most significant local study solely dealing with these issues is o f Lahj 
(Maktari,1971) and studies which mention them include Wadi Dahr (Mundy,1989 and 1995), 
Wadi Zabid (TESCO,1971) and the Hadramawt (Serjeant, 1964).
2.5.4 Law Enforcement and Water Rights versus Rights to Water
Although legal models may provide filters through which researchers try to interpret field 
observations o f allocative practices, the ability to enforce the law is much more relevant to 
locals, at least in Yemen (Vincent, 1991, Coopers and Lybrand,1992;231). It is suggested that 
the need to resort to legal measures is the prerogative o f the those who feel they are deprived 
of rights, in particular the downstream user (Dellapenna, 1994, Johnson, 1996;9), whilst
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upstream riparians may prefer the status quo, as noted even on the international scale in the 
case o f  Egypt (Allan, 1996c;112).
Lundqvist (1998;Table 2) makes an interesting comparison between what he terms ‘water 
rights5 and ‘rights to w ater’. The former he conceives as a contract o f  formal rules and 
regulations which define duties and rights to benefits and do not imply free access, but still 
cater for third party interests. In contrast, rights to water are perceived as an “unconditional 
right to demand water services and the authorities/public sector has the duty to make sure that 
their rights are being met” . Lundqvist argues that the latter is a moral argument or attitude 
with very unclear obligations on the part o f the user, and where the providers retain a strong 
control over supply. This ‘rights to w ater’ model is closer to the modern urban water supply 
where water is supposed to be free to have, use, pollute and dispose, but where these 
freedoms are only partly enjoyed by the poor (ibid.). Through these contrasting perspectives, 
Lundqvist underlines the need to re-couple water use responsibilities to rights. Whether the 
tension between the ‘water rights’ and ‘rights to water’ lobbies coincides with the supplier- 
consumer divide will be examined in the case o f  Ta’iz.
Table 2.2: Some of the principles and examples o f water rights mentioned above may be 
categorised approximately as:
Ownership Private Common State
User Individual / Group Small Communities Public
modus operandi 
Johnson, 1996;6
Capital Exchange Customary (viz.: non- 
market)
Authority and 
Coercion
Law Basis USA 
Dellapenna, 1995
Natural Flow Reasonable Use State Intervention
Shari’a Provision shirb shafa Original Right
Yemeni Legal 
Framework
shari’a* 
(Islamic Law)
‘urf* (Customary Law) 
and musha’
State Intervention 
(Also: Mubah/Waqf)
Yemeni
Application
Tubewells? /
Bottling Treatm ent/ 
Tankers
Traditional Agriculture Urban Supply
Iranian examples 
Wilkinson, 1977
Well Qanat Government Dam
Drawbacks Wealth Reallocation 
and Inequity
Tragedy of the Commons, 
Wealth Reallocation and 
Inequity
M isappropriation by 
the Powerful
* Some overlap, see text.
Bromley (1986;597-8) identifies a fourth type o f resource, not ownership, termed open 
access, where ‘everybody’s access is nobody’s property’. He distinguishes open access from 
common property pointing out that the latter has claims to its use, whilst open access does
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not, asserting that there is no property in an open access situation. Other definitions do not 
make this distinction (Ostrom,1986;604). Although ‘common’ may aptly describe easily 
tangible irrigation schemes, fugitive groundwater is not so tangible to its users and is a more 
‘open access’ resource, characterised by unrestricted entry and unregulated use (ibid.;605). 
Bromley prefers the term ‘regime’ to property/resource, since it is the form o f management 
(really institutions) that characterises them (1986;594-5).
2.6 Institutions
2.6.1 Types of Institution
Some authors use the terms institution and organisation interchangeably, or make 
organisations a subset o f institutions (Berkoff, 1994;40), whilst others are more rigid in their 
definitions. Johnson (1996; 1,2), using a sporting illustration to clarify the difference, defines:
a) institutions: the rules o f the game (the formal rules, laws, regulations, informal 
constraints, behavioural norms, conventions) as opposed to:
b) organisations: the players, actors or groups o f individuals taking part.
The latter are termed institutional systems by Coopers and Lybrand (1992; 105). This study 
uses ‘rules, laws, behavioural norms, conventions, institutions or regulations’ for Johnson’s 
‘institutions’, and ‘organisations, institutions, players or actors’ for his ‘organisations’. The 
meaning o f institutions in this study (as with most others) will have to be determined from the 
context. Although this is unacceptable to the purist, it seems to concur with the understanding 
o f most readers, some of whom may have skimmed past this paragraph.
A major debate analyses the roles and relationships o f the state, society and the array o f 
formal and informal institutions. Cowen, distinguishes formal and informal ‘institutions’, on 
the basis o f the clarity o f their ownership and control rights, the former having more precise 
ones than the latter (1994; 1). Apart from a few anarchical cases, the social control o f states 
and societies over their people can be placed on a spectrum from ‘strong states’ and ‘weak 
societies’ (such as many late twentieth-century Northern countries) to ‘weak states’ and 
‘strong societies’ (Migdal, 1988; 15). The latter describes many Southern countries such as 
those in Africa with a “personalised, fragmented power structure” (Therkildsen, 1988; 10.2) 
and could include Yemen.
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Migdal defines a strong state as one with “a high capability to extract, penetrate, regulate and 
appropriate” (1988; 15). The state is described as one where, by coercion, leadership follows 
its own desires, establishes agencies and staffs them to carry out the function o f raising taxes 
and armies, and developing courts in order to shift economic, territorial and judicial control to 
the state. People are coerced into compliance to, then participation with, and ultimately 
legitimation o f the state (Migdal, 1988; 18,32). He uses M yrdal’s (1968) definition o f soft or 
weak states as “ones in which governments require extraordinarily little o f  their citizens, and 
obligations that do exist are enforced inadequately, if at all” (ibid; 18). Strong statehood and 
strong society appear to be mutually exclusive, that is, the scale really spans from state 
control to society control.
It is suggested that whether a country can (or, dare we ask, should) move towards stronger 
state control depends on the capability o f the state or society to provide survival needs for its 
people and also on its right to rule (Migdal, 1988; 10,28,30). The forces pushing towards 
stronger statehood lie in the state’s domestic credibility/legitimacy as revealed in the 
international arena (ibid;21) and include the state’s relationships with potential outside 
benefactors (ibid;40) and enemies (ibid;24). These forces are perhaps weaker in Yemen than 
in many countries, but ebb and flow with Yemen’s prominence in international affairs. 
Another issue in the Yemeni context is whether donors are prepared to work with focal 
institutions outside o f specific bureaucratic structures (Vincent, 1991) and, perhaps more 
importantly, whether the central Yemeni government would allow them to. Increasing 
environmental degradation, it is suggested, will also loom larger as a factor demanding state 
intervention.
Different models are put forward regarding the role of the state and society in running its 
peoples’ affairs. New Institutional Economics (NIE) gives the state a significant role, 
particularly as referee (Johnson, 1996;4), whilst Common Pool Resources (CPR) theory 
lessens that role (ibid;8). Social capital theory suggests that whilst vertical networks o f social 
interaction are based on hierarchy and mistrust, forming a poor base for allocating scarce 
resources, horizontal networks based on equitable membership and common understanding 
(Lam, 1994; 16,38, Ostrom, 1999; 197-9) promote co-operation, civic society and are more 
accepting o f government control (Johnson, 1996; 12-14). The resistance to state control lies 
with chiefs o f  families, ethnic groups and religious organisations (Migdal, 1988;28,30), so 
prominent in Yemen, who question the state’s right and capability to rule.
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When it comes to the realities o f water allocation and management in the Middle East and in 
Yemen in particular, although there is a need for a strong state if reallocation is to be directed 
from that quarter (Feitelson and Allan, 1998; 1,3), public debate is rare (Mollinga,1998;263), 
and parliamentary tradition is weak to non-existent (Mallat, 1995 ;7). Society is therefore 
going to continue to play a major role and we can expect water policy initiatives from the 
centre to be resisted at medium and local levels (ibid;9). Vincent (1991) suggests that in the 
rural areas in Yemen, the role o f non-traditional local institutions is unclear and their absence 
o f authority deprives them o f meaning. Local non-traditional institutions can also become 
prey to traditional inequitable ones if local powerful families become strongly represented on 
councils and do not have dispassionate interests in water development (ibid.).
It is suggested that the balance o f roles between state and societal institutions in water 
allocation and management problems are primarily related to their scale and function.
2.6.2 A Question of Scale
At the local scale, Bromley (1986;596-7) identifies basic or ‘primary decision units’ (PDU’s), 
noting that the very essence o f common is that more than one PDU is involved. When uniting 
together for management o f water resources under a common property regime, the PDU’s 
form a resource decision unit (RDU), the largest o f which forms the upper limit o f ‘local’ 
(Mahdi, 1986; 192). In the Middle East, water related problems appear to become more 
solvable as the number o f actors is reduced (Cowen, 1994;6). State interventions are 
considered inappropriate at the micro-scale, and tend to undermine pre-existing institutional 
arrangements (Johnson, 1996;5). The existence o f central institutions can even offer an escape 
route from the demands o f traditional institutions and undermine communal responsibilities 
(Johnson, 1996;23) as it did in Nile Delta irrigation management (Radwan,1994;62). The local 
indigenous clan system can also work against village community interest 
(Wilkinson, 1977 ;216).
CPRs become pressured particularly by population growth, mobile populations, poor 
governance, and market expansion (Johnson, 1996; 11). These trends, so typical o f Yemen 
today, threaten CPRs which survive better where decisions involve a ‘smallish and stable 
community’ (ibid;7). If the problems are bigger than local, or the cause-effect relationship o f 
proposed or existing changes are not obvious to the ‘man in the field’, then for CPR theory to 
work and conflicting parties to exercise mutual trust essential for resolution, the activities and 
motives o f the larger broker, or referee, to which they must resort must be transparent 
(ibid;9). However, they rarely are. In Yemen, even local development bodies (LDA’s) with
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local representatives were emblems o f imposition by the state and were typically suspected by 
locals o f  corruption (Swanson, 1985, Vincent, 1991). It is suggested that the institutional 
difficulties o f water allocation and management are felt most acutely in micro-macro linkages 
(Lam,1994;289) o f the middle ground between local (CPR theory relevant) and national (NIE 
theory relevant) state control.
The scaling up and mobilising o f local, societal, institutions in horizontal relationships to 
regional level needs facilitating (Johnson, 1996; 17) so that stakeholders meet (Falkenmark and 
Lundqvist, 1995;205), however, if there is no increase in the number o f decision makers 
(U phoff et al,1990;31) scaling up also increases the principal-agent problems outlined below. 
Another possibility, at least in theory, is the scaling down of state agencies which could help 
by respecting and helping maintain the autonomy o f existing (local) institutions 
(Johnson, 1996;8). In reality, conflict resolution in the South takes place in the context, not o f 
state rule, but in the multifarious hierarchy o f nested jurisdictions and web societies that 
characterise them (Migdal, 1988;39, Johnson, 1996;8). Conflicts over water in Yemen are 
commonplace, and although devastating, they can be the means whereby groups can 
overcome inappropriate or ‘unjust* allocations and may improve interaction and respect 
(Vincent, 1990). The plurality o f  institutions in Yemen, state and local, may offer the villager 
more options in conflict resolution (ibid.).
2.6.3 A Question of Function
Apart from scale, the second major determinant o f the usefulness o f state or local, formal or 
informal institutions in water management is to do with their operational, regulatory and 
planning functions. Institutional arrangements have been described as the “transmission gears 
between policy objectives and field-level performance*’ (Guggenheim, 1991 ;2 1) or the 
“mediating activity between potential and actual performance” (DISWC,1993;3). A bundle of 
principles and measures occupy current thinking regarding the roles and functions o f central / 
local, government agency / stakeholder, formal / informal, and public / private institutions in 
water management. These principles include the integration o f local participation in 
management, privatisation and decentralisation (ibid;8).
Participation
The concept o f ‘the government borehole5 village supply (Carl Bro International, 1990) 
captures the problem o f lack o f ‘ownership5 o f facilities which so easily characterises 
unsustainable development. Many think that the involvement o f the informal, local 
stakeholders via indigenous (perhaps even newly created) institutions is the solution.
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However, incentives to participate depend on the indigeneity o f the local institutional context 
(Cowen,1994;5, Lam,1994;308). Coward specifies the involvement at the level o f ‘property 
relationships’ that must be created in the community so that facilities become owned by those 
responsible for their continuance (1986). Practically, and traditionally, community 
participation is perceived as investment o f resources (information, money, labour) which are 
made through non-formal institutions at a local level (Cowen,1994;3). However, stakeholder 
participation must also include decision making if resources are to be considered owned. The 
name o f the decision making forum might be ‘water user association’, or similar, and its role 
may be multi-functional (effectively local government) or a single (e.g. domestic water 
supply) function organisation (Uphoff,1986;89). Guggenheim notes the latter usually have the 
highest rates o f user satisfaction, long-term sustainability and cost recovery (1991;22). In the 
discussion as to whether stakeholder participation can play a significant role in water 
resource management Cowen contrasts ‘participation optimists’ who believe non-formal 
institutions can transmit community demands and mobilise resources commitments in an 
effective manner, and ‘participation pessimists’ who favour legal reforms to improve the 
performance o f formal institutions and so do not need to rely on non-formal institutions 
(1994;26). Improvements involving the commercialisation o f the existing institutions seek to 
reverse the causes o f weak institutions listed above, so that performance indicators show an 
improvement. Measures include management incentives and greater financial autonomy for 
branches (Coopers and Lybrand, 1993;Appendix 1;8). These measures are currently being 
implemented in Yemen (Davies and Sahooly, 1996).
W hether non-formal institutions can succeed where the formal ones have not or cannot 
(Cowen, 1994;2) is related to three problems; the tendency for water to be treated as a public 
good and be prone to free rider behaviour, principal-agent problems o f  the ‘elected’ agent or 
representative looking after their own interests rather than those o f their ‘electorate’, and 
problems o f preference aggregation, that is, how the representative can truly reflect the sum 
of the ‘votes’ o f his ‘electorate’ (ibid;4-5). Because the scaling up o f water management 
discussion beyond the very localised encourages principal-agent abuses, Cowen thinks it may 
be better to switch to improving the formal institutions. This may be a backward step, 
however, as the development o f stakeholder participation can be a valid water management 
goal in itself (Therkildsen,1988;61). The day when development changes from top-down to 
bottom-up agendas and recipients become the subject as well as the object o f  development 
has not yet dawned (Serageldin,1994;32).
Privatisation and Decentralisation
Centralised institutions have been characterised by bureaucratic cumbersomeness and slow 
response but also by good potential for co-ordination and integration. On the other hand, 
decentralised institutions have the potential to be flexible and specialised but prone to poor 
co-ordination and a redundancy o f functions (Guggenheim, 1991;21). He stresses that we 
should recognise that the private sector is usually less concerned about equity, institutional 
issues and environment than the public sector, and that the handover o f water management 
functions to the private sector must address which functions to hand over and which not 
(ibid;22). Berkoff suggests that policy, allocation and environment are a government function 
(Berkoff, 1994;43) and Feitelson and Haddad considered monitoring and resource data base 
as top priority government functions in jo in t management of the West Bank aquifers 
(1998;Table 2). The World Bank (1997 report in Hildyard, 1998;39) encourages weak states 
to establish a foundation o f law, maintain macroeconomic stability, invest in basic social 
services and infrastructure and protect the environment and the vulnerable.
It is suggested that markets do not function without institutions (ibid;42, Lundqvist,1998). 
More specifically, this is not true o f the water markets o f Yemen in terms o f formal, visible, 
institutions, however, informal institutions, although essentially invisible to the observer 
(Varisco,1983), are present in functioning markets. For equity and environment to be 
addressed in a water market situation, the World Bank suggests that some form o f institution 
retaining regulatory and allocative jurisdiction, plus the legal framework necessary, must be 
in place (1993;48).
2.6.4 Institutional paths to more jobs and crops per drop
Network Management
The obligation to provide for the w orld’s water needs through sustainable development o f the 
resource underlines the importance o f providing the right economic signals to abstractors and 
users so that water is allocated to higher value uses. Many of the measures discussed require 
an institutional framework which will help these policies to become reality. De Bruin and ten 
Heuvelhof suggest that the three characteristics o f stakeholders; their differences, their 
independent nature but their mutual dependencies, form the opportunity for the government to 
steer networks o f stakeholders towards desired water management goals (1995, described in 
Hansma and Hermans, 1997;Appendix 2). However, the theory o f network management may 
lose a little relevance at the local level in weak states, such as Yemen, where there is little 
recognition o f a government role (Vincent, 1991). At the national level o f  states which lack a 
record o f open policy discussion, it must be asked ‘who steers the government?’
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Institutional and Policy Reform
A second path o f institutional and policy reform in the change-resistant M iddle East region is 
equally tortuous. Steenbergen (1996; 17,18,22) distinguishes first order transaction costs o f 
monitoring and enforcement functions o f institutions (mentioned in section 2.3.2) from 
second order transactional costs involved in transforming those institutions. The enabling 
factors or pressures for institutional change include democratisation, urbanisation, 
industrialisation, pressures from outside agencies, environmental degradation and, more 
importantly, the awareness o f the latter (Coopers and Lybrand, 1993; Appendix 1;20). 
Democratisation may not help the reform process. Kennedy comments that if Californian 
politicians were to vote for raising water rates above charges for service they would 
jeopardise their jobs (1991; 16), confirming that the role of politicians is to ensure their own 
survival (Migdal, 1988;23). As a consequence public decision makers do not like to address 
water allocation (Easter, 1991;9). Regarding the importance o f public, and particularly 
politician, awareness o f water resources problems in promoting allocative efficiency policies, 
Berkoff observes that, in practice, water reallocation does not occur by legislation but in 
response to events (1994;42). These events, typically water shortages and crises can provide 
‘windows o f opportunity5 or ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon,1984, Feitelson and A llan ,1998, 
Johnson,1996;24-25, Mollinga, 1998;241,263) such as those in California and Israel (Allan 
and Karshenas, 1996; 130) when policy entrepreneurs can promote policy change. However, 
both Allan (in prep) and Redclift (1987;7) point out that institutional change is slow to too 
slow respectively. Steenbergen cites the high second order transactional cost o f institutional 
change as a restraint (1996;203), but (Coopers and Lybrand assert that resistance to 
institutional reform can be changed with information (1993; 13). However there are some 
principal-agent problems:
1. Communication
There is a basic problem of hermeneutics; what do the words o f each party mean to the
other?, and, if overseas donors are involved, what if language gets in the way? 
(Clammer,1984;83). This problem occurred in East Ugandan tribes where there was no 
concept of, and no facility in the language for health, only for lack o f disease. This made
preventative medicine a very difficult concept to communicate (Carl Bro 
International, 1990;4.10). An agent ‘I know better than my principal5 attitude can occur and
indigenous existing knowledge (Chambers and Carruthers,1986;2) can also be overlooked by 
developers due to communication problems.
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2. Participation, Ownership and Equity
There are informational needs associated with affiliating with an institution (Johnson, 1996;9) 
and informational needs in trusting its decisions. Measurement leads to information and 
knowledge resulting in power to the one who possesses it (Rondinelli,1983;6). Whether 
information, such as water quality and rights data (Le Moigne et al,1994;49 et seq.), is 
viewed as transparent or opaque to the public, is decided by its possessor. Johnson suggests 
that public officials firstly have only a finite capacity to obtain and synthesise information 
(termed ‘bounded rationality’), and secondly, can misuse the information for their own 
benefit and at the cost o f their constituents (Johnson, 1996;5,13). This misuse results in the 
destruction o f the mutual trust required when information is imperfect (Johnson, 1996;20). 
Informational asymmetries regarding the accuracy o f data collected by government officials 
resulted in the inefficient allocation o f water between Nile Delta irrigators 
(Radwan,1994;60). The public may consider that knowledge owned by government should be 
made available if the former’s trust is to be won. That trust will also be won only if the latter 
has demonstrated a track record that it is worthy o f that trust. Although the principal needs to 
be informed at zero cost about the actions o f the agent (Johnson, 1996;5), information is never 
free and there can be a tendency for information to be more costly (transaction costs) and 
difficult to communicate, the more ‘high-tech5 it becomes (Easter, 1991;9, Le Moigne et, 
al,1994;49 et seq.).
3. Relevance
Finally, there is a tendency towards institutional irrelevance caused by the gap between the 
specialised knowledge o f the government agency and the ‘time and place’ needs o f their 
constituents (Johnson, 1996;4). In the South, where policy change decisions do not simply 
belong to the state; the accommodation between the state and other interest groups, their 
struggles and manoeuvres constitute the real politics (Migdal,1988;30). Means o f changing 
the political will seems to depend on offering incentives o f wealth / power, and/or presenting 
convincing logic (Feitelson and Allan, 1998). Whether politicians are convinced to adopt a 
different policy depends on the information they are presented with. In order for information 
to be presented, water resource management indicators must first be monitored, data collected 
and information transferred. Depending, amongst other things, on who monitors, collects, 
analyses and transfers what, the information can be lies, damn lies or, perhaps, reality.
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Table 2.3 Summary: aspects o f institutions: local -  national scale polarisation:
Scale Local National
Migdal (1988) Society Control State Control
Political Context Local Web Jurisdictions National Parties
Actors local / stakeholder* / 
informal / private
central /  government agency / 
formal / public
Actor Focus Time and Place Needs Specialist Knowledge
Key Institutional 
Functions
Resource management 
including decision-making
Legislative, environment, 
standards, Monitoring
Participation Advocates Participation Optimists Participation Pessimists
Model Relevance Common Pool Resources 
Social Capital Theory
New Institutional Economics
Increasing Problems of Free Rider/ Agent-Principal
--------------------------->
/ Preference Aggregation 
--------------------------->
Participation and 
Ownership Initiatives
Market / PSP => <= Decentralization
Changes needed Scaling Up of Participation Scaling Down o f Central 
Authority
Change Mechanisms Manage the Network Reform the Institutions
Current Project Emphases Rural Irrigation and 
Domestic Supply
Urban W ater and Sanitation 
Supply
Current Proportion of 
World Bank Lending in 
MENA (and W orld)1
Irrigation and Drainage 
7% (6.3%)
Water Supply and Sanitation 
9% (4.5%)
'-B erkoff, 1994;Appendix.
*some of the national scale actors are stakeholders, but their stake is smaller
The key environment needing change if institutions are to be reformed so as to facilitate 
reallocation is the political environment. Changes in political will are likely to have a greater 
impact on water allocation than institutional tinkering does. Vincent is convinced that Yemen 
does not need any further organisational innovations in the sphere o f rural water supply but 
does need technical assistance (1991). She also suggests that under the LDA system rural 
Yemen suffers from unclear organisational arrangements and an absence o f authority to give 
meaning to the organisations (1990). These problems contributed to the current demise o f the 
LDA leaving a hiatus in rural development at present. Rural development contrasts with the
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current urban water supply arena in Yemen where institutional and policy reform is well 
underway (Davies and Sahooly,1996).
2.7 Sustainable Development
Development initiatives are superimposed on the economic and political forces which 
contribute to determining water allocation and the legal and institutional linkages between 
them. Allan (1996a;81) asserts that the prime purpose of demand management is to allocate 
and manage water resources in an environmentally and economically sustainable way.
Section 2.3 discussed the economic aspects and this section discusses environmental issues 
and the role o f aid.
2.7.1 Environmentally Unsustainable Development to Date
The impact o f  water lift technologies, which have only become available in Yemen in the past 
30 years, have raised farm ers’ expectations o f expanded irrigation (Varisco,1991). However 
the consequent trend o f groundwater depletion is becoming all too apparent. Davies and 
Sahooly (1996) comment that the annual renewable water resources o f Yemen are 
125m3/capita/yr, which is less than 10 % o f the regional average and compares with a world 
average o f 7500m3/cap/yr. Population growth trends alone suggest that the renewable water 
resources o f Yemen will decline to 72m3/cap/yr by 2025, well below the 100m3/cap/yr 
domestic water supply requirement commonly mentioned. National withdrawals are 3.4 
billion m3/yr whilst renewable water resources are 2.5 billion m3/yr (ibid.). Annual 
withdrawals from the San’a basin alone were 224Mm3 in 1994 compared with an estimated 
recharge o f only 42M m3/yr (Ward, 1998).
Although investment in infrastructure has been a priority o f development aid and the 
development o f roads has made water more easily accessible to tankers thus contributing to 
the unsustainable trend o f groundwater abstractions (Vincent, 1990), the alternative 
development o f pipelines has had a much greater impact. However, there are economic limits 
to piped water transfers where terrain increases the cost o f lifting the water. Such is the case 
in Ta’iz where nearly all significant water sources for more than 100km are at a lower level, 
the only exceptions being in the Ibb governorate.
The extent o f  the impact o f  technological innovations through industrial development and the 
provision o f piped water supply schemes and sanitation without adequate waste water
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treatment is impossible to tell. Yemeni domestic and industrial liquid wastes typically 
infiltrate to aquifers if they are not intercepted beforehand by irrigation. W ater quality and 
food chain monitoring for pollutants is almost universally absent, particularly o f toxins.
2.7.2 The Value of the Environment
Although nature may have previously been perceived as a “stockpile o f raw materials to be 
used by humans for their needs and pleasures” (McSweeney,1998), environmental accounting 
has been a major issue o f the 1990s. If  national accounting were to include an evaluation o f 
natural resource depletion, many countries would be in deficit (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1992;212). There is therefore a need to try to value the environment if development 
is to be sustainable (Pearce, 1993; 11,27,63). Part o f the problem o f valuing the environment is 
that “ its price is not perceived” because it is seen as a public good (Pearce, 1993;1). Pearce 
identifies various separate parts o f the total economic value o f an environmental asset 
(ibid; 16) and goes on to discuss the total capital o f a country as an aggregate stock o f human 
(knowledge, skills etc or returns to education (Dixon and Hamilton, 1996; 15)) and natural 
capital (Pearce, 1993;50). Pearce also questions the traditional assessment o f  national 
economic fortitude on the basis o f  GDP because this omits aspects o f depreciation o f natural, 
human and man-made (products, infrastructure) capital (ibid.). He suggests GNP comprises 
net national product less these depreciations (ibid;32&50). Dixon and Hamilton also take 
social capital into account (1996; 16) which they define as “an amalgam o f individual and 
institutional relationships that determine why one society is more effective than another in 
transforming a given endowment o f assets into sustained well-being” . W hether average GDP 
is a sensible starting point in national accounting has been questioned, especially for 
developing countries, where, due to the high proportion o f veiy low income households and 
the few high income households, the mean can be very different from the median, the latter 
being more representative (World W ildlife Fund,1996;25). Another aspect o f  environmental 
accounting is that o f ‘discounting the future’, which results in the benefit o f the resource 
being enjoyed now and the cost o f its degradation being transferred into the future, accruing 
(as Pearce puts it, 1993;6) to “generations yet to come” who “have no power at all” to decide 
otherwise.
2.7.3 Environmentally Sustainable Development
Putting a monetary value on the environment and linking it to the sustainability o f 
development is precarious. Against prospects o f Malthusian scarcity (exceeding the limit and 
facing the cost) and Ricardian scarcity (diminishing returns from overused resources)
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(Pearce, 1993; 1, Rogers, 1992;7.13) an ‘environmentally sustainable developm ent’ debate is 
taking place which, in part, revolves around the definition o f these terms.
Two different camps may be discerned. The so-called ‘deep ecologists’ see an inherent value 
in the environment irrespective of its usefulness to personkind and have a ‘strong’ 
sustainability message which requires “no net damage to environmental assets”
(Pearce, 1993;52, Karshenas, 1992;9-10) and suggest that the environment should be protected 
for its own sake (McSweeney,1998, Rogers, 1992;7.23). However, Karshenas considers the 
deep ecologists to have confused the “determinants o f well-being with the constituents of 
well-being” (1992;9-10), committing him self to determining causation o f environmental 
degradation (which is the crux o f the debate, see below).
The ‘weak’ sustainability camp, says “a country needs to save more than the depreciation on 
its assets” but will tolerate some damage (Pearce, 1993;52), and defines sustainability in terms 
o f ‘optimum depletion’ and the feasibility of an anticipated ‘growth path’ (Karshenas, 1992;4- 
5). Their hypothesis is that, although environmental degradation increases with economic 
development, a point is reached where the degradation trend is reversed (Karshenas, 1992, 
W W F,1996;3et seq., Feitelson and Allan, 1998, Allan and Karshenas, 1996). The turn is a 
form o f Kuznets curve. Levels o f air pollutants in industrialised nations are said to follow the 
trend o f Kuznets curves in which up to certain values o f per capita GDP, levels increase, and 
with further increases in GDP, pollutant levels decline (World Wildlife Fund, 1996; 18). This 
is one line o f supportive evidence for the ‘growth path’ hypothesis. However, many key 
pollutants have not been considered and some environmental performance indicators are still 
declining in the most industrially advanced nations (ibid.). The problems o f time series 
sampling methodology, statistical significance o f results and whether changes in energy 
sources on air pollutant levels, particularly from coal to oil, during the period would also raise 
doubts regarding the validity o f the theory. Its relevance and validity must also be doubted by 
the 60% o f the worlds population who have not reached any ‘turning point’ for any variable 
(ibid; 13). A second line o f defence is the supposed correlation o f ‘forced environmental 
degradation’ with economic stagnation in many developing countries (Karshenas,
1992; 14,10). However, even if the correlation is valid for the pre-turn Kuznets curve segment, 
it does not prove that economic development and environmental reconstruction are 
complementary (the post-turn segment) and neither correlations give proof o f causation 
(World Wildlife Fund,1996;26), Another problem arises from resource renewability; whether 
natural resource reconstruction is slow (e.g. a depleted aquifer) or impossible (e.g. a polluted 
aquifer) due to irreversible changes (World Bank,1993;94, Pearce,!993;50). These factors are
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overshadowed by our uncertainty o f the scientific processes involved and our technical ability 
to correct damage (Karshenas, 1992;20).
Despite blaming the plight o f  low-income countries on their poor endowment o f initial natural 
resources (World Wildlife Fund,1996;8), natural capital appears to be rather evenly spread 
(Dixon and Hamilton, 1996; 16). Rather, the difference between low and high-income 
countries lies in their human resources which have been shown to be correlated with 
education provision (ibid; 17). Education is, therefore, one area for reinvestment o f the rents 
accrued from the environmental damage caused by economic development (ibid; 16,
Pearce, 1993 ;50, Karshenas, 1992; 14).
The foundation for forced environmental degradation of population growth, increasing 
scarcity o f  indigenously produced food and a stagnant economy, so typical of low-income 
countries, underscores the most important role for water, livelihood provision (ibid; 16,23, 
Allan and Karshenas, 1996; 122). Dixon and Hamilton point out that agricultural land is the 
dominant natural resource o f rich and poor countries, but especially for low-income 
countries, and emphasise the need to manage land sustainably and encourage the growth of 
rural incomes (1996; 18). This is contrary to the desired trend o f economic development (and 
supposedly environmental rebuilding, in the long run) which envisages countries moving 
from an agricultural to an industrial to a service industry base. (Karshenas, 1992; 16, World 
Wildlife Fund,1996; 13, Winpenny,1994;45).
There is an equity question at the North-South level. The world still wants the products o f 
heavy industry and there is at least the possibility that the nortlf may be ‘free riding’ by 
exporting environmentally damaging industrial processes to the south, whilst happily 
importing the products at prices which do not cover the cost o f the environmental damage. 
(World Wildlife Fund,1996;25, Pearce, 1993;75, Karshenas, 1992; 16,22). There is also a 
suggestion that this export may be realised, and even sanctioned, at the highest levels 
(Summers quoted in McSweeney,1998;6).
2.7.4 Roles of Aid and Poverty
What is the role o f foreign aid in the context o f  the aims o f economically and environmentally 
sustainable development in the South? Serageldin (1994;31) suggests helping the poor. This 
raises the issue o f social and ethical sustainability (Du Bois,1992;2). Morton points out the 
dilemma o f trying to pursue economic and social aims in development (1994;55) and Migdal 
suggests the UN has created a further paradox o f hallowing the state by dealing with it, whilst
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undermining the state by its economic and social programs (1988; 13). The very structural 
adjustments prescribed by the World Bank to strengthen the state can weaken it 
(Hildyard,1998;49). Vincent (1991) suggests that in Yemen this paradox is further 
complicated by what is observed as an unwillingness o f donors to work with local institutions 
outside o f specific (central) bureaucratic structures.
Falkenmark and Lundqvist (1995; 183) find the notion o f sustainable development awkward 
in the context o f the pursuit o f mere survival by the poor. Whether the poor in any country 
actually benefit from the economic development associated with Kuznets principles is also 
questioned (World Wildlife Fund,1996;8). In order to address the problem o f poverty, one 
must examine its causes. Chambers (1983) points out some different views: he suggests that 
political economists see processes concentrating wealth and power as the cause and seek to 
change social and property relations, whilst physical ecologists see physical causes. He sees 
an interdisciplinary vicious circle o f powerlessness, vulnerability, physical weakness, poverty 
and isolation forming a deprivation trap; a vortex pulling down the poor. Karshenas cites 
population levels relative to the resource base as the cause of poverty, particularly 
degradation o f the environment in the pursuit o f maximising agricultural production by the 
increasing rural population, especially in arid and semi-arid countries. Besides rural poverty, 
Berkoff also identifies the modern urban areas as Southern poverty traps (1994;37). Whether 
urban or rural, although M cSweeney’s warning that the commodification o f water may cause 
the poor to die o f  thirst is unlikely to be fulfilled, (1998) the potential for them to die from 
water borne diseases at an increasing rate is more likely.
The literature takes a critical and often cynical view of foreign aid efforts, Morton traces the 
shift in focus o f aid from industrialisation/modernisation, to agriculture and integrated rural 
development, to the structural adjustment o f macro-economics and, most recently, to 
development o f institutional and human capabilities (1994; 13) The dynamic for the changes 
in focus seems to emanate steadily from northern academia searching for something new to 
publish rather than from recipients’ day-to-day survival needs. For instance, although 
operation and maintenance are not ‘flavour o f the month’ in development circles, these are 
identified as key areas at grass root levels, and particularly the absence o f (imported 
technology dependent) spare parts (Therkildsen, 1988; 166, Miller, 1979; 133).
The traditional donor-control oriented, non-adaptive, blueprint method o f development 
planning is severely criticised (Therkildsen, 1988). Many see foreign aid as an industry with 
‘one shot’ quantitative targets in which the donor firmly controls the conduction o f a
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blueprint development plan, commissions consultants (usually from the donor country) to 
conduct data-intense studies. It has been noted that ‘long-and-dirty’ data intensive studies can 
‘hide the wood from the trees’ (Chambers and Carruthers, 1986; 1-2). The problem may not be 
one of generating too many data, but o f not obtaining the right data and not integrating it 
holistically, a task which is certainly made more difficult as field experts multiply. The 
consultants then make recommendations to purchase technologically inappropriate hardware 
from the donor country (Cowen,1994;7, McSweeney,1998, Chambers and Carruthers, 1986;4, 
Therkildsen, 1988; 102,166). This tendency has also been noted in Yemeni rural water supply 
development (Vincent, 1991;204). The donor’s interest in aid is only in maintaining the 
volume o f giving and “his interest in what happens to it is relatively small” (Morton, 1994;5 8- 
9). Chambers identifies another major contributing factor to the non-arrival o f aid at the point 
o f  need as bias in donor awareness o f the needs, particularly o f the rural poor (1983). In 
Yemen, Vincent (1990) questions the large amount o f time spent in technical feasibility 
studies o f development schemes compared with the time spent in developing trust, legitimacy 
and authenticity (that is, enabling local ‘ownership’). Government institutions o f recipient 
countries are also happy to keep the aid flowing (Therkildsen, 1988; 166), particularly if it 
means employment for them and, in some cases at least, an opportunity for nepotism and the 
skimming o ff of benefits (Johnson, 1996;7, McSweeney,1998) euphemistically known as ‘rent 
seeking’ in the literature (DISWC, 1993;8, Cowen, 1994;5), but perhaps better labelled 
corruption or at least rent collection. This item, which can be a significant part o f the aid 
budget (ibid.), belongs in M orton’s ‘forbidden territory’ list of untouchables along with 
taxation and law and order (Morton, 1994;48,50) which donors are not allowed to question. 
The charicature representation o f rent-seeking officials and opportunistic farmers may be 
rather one-dimensional when compared to the full array o f incentives which they face 
(M ollinga,1998;21), but at least we should face this major one.
Morton reduces Chamber’s development biases to one: “a bias towards the short term” 
(Morton, 1994;37). The foreign aid expert envisaged by Morton (1994,43-44), Chambers 
(1983) and Clammer (1984) appears to be ‘Superperson’ with an interdisciplinary 
background, great powers o f integration, a grasp o f the local language and can keep motivated 
during their long term posting despite knowing their counterpart has no intention to take their 
‘expert’ advice. Certainly commitment and continuity o f development programs, and 
particularly staff, are vital if programme impacts are to become sustainable, but one wonders 
if such staff exist, could be afforded or are likely to stay when they realise what is expected o f 
them. They do not appear to stay in Yemen (Vincent, 1990 and 1991).
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Urban Water Supply and Sanitation.
A specific issue in the field o f sustainable development, though bridging other fields as well, 
is the provision o f urban water supply and sanitation. Allan (in prep;5.9) suggests ‘It is a 
generally accepted development goal that the basic needs of about 100mJ/c/yr should be made 
available to individuals and communities at prices consistent with the economic capacity o f 
the respective communities’. However, there is some debate over the validity o f encouraging 
development o f urban water supplies and sanitation. Falkenmark and Lundqvist suggest there 
is greater political pressure for urban supplies as opposed to rural supplies (1995; 188) which 
is related to tarmac/capital development biases. The provision o f piped water supplies is 
questioned because o f the high cost (Rogers, 1992; 1.3, Berkoff, 1994;3 5), particularly for 
urban provision. Urban supplies cost more because the distribution systems connect every 
house rather than just providing standpipes and the cost o f fitting the distribution system 
around the existing infrastructure o f roads, pavements, telephone and electricity cables in the 
urban environment. Sewerage provision is questioned even more (Serageldin, 
1994;l,3,Fig5,15). However, Serageldin’s internalisation o f the externalities by local groups 
paying for the sanitation necessary to remove sewage from their immediate area which they 
then export to the larger urban district ends up with the polluted paying at the final stage of 
removal from the area unless the formal institutions cover this cost (1994;Figure8). Contrary 
to Serageldin, others insist that if water is supplied, sanitation must also be supplied 
(Rogers, 1992;7.34). The poor are particularly prone to poor sanitation provision 
(Pearce, 1993 ;79) and the subsidies inevitably built into water and sanitation systems 
consistently benefit the rich, not the poor. The literature disagrees over the willingness o f 
users to pay for improved services, some saying they are (World Bank, 1993; 15) and others 
saying they are not (Pearce, 1993;77).
2.7.5 Why aid now focuses on institutions
The failure o f  institutions to provide adequate water management despite significant inputs o f 
infrastructure from outside has contributed to the current shift in development emphasis to 
institutional and human capabilities (Morton, 1994; 13). Weak institutions characterised by 
overstaffing, inadequate pay, declining skills, poor working environment, lack of job  
satisfaction have been identified as the cause (Berkoff, 1994;37, Falkenmark and 
Lundqvist, 1995; 178, Coopers and Lybrand, 1992;235, Delft, 1991; 19). Worsening 
performance indicators o f increasing unregistered connections, unaccounted for water and 
number o f jobs per connections are added to the picture (Serageldin, 1994; 11), and increasing 
insecurity o f deliveries is thought to lead to irresponsible use by customers with the supplier 
blaming the user (and becoming customer desensitised) and vice versa (Lundqvist, 1998; 11).
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Berkoff (1994;42) traces the typical historical development o f water entities from the first 
water agencies through their amalgamation into an overarching body. This body is delegated 
functions before it has the mandate, skills or resources to manage (Guggenheim, 1991;22, 
Berkoff, 1994;45), its legal validity may be precarious (Mallat, 1995;7) and it has a secretariat 
that is weakened by opposition from line agencies (Berkoff, 1994;45).
Development agencies have not always helped in the reform o f institutions. Often the 
development plan is prepared outside the recipient institutional framework (Therkildsen, 
1988;chapter 6) which can result in failure to understand and allow for institutional features 
(Coopers and Lybrand, 1992; 108). The assumption that the lack o f recipient capacity to plan 
and implement can be substituted by the provision o f technical assistance staff diverts 
attention from domestic institutional capacity building to the production o f new schemes 
(Therkilsden,1988;17), Donors by-pass institutions in their development planning and 
implementation, which results in non-integration and unsustainability (ibid;3.6,102), and 
rather than contributing to capacity building, donor technical assistance staff become 
performer/substitutes instead o f teacher/mobilisers (ibid; 18-19). There is therefore now a 
development emphasis on improving institutional human resources capabilities so that 
indigenous decision making quality, sector efficiency and managerial performance are 
improved (Delft, 1991; 19).
2.7.6 Conceptual Frameworks of Sustainable Development
Two basic and contrasting models o f sustainable development are apparent in the literature:
a) The environmentalist view: economic development and environmental sustainability 
are not compatible.
b) The Ekcurve theorists / Karshenas view: economic development and environmental 
sustainability are compatible.
The first places economic development and environmental sustainability at opposite poles 
with sanctioned discourse and policy possibilities, at whatever level -  national, local etc, held 
in tension between them. Figure 2.1a adds another axis between internally and externally 
derived dynamics, such as belief systems and foreign aid respectively for example, which 
hold discourse and policy in tension in another dimension. For illustration, various activities 
or initiatives which have occurred in the T a’iz area are plotted in the quadrants defined by 
these axes. It is suggested that the more socio-politically acceptable water resources 
management initiatives usually reflect internally derived preferences and economic 
development than environmental and externally derived dynamics.
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Figure 2.1b is a reworking o f Karshenas (Allan and Karshenas, 1996) and the Ekcurve model 
in which economic development and environmental sustainability in the form o f ‘capital5 are 
plotted on perpendicular axes, that is, as though they were compatible. The Yemeni reality o f 
no apparent turn in the curve, economic progress for the ‘haves5, declining economic capital 
for the ‘have nots5, and declining environmental capital for both is superimposed. Since 60% 
o f the world economies lie somewhere between these two paths they are termed ‘Southern 
Reality'5.
2.8 Summary: key themes relevant to Yemen
The literature recognises the need for a holistic view o f water management, however 
examples o f this approach are rare. The importance o f considering whether there is sufficient 
water (quantity), whether it is adequate for the intended use (quality) and whether it is 
affordable to the all users (price) is not new, although these aspects are seldom seen 
simultaneously in specific situations. The Middle East is recognised as a water scarce area, in 
global terms, and Yemeni water as the scarcest o f the scarce for a region with such a high 
population. The following chapter examines that scarcity in the T a’iz area.
As well as physical reasons for water scarcity, this chapter has discussed some o f the human 
factors. As a starting point the literature points out the failure to perceive the economic value 
o f water that forms the basis for implementation o f demand management measures rather than 
simply increasing supply as populations increase. Some authors suggest that one o f the 
reasons for failing to perceive the economic value o f water is the presence o f political 
motives. These motives are identified as particularly apparent in the reticence to reallocate 
water from agriculture to domestic and industrial uses and the failure to recognise the 
contribution o f virtual water to meeting the food deficit. The use o f information and 
knowledge in achieving political aims has been noted and traced to underlying belief systems. 
The role o f  plural legal and institutional frameworks in implementing politically determined 
policy raises the issue of bottom-up vs. top-down initiatives, and underlines the strong society 
/ weak state Yemeni context. Some, particularly those working in Yemen, have recognised 
the importance o f local, mostly small scale, rules and players if water use is to become more 
allocatively efficient and equitable. Models o f sustainable development provide a conceptual 
framework against which to examine the impact o f water use on the environment in and 
around T a’iz and the role o f the development agencies.
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Chapter 3 Autopsy o f an Aquifer
‘if groundwater abstraction for the city remained at the (low) 1995 level
and if irrigated agriculture ceased 
... .the A1 Hayma basin would recover after ten years 
and the Miqbaba basin after five years.’
3.1 Introduction
The T a’iz study area is an extreme case of environmental degradation and provides a unique 
opportunity with which to put some empirical flesh on the theory discussed in the previous 
chapter. The demise o f the water supply o f T a’iz has centred on two main water resource 
problems. Firstly, the resource base has been declining, and secondly, that resource has 
become increasingly polluted. The major part o f this chapter investigates the declining 
groundwater levels in the main aquifer serving the city, that o f A1 Hayma (Figure 3,1) in 
order to:
a) provide a better understanding o f the natural water movement processes,
b) assess the relative significance o f different human water use activities,
c) determine the physical causes o f the crisis,
d) define the sustainable yield o f the aquifer and
e) predict how long it would take the aquifer to return to its starting condition if only 
current minimal abstractions for the city were to continue,
The latter point permits evaluation o f the cost o f  reversing environmental degradation in 
section 4.1. The problem o f declining surface and groundwater quality is described and its 
causes are identified in section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes the chapter with a summary o f the 
environmental impact o f water use and abuse in the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment (area 
defined in Figure 3.2).
Groundwater Development: Historical Background
Since the 1960’s, the water supply o f T a’iz has been derived from groundwater sources 
located successively further north o f the city. The earliest wellfields were developed close to 
the city (Hawban / Hawgala, Figure 3.1) but were o f low quality water. W ater quality has 
deteriorated further because the wellfields are located downstream o f the city and receive 
effluent from it. Development then shifted to the A1 Hayma valley 12 km to the north. As this 
source was exhausted, the conveyor was extended further north to the Habir area where the
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Tawilah Sandstone was hoped to provide some relief to the water shortage. Exploration 
further afield continues to today. A summary o f these events follows (Box 1):
Box 1: History of Hydraulic Events in Ta’iz
Early 1960’s: Hawban and Hawgala fields developed and Kennedy scheme developed 
to supply T a’iz (low quality water) by USAID.
1967 USAID leave, Kennedy scheme starts to deteriorate
1975 JM Montgomery report identifying other well potential wellfields and 
recommends A1 Hayma -  Miqbaba
1976-81 Investigation o f A1 Hayma well field (Miqbaba -  As Sahlah) recommends 
utilisation o f all groundwater in A1 Hayma including the complete cessation o f irrigated 
agriculture. Tipton and Kahnbach (1979) recommend compensation o f $10M to 
farmers (which was never paid). Awareness o f the impossibility o f simultaneous use by 
agriculture and T a’iz city.
1982-3 Commissioning o f A1 Hayma wellfield.
1987: A1 Hayma wellfield running dry. Emergency measures include reconnection of 
low quality Hawban Hawgala fields and emergency drilling o f six more wells in Al 
Hayma.
1989: Attention turned to Tawilah Sandstone in Habir, immediately to the north o f Al 
Hayma and negotiations for exploratory drilling began with shaykhs o f Habir / Dhi 
Sufal. Some wells drilled in Dhi Sufal, Al Q a’idah, Al Janad (No production wells).
1995-6: W ater supply in T a’iz reaches once per 40 days, EC >1500pS/cm. Emergency 
drilling in T a’iz city by instruction o f the Governor. Negotiations with shayxs o f Habir 
/ Dhi Sufal over six wells to be connected to an extended Hayma -  Ta’iz conveyor. Six 
wells drilled, three connected (from West Habir).
1997-Present (1999): Declining yields o f three West Habir wells and T a’iz city wells. 
Exploration by NWRA o f Wadi Warazan, Wadi Al Ghayl / Bani Khawlan.
Sources: Leggette, Brashears and Graham (1977 and 1980), Montgomery,James M (1975), 
Adel (1986), Dubay,L (1993), Dubay,L (1989), Dubay,L (1996), Tipton and Kalmbach 
(1979), CES (1997),
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Groundwater Development: Hydrogeological Background
The Al Hayma aquifer comprises a sequence o f alluvial materials o f all grain sizes but 
predominantly sands and silts. The alluvium was deposited in a north-south trending fault- 
controlled depression in the volcanic bedrock, which reaches depths in excess o f 80m. To the 
north o f the valley lies a major east-west fault which forms the northern limit o f the graben 
(Figure 3.1) and the base o f the horst slope from which the alluvium was, and continues to be, 
derived. The relatively high permeability o f the alluvium, in contrast to the volcanics, 
underscores its importance as a water resource. The Al Hayma valley constitutes the largest 
underground storage facility for water in such proximity to the demand centre o f Ta’iz. The 
valley floor covers 16 km2, excluding As Sahlah (Figure 3.7), and is the downstream point in 
a catchment o f 231 km2 of mountainous terrain. The potential o f the Tawilah Sandstone, 
which underlies the volcanics, at least in some areas, is unproven. Although it outcrops at the 
base o f the horst, the Tawilah Sandstone has not been reached by any borehole in the graben.
3.1.1 Outline Methodology
The analysis o f the alluvial Al Hayma aquifer is based on the principle that all water inputs to 
the valley must equal the outputs, plus or minus any change in groundwater storage:
Rainfall + R u n o ffs  Outflow + Evaporation & Evapotranspiration + Abstraction for City 
+/- Change in Storage
Runoff is that into the valley from the surrounding hills and, like outflow, may have surface 
and sub-surface components. Evaporation and evapotranspiration mainly comprises that from 
soil and from plants. Consumption by the population comprises less than 0.2% o f the total 
water budget. Change in storage is the net result o f subsurface inflow and outflow and 
infiltration both from rainfall events and Te-infiltration’ from irrigation. The change in 
storage is observed through hydrographs.
In order to address the five points listed above, a number o f models have been developed to 
simulate the terms in the water-balance equation so as to reproduce the observed decline in 
water levels, that is, change in storage in the Al Hayma valley, over the period abstraction for 
the city has been taking place. This constitutes the period 1983-1995. Because each o f the 
terms have varying margins o f error, the rationale behind the modelling has been to eliminate 
scenarios and assumptions which cannot reproduce the historical trend.
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Table 3.1. Summary description o f the function, inputs and outputs o f  each o f the models:
Function Inputs Outputs
3.3 SCS / TS-HWC Runoff Moc el - Daily data from 1983 to 1995.
To generate runoff volumes to 
Al Hayma.
Airport Daily Rainfall, 
SCS Land Use Types
Daily flows from tributaries 
and flanks to be applied to 
central wadi course and edge 
areas o f Al Hayma (as mm)
3.4 Penman-Monteith Evapotranspiration Model - Daily data from 1983 to 1995.
To estimate the amount of 
water required by each crop 
from abstraction above and 
beyond that provided by 
rainfall and runoff and, where 
water input from the latter two 
exceeds demand, to estimate 
the infiltration.
Airport daily mean dry 
and wet bulb 
temperatures, sunshine 
hours, Airport and 
Usayfra wind run. z-d and 
crop heights. Output from 
Runoff.
Net infiltration and 
abstraction for locations 
receiving central spates, 
flank spates and just rainfall 
for the appropriate cropping 
pattern (m3 per 100m x 100m 
grid square per season. Dry 
season Oct-Feb, wet Mar- 
Sept)
3.5.1 Steady State Groundwater Flow Model (GWVistas/Modflow) 1976 pre-development 
calibration
To match groundwater heads 
in 1976 as an essentially pre~- 
development steady-state 
condition and compare runoff 
indicated by the groundwater 
model with that by the runoff 
model.
Aquifer geometry, 
hydraulic conductivity, 
subsurface tributary and 
outlet constant heads, net 
recharge derived from 
evapotranspiration model.
Calibration o f  flows and 
heads
3.5.2 Transient Water Balance Model a)
To run a mean rainfall year 
(1987) five times, 
incrementing drawdowns to 
examine whether the scenario 
being considered could 
approach matching the 
observed hydrographs.
Satellite image 
determined irrigation 
areas for 1986. Output 
from evapotranspiration 
model for 1987.
Calibration o f hydrographs. 
Assessment o f flows.
3.5.2 Transient Water Balance Model b)
To match the complete 
observed hydrograph record 
from 1983 to 1995
Satellite image 
determined irrigation 
areas for 1986 and 1995. 
Output from
evapotranspiration model 
for 1983 to 1995.
Calibration o f hydrographs. 
Assessment o f flows.
3.6.2 Recoveiy Model
To predict how long it would 
take the aquifer to recover to 
approximate pre-development 
levels if the city continued to 
abstract as in 1996 and there 
was no irrigation
Satellite image 
determined irrigation 
areas for 1995. Output 
from evapotranspiration 
model for 1987.
Predictive hydrograph
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Although it is not possible to arrive at a unique solution, the error margins o f  individual 
variables when considered together (sensitivity analysis) still permit an evaluation which 
addresses the five points . The methodologies for determining the inputs to the models are 
described in each o f the following sections. After a discussion o f the origin o f the rainfall 
data (section 3.2), section 3.3 attempts to model the runoff to the Al Hayma valley, 3.4 the 
evapotranspiration from the valley with changing irrigation and cropping practices. Section 
3.5 attempts to reproduce the observed hydrographs by a series o f groundwater models and
3.6.1 to predict the aquifer recovery period. Table 3.1 gives a summary description o f the 
function, inputs and outputs o f each o f the models.
3.2 Rainfall
The area lying within the previous political boundaries o f North Yemen may be roughly 
divided topographically into three zones running north-south: the western coastal strip (or 
Tihamah) flanking the Red Sea, the central highlands, and the eastern slopes descending 
towards the desert o f the Rub’ Al Khali. This topographic division largely determines the 
rainfall distribution, with very little rainfall in the Tihamah and the eastern desert. The central 
highlands receive most o f the rain, which increases southwards, reaching a maximum of over 
lOOOmm/yr in the vicinity o f Ibb, only 35 to 40 km north o f T a’iz.
The northward movement o f the inter-tropical convergence zone, sometimes referred to as the 
Red Sea convergence zone (Gun and Abdulaziz,1995;21-22 and WAPCOS, 1996;2.1), in 
early summer (April-May) and its southward movement in late summer (August-September) 
results in increased precipitation at these times (Williams, 1979;3-6). Precipitation during this 
bimodal rainy season is in marked contrast to the dry season (October-March) o f prevalent 
north-east trade winds, and in many areas, including T a’iz, to the noticeably drier months o f 
June-July (Figure 3.3).
The main meteorological stations currently operating are located at Usayfra (monitoring 
period 1979-present) and at the new T a’iz airport (1976-1979 and 1983-present). Coupled 
with data from a few, more minor stations, a tentative rainfall distribution map has been 
proposed (Figure 3.2). It should be pointed out that the interpretation o f any o f the climate 
data is dependent on the quality o f the data. Measurement and recording errors, and periods 
without readings are present in the data sets. Also, apart from a few months during 1977 and
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two months during 1989, there has been no monitoring o f climatic variables in the Al Hayma 
valley itself. However, the TS-HWC (DHV, 1993) note that for Yemen as a whole:
“Daily rainfalls observed at any one station are effectively samples from a 
statistical population o f rainfalls that is constant irrespective o f position, 
altitude, or any other physical variable”
and DHV 1993 goes on to point out that the difference in rainfall between locations:
“ is caused by the number o f rain-days, not by the daily rainfall amounts” .
On this basis, and in the absence o f more comprehensive rain gauging, rainfall data from 
other nearby locations has been used in estimating the runoff and evapotranspiration 
described in the following sections.
T a’iz airport is the nearest station only 8 km to the East and with a similar elevation (1450m) 
and aspect to Al Hayma. Usayfra is the second nearest, 12 km to the south and o f a lower 
elevation (1200m). The airport daily meteorological data have been used in calculating 
evapotranspiration and runoff over the modelled period, however, data had to be generated 
for the wet months o f August 1990 and May-July 1994 which were missing from the record. 
These periods were generated by applying typical rainfall frequencies and amounts for those 
months on a pro-rata basis, relative to the annual total rainfall observed at Usayfra.
Although some have suggested that there may be longer term trends in annual rainfall 
variation (for example, Zagni, 1996), the short record available for the area does not appear to 
support such a view (Figure 3.4).
3.3 Runoff
‘During 1995 it is estimated that 85% of the year’s rainfall in Ta’iz 
occurred during a period of only 12 hours 
if the periods of the most intense rainfall were summed.’
3.3.1 Methodology
The pattern o f rainfall, with high intensity convectional storms during some afternoons in the 
rainy season, is particularly important in analysing both the runoff to the study area and the 
evapotranspiration. During 1995, it is estimated that 85% o f the year’s rainfall in T a’iz 
occurred during a period o f only 12 hours if the periods o f the most intense rainfall were
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summed. In these circumstances, the analysis o f  evapotranspiration and runoff based on 
lOday, monthly, or longer averages must be questioned. The approach here has been to use 
daily data.
Apart from a few months o f stream gauging in 1976 as part o f the resource assessment from 
the Al Hayma valley for the development o f the public supply there has been no other stream 
gauging in the area. One o f the main methods used in assessing runoff where there is no 
stream gauging is the SCS method (Rango,1984, Mockus,1972 and N om an,1982). This 
method is also recommended for use in Yemen in a modified form developed by the 
Technical Secretariat o f the High Water Council (TS-HWC) and is documented in DHV 
(1993). The SCS method assumes that rainfall is initially abstracted (Initial abstraction, la) by 
interception, infiltration and surface storage before runoff begins, as a set proportion o f the 
total maximum retention o f the watershed (S) such that:
Ia=0.2 S
The relation o f these two parameters to the rainfall (P) and the runoff (Q) is: 
Q=((P~Ia)2)/((P-Ia)+S)
And, where Ia=0.2 S:
Q=((P-0.2S)2)/(P+0.8S)
S is determined from:
S=((1000/CN)-10) x 25.4*, (* conversion from inches to mm)
where CN is a curve number devised on the basis o f different soil types and land uses.
Although originally developed on Eastern USA catchments, TS-HWC (DHV, 1993) have 
suggested values o f la and CN applicable for Yemen. In order to test the relevance o f either 
method, monitoring o f wadi flows during storms in T a’iz area on the slopes to the south o f 
the graben has been carried out. Although the monitoring was not possible in the wadis 
discharging to the Al Hayma valley (located on the slopes to the north o f  the graben), they are 
similar catchments in terms o f topography, altitude, land use, soils, rainfall amount, intensity
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and frequency. The difference in aspect does not seem too important since the local 
prevailing winds during the rainy season are westerlies, and sometimes easterlies.
During the rainy seasons o f 1995 and 1996, thirteen wadi flows from ten rainfall events were 
monitored. Flow estimates comprised rudimentary measurement o f the stream cross-section 
and the velocity o f floating objects at regular intervals during the storm. Locations were 
chosen where the wadi bed profile was relatively smooth and constant. Allowance for drag 
was made by taking a mean velocity o f 75% of the observed surface velocity' (van der Gun 
pers comm.). Rainfall measurement was by rain gauge mostly located within the catchment. 
Due to the absence o f other rain gauges, it was not possible to carry out rainfall averaging 
methods over the catchments, such as Thiessen polygons, although it should be noted that the 
catchments are adjacent and o f similar aspect and elevation. The catchments are shown in 
Figure 3.5 and a representative hydrograph in Figure 3.13.
Table 3.2. Curve numbers derived from the SCS method and those proposed by TS-HWC as 
applicable to Yemen:
Land Use 
Classification*
SCS ** 
Description
SCS
Soil***
SCS**
Curve
Number
TS-HWC** Description 
/ Type / la value
TSHWC
Curve
Number
Uncultivated, 
steep slopes
Bare Ground D 90 Steep slopes with bare 
rocks / PI / 0.15
90
Uncultivated, 
lower slopes
Bare Ground C 88 Low slopes with bare 
rocks or thin soils 
/P2/0.2
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Terraced steep 
slopes
Row Crops 
Contoured 
and Terraced
B 72 Terraces on slopes / P5 / 
0.3
65
Cultivated 
Wadi Floor
Row Crops 
Contoured 
and Terraced
A 64 Terraces in wadi beds or 
on plains / A2 / 0.3
65
Urban Area Residential B 74 Flat areas with 
impermeable soils / P4 / 
0.2
75
* adapted from Dar al Yemen, 1997 
** DHV, 1993 and Rango 1984
*** matched with soil types given in Dar al Yemen, 1997
The curve numbers were converted for antecedent moisture condition according to the 
previous 5 days rainfall and the season, according to Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in DHV, 1993.
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The observed and calculated wadi runoff / rainfall ratios are contrasted in Figure 3.6. The 
rainfall events were typically intense, with a distinct start and Finish and the lag time between 
commencement o f rainfall and the peak flow was o f the order o f 15 to 20 minutes. Although 
the ratio determined by calculation was greatly different from the observed data in some 
instances, these instances tended to be for the tower rainfall events where a greater margin of 
error might be expected due to the rain gauge being distant from the storm centre. For the 
purpose o f adopting a method to simulate runoff, it is more important that calculated and 
observed runoff are closer for the higher rainfall events, as was the case. On the whole the 
TS-HWC values were closer to the observed than the SCS ones. This is thought to be because 
land type descriptions, and therefore land type areas, in the TS-HWC method more closely 
approximate the field condition. The TS-HWC CN and la values have been used in 
preference to the SCS ones in calculating runoff to Wadi Al Hayma.
[The SCS model and its application by TS-HWC are regarding runoff. The use o f it here is to 
determine runoff from the surrounding wadis and slopes to the Al Hayma valley. Perhaps, 
more correctly, this should be termed runon, however here it is referred to as runoff. Sub­
surface outflow through the Miqbabah gorge is referred to as ‘outflow’ in this chapter.]
3,3.2 Runoff to Wadi Al Hayma
Runoff to Wadi Al Hayma is observed as occurring in three different ways:
i) inflow at specific points where there are known wadi flows (within the period of 
resource development / modelling viz. 1983-1995) and which form a linear source 
along the length o f the wadi bed as spate flows.
ii) inflow at specific points where major subsurface inflows occur at the entry points 
o f major tributaries to the valley.
iii) runoff from a large number o f small wadis on either side o f the main valley where 
the water harvesting system spreads the runoff over the fields along the main valley 
perimeter. This is said by locals to extend approximately 200 to 300m into the main 
valley.
The three types are shown on Figure 3.7. The wadis, Rahabah and Hama’ir discharge minor 
surface flows to the Al Hayma valley. Wadis Tanif, Ja’ashin, and Hajib have been observed 
by locals to discharge as surface flows into the Al Hayma valley, though the flow frequency 
has been noted to decline during the modelled period (see section 3.5.1). These wadis receive
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water from the elevated high rainfall area to the north. It is estimated from rainfall 
distribution maps (Dar El Yemen, 1997 and Gun and Abdulaziz,1995) that rainfall over these 
areas is approximately 60% higher than in the Al Hayma valley. The boundary is placed 
along the E-W fault line at the northern limit o f the graben, which marks the major change in 
slope.
In generating rainfall data for the Al Hayma catchment as an input to the model, the following 
assumptions have been used:
a) that, because the nearest rainfall station (Ta’iz airport) occupies a similar altitude 
and aspect to Al Hayma, its rainfall record can be taken as representative o f the Al 
Hayma valley. This is not to say that rainfall occurred in the valley catchment on 
exactly the same days and by the same amount as occurred at the airport, but that the 
monthly totals, frequency and duration o f storms will be similar. This forms the basis 
o f the daily rainfall applied to the valley floor in the model.
b) on the basis o f the TS-HWC and DHV observations quoted above regarding 
rainfall, runoff to the catchment from north o f the graben has been generated by 
adding 60% more days o f rain to the airport record. These days have been added 
randomly but in an identical distribution in terms of season (Figure 3.2) and amount.
Runoff from areas south o f the fault has been generated using the T a’iz airport 
rainfall record.
In addition, runoff observations in the catchments around T a’iz suggest that in the model:
a) daily rainfall below 6mm (Figure 3.8) should not contribute to runoff (DHV 
1993;5) and therefore should be excluded.
b) for catchments o f the order o f tens of km2, such as those being considered, that a 
maximum runoff/rainfall ratio o f 10% occurs (Figure 3.9).
In order to assess the validity o f the last point, as part o f the model sensitivity analysis, two 
variants have been considered:
a) runoff without a maximum cutoff,
b) a runoff maximum o f 10% of the rainfall
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The main reason for the decline in the frequency and amount o f spates reaching Al Hayma in 
recent years is considered to be the significant increase in groundwater abstraction for 
agriculture in Wadi Hajib, and the associated change in land use, and for the T a’iz municipal 
supply below Wadi Ja ’ashin (viz. Wadi Al M inqa’ah). Although this is part o f  the point the 
model is attempting to analyse, in the case o f Wadi Al Hayma, the observation by locals o f 
declining spates into Wadi Al Hayma must be built into the model inputs.
The model developed by SCS also assumes that the whole o f the catchment received the 
rainfall o f that day and that the antecedent moisture condition was the same for the whole 
catchment. In reality this is not the case and some o f the runoff absorbing zones DHV 
(1993; 16) will do exactly that, and absorb the runoff from other parts o f the catchment before 
it reaches the exit point. The curve numbers ‘lump’ together an overall average 
runoff/absorbtion property for the catchment being considered. In summary, effectively the 
development o f the water resources has increased the water absorbing capacity o f  the 
catchments with time and changed their curve numbers. Because no calibration for this is 
available, the calculated runoff from wadis Tanif, Ja’ashin and Hajib to Wadi Al Hayma in 
this analysis have had to be altered so that they occur only during maximum spate periods.
The largest spates in the field occur in August and May. Runoff in the model to Wadi Al 
Hayma from these wadis has only been permitted in August, when the model usually 
generates one or two spate periods o f a few days.
Table 3.3 summarises the 1983-1995 mean runoff (m3/day) to the Al Hayma valley from the 
main tributaries and from the flanks as determined by the different methods used in the runoff 
model:
Runoff Type i & ii i & ii i & ii iii iii
Wadi
Model Variants
Tanif Ja’ashin Haji
b
West Flank East Flank Total*
a) SCS-TS-HWC 5000 5600 4100 2300 1400 21200
b) 10% max Q/P 1700 2000 1500 800 500 7500
*also includes some minor tributaries
These values are compared with those determined from the sensitivity analysis o f the steady 
state groundwater flow model (section 3.5.1).
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3.4 Evapotranspiration
3.4.1 Choice of Evapotranspiration Model
Doorenbos and Pruitt (1977;Table 1) and more recently, Shuttleworth (1990, cited in 
Wallace, 1991; 141) have summarised some o f the methods used to determine 
evapotranspiration rate. The methods may be divided into direct methods (using lysimeters, 
evaporation pans), and a range o f highly empirical to very complex physically-based 
formulae. Each method has its advantages and drawbacks, but underlying all o f them is the 
problem o f Actual Evaporation falling below Potential Evaporation estimated by the method 
due to restricted uptake o f water by the plant root system (an area still not clearly 
understood, Monteith, 1991;20), Essentially the methods of measuring evapotranspiration 
directly require equipment not generally available (or in some states, such as Yemen, poorly 
maintained), the empirical methods have very limited applicability, and the physically-based 
methods require equipment which, although used in a research context, is not found in routine 
meteorological station monitoring. The best compromise o f applicability, accuracy and data 
requirement is in the less complex physically-based formulae.
Since the FAO recommendation o f 1990, the Modified Penman method of Doorenbos and 
Pruitt (1977) has been superseded by the Penman Monteith method (Monteith, 1965) as a 
basis for calculating reference crop evapotranspiration. Both these methods involve an energy 
input term and an aerodynamic term. The latter method uses a more physically-based estimate 
o f resistance to energy and water vapour flux, simulating evapotranspiration as though it were 
from one ‘big lea f , representing the crop canopy.
The changes in crop water requirements, and hence ‘losses’ to evapotranspiration and 
evaporation from plant and soil as the plant develops were ‘built into’ the Modified Penman 
method via empirical crop factors rather than through the physically-based resistances. The 
crop factors also relate the crop water requirements for various crops to that o f a ‘reference 
crop’ of 8 to 15cm grass not experiencing water shortage. More recently, the ‘big lea f 
concept has been questioned and the importance o f evaporation from bare soil in between the 
plants which significantly changes the aerodynamic properties o f the ‘field’ has been 
recognised. This has led to a proliferation o f resistance terms in the formulae to cover soil, 
stomatal, canopy and aerodynamic resistances (Shuttleworth and Wallace, 1985;842).
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Complex multi-layered models applicable to detailed research at the individual field scale, 
and smaller, have been developed, but these methods require sophisticated research 
equipment for the lab/field measurements (Wallace, 1991; 140).
3.4,2 FAO Penman Monteith Model Parameterisation
The derivation o f the Penman Monteith equation for the estimation o f  evapotranspiration is 
described in Monteith (1965, 1991), and in Monteith and Unsworth, (1990;247 et seq.). The 
FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper No. 56 ‘Crop evapotranspiratioiT incorporates crop 
coefficients which aggregate the physical and physiological differences between crops 
relative to a reference crop of standard surface resistance (Allen et al.l998;iii).
Table 3.4. Values used for the location-specific variables/constants o f the Penman Monteith 
equation and the basis for their selection in the T a’iz context:
Parameter Description Value / 
Unit
Basis
alpha albedo 0.23 Allen et al 1998;23
a Constants in equation for atmospheric 
emissivity
0.34 Rhebergen & van 
Waveren 1990 for 
Yemen highlands 
cited in AI Derwish, 
1995
b 0.044 ditto
a ’ Constant in equation for net long wave 
radiation
0.2 AI Derwish, 1995
C Surface soil heat flux = C (net radiation) 0.3 Fuchs and Hada, 
1972 cited in Al 
Derwish, 1995
P Atmospheric Pressure +/- 5 mbar 858
mbar
T a’iz airport 
measurements
Is Surface resistance to heat and water vapour 
fluxes for well watered vegetation
70
sec/m
Allen et al 1998;22
Daily measurements o f  mean dry bulb temperature, mean wet bulb temperature, wind speed 
and sunshine hours were provided from the T a’iz airport meteorological station. Saturation 
Vapour Pressures were calculated from the wet and dry bulb temperatures using the method 
described in Abbot and Tabony (1985).
Other parameters and their units used in the Penman Monteith equation are described in 
various places such as Monteith and Unsworth, 1990;247 and Shuttleworth and
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W allace,1985;842. However, the evaluation o f ra, the aerodynamic resistance to heat and 
water vapour flow also requires site-specific inputs:
ra=[ln((z-d)/z0)/k2u]2 (sec/m)
Where, from Monteith and Unsworth, 1990:
k is the von Karman constant = 0.41
u is the wind speed (m sec_i) at the measurement point (typically 2m
above ground level) 
z is the reference height (m), that is, the height o f the measurement 
point above the ground 
d is the equivalent height (m) for the conservation o f momentum such that
d+z0 is the height (m) o f zero wind speed
Typical relationships (ibid; 117 and Allen et al 1998;21) are:
d=0.65 x crop height (m) 
z0=O.123 x crop height (m)
Ta’iz wind speeds were checked independently and were 50% lower than those measured at 
the airport and were closer, but higher than those measured at the Usayfra meteorological 
station. T a’iz airport is more exposed than the Al Hayma valley or the Usayfra site. Although 
wind measurements at both are at 2m height, the Usayfra site conforms better to the intended 
application o f the Penman Monteith method. Modelling has compared both airport and 50% 
airport wind speeds.
3.4.3 Soil Moisture Content: Model Methodology
The absence o f data regarding soil moisture content with depth at different times since 
rainfall or irrigation precludes the use o f a zero flux plane model. The simpler FAO readily 
available water (RAW ) model (Allen et al, 1998; 161 et seq.), more commensurate with the 
available data, is used here. For the summer crops, it is assumed that for the medium silty 
loam soils o f the Al Hayma valley (Dar El Yemen, 1997;27) the total available soil moisture 
content is 14% (Smith, 1992;36 and Allen et al 1998; 144). Applying the effective rooting 
depth (ibid. 61 and Allen et al, 1998; 163) for each crop type at each growth stage gives the 
RAW for the crop.
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3.4.4 Irrigation
Current cropping patterns o f the major crop types are given in Table 3.5 together with crop 
coefficients used. Crop coefficients were calculated on the basis o f Allen et al (1998;chap 6).
Table 3.5 Cropping Patterns, length of season (days) and crop coefficients (Kcini, mid, end) 
for major crop types.
Winter Irrigated Summer Supplementary Irrigated Summer Rain-fed
Potatoes: 120-125 
days, (0 .5 ,1.2,0.8) 
Tomatoes: 180 days, 
(0.6,1.2,0.815)
Maize: 145 days, 
(0.6,1.275,0.57)
Qat*: 365 days (0.65)
Maize: 140-145 days, (0.7,1.3,0.58) 
Sorghum / M illet 125-130 days, 
(0.7,1.1,0.5)
Qat*: 365 days, (0.65)
Sorghum / Millet: 125- 
130 days, (0.7,1.1,0.5)
* A cash crop bush, similar to privet, the leaves o f which are chewed by many Yemenis each 
afternoon because o f its amphetamine I stimulant properties.
Rainfall seasonality results in maximum irrigation occurring during the dry winters and 
supplementary irrigation in the summer. In the case o f winter irrigated crops, it has been 
assumed that the crop water requirement is met, and the FAO Penman Monteith method has 
been used in calculating the reference crop evapotranspiration.
It should be noted that the ‘rainfall’ used in evapotranspiration calculations is the recorded 
rainfall, whilst irrigation is an effective irrigation. Effective irrigation is defined as the water 
pumped for irrigation less that portion which recirculates to the aquifer, which can be, and 
has been, ignored in terms o f the total water balance. As an approximation it is assumed that 
evaporation from channels is similar to that o f the evapotranspiration from the crops they 
irrigate and is proportional to the area they occupy. The estimation o f irrigated areas by 
satellite imagery discussed above includes the channel area. This is also effectively one o f the 
assumptions in the image analysis; that the growth o f natural vegetation around the channels 
contributes to the image and the registering o f an ‘irrigated pixel’. This assumption together 
with the occurrence of high infiltration rates result in small evaporative loss contributions to 
field application efficiency (though there are large infiltration ‘losses’) and no further 
calculation for irrigation losses has been made.
Summer Rain-fed Crops
The FAO RAW methodology has been used with both irrigated and rain-fed crops. Inputs 
from rain and daily abstractions by crops from the tank are dealt with as described in the 
previous paragraph except that the only input is rainfall.
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Winter Irrigated Crops
The rare occurrences o f rainfall in the winter have been evaporated from the non-irrigated 
areas (that is, bare soil areas) in the model at a rate proportional to the reciprocal o f the 
square root o f  time after an initial two day period o f evaporation at the potential rate for 
wetted soil (Monteith, 1991; 14 et seq.) which is assumed to be at 90% o f the potential rate for 
an open water surface calculated using the Penman method (Wilson, 1990;51). It is assumed 
that the RAW for bare soil is 35mm (equivalent to 14% porosity over 0.5m depth, which 
compares reasonably with Smith, 1992;61, and Monteith, 1991; 15). Although these are very 
rough approximations, the number o f uncropped periods in which there are more than two 
successive rainfall days are very few. Thus large changes in the assumed values o f the 
variables mentioned above have a small effect on the volume o f water available for 
infiltration in the model.
Supplementary Irrigated Crops
With supplementary irrigated crops, it is important to assess the amount o f water from the 
farm er’s contribution via irrigation and that from rainfall and runoff. These amounts are 
summed separately in the evapotranspiration model.
Qat Irrigation
Qat crop water requirement calculation is problematic. Qat has been considered analogous to 
citrus fruit in calculations (Zagni, 1996), however, local irrigation practices indicate that the 
plant can survive on much smaller quantities o f water and in the dry winter season almost 
‘hibernates’ if it is not irrigated. Farmers will typically irrigate in order to obtain one crop in 
the lucrative winter months. This usually comprises three irrigation turns at around 10 day 
intervals with a maximum o f 10 to 15 cm application each turn, applied directly to a basin 
surrounding each individual bush. It is unclear if qat receives supplementary irrigation in the 
summer. Many farmers comment that they obtain three crops per year, one in winter and two 
in summer. This would coincide with the bimodal summer rainfall. However it is unlikely 
that with irrigation facilities to hand (which nearly all the Al Hayma valley qat farms have) 
no supplementary irrigation takes place. From discussions with farmers, it has been assumed 
in the model that three crops per year are irrigated/ supplementary irrigated; one in winter, 
one in early summer and one in late summer. It has been assumed that three turns are applied 
to the winter crop, and that a significant rainfall event in both o f the summer rains triggers the 
farmer to aim for a crop which then needs a further one or two irrigation turns, depending on 
whether the date o f the next rain is before or after the 10 day irrigation interval.
79
Results
Evapotranspiration by different crops (Table 3.6) has been calculated using wind 
measurements from both T a’iz Airport and 50% o f that rate, as discussed above.
Table 3.6. Mean crop evapotranspiration (mm/day) calculated for the full season:
Airport Wind, 50% Airport Wind
Supplementary irrigated 
sorghum/ millet
5.26 4.58
Rainfed sorghum/millet 2.05 2.00
Summer maize 5.89 5.15
W inter maize 3.53 3.26
Potatoes 2.67 2.52
Tomatoes 3.65 3.38
Qat 2.20 2.14
ET0 4.76 4.24
ET0 values calculated by the pre-FAO 56 Penman Monteith method in other studies have 
ranged from 5.8 (Zagni,1996, T a’iz Airport), to 4.0 (Dubby and Taher,1998, Al Hayma).
3.4.5 Irrigation Trends
In order to assess the evapotranspiration throughout the modelled period, it was particularly 
important to determine the extent o f  irrigation activity over this period. Interviews with local 
farmers suggested that irrigation activity in the central portion o f the Al Hayma valley peaked 
in the mid-80’s, after which, according to the farmers, increasing abstraction by the water 
authority for the T a’iz municipal supply began to deplete the aquifer significantly. Subject to 
availability, financial budget, and the absence o f cloud, Landsat TM data were selected for 
the peak central valley irrigation period (1986) and for recent times (1995). Summer (June 
and September) and winter (January) data were obtained for both dates so that rainfed 
(summer image) and irrigated areas (summer and winter images) could be distinguished. The 
recent data facilitated field checking o f current water use during the summer and winter 
seasons o f 1996. From the Landsat data, various images were produced by SOAS researchers 
and graduates undertaking projects in remote sensing. Three main assumptions are involved:
a) In January, all vegetation is irrigated.
b) Pixels with a high response in TM4 (Very Near Infrared) and a low response in TM3 
(Red) are vegetation.
c) Pixels classified as ‘irrigated’ are 100% irrigated -  that is, there are no part-irrigated 
pixels (pixels cover a horizontal land area o f 30m by 30m).
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Four main images were produced. Although Bands 1,2,3,4,5 and 7 were available, the two 
vegetation indices (NDVI and TVI) use TM4 and TM3 bands only, the latter taking into 
account soil brightness. The other two methods, Principal Component Analysis and Tasseled 
Cap Analysis are statistical analyses which look at interband correlations. All four techniques 
produce different estimates o f irrigated area, the variation being +/-20% o f the mean. The 
main reason for the difference is the thresholding process. A threshold digital number is 
selected ‘manually to a level which selects as much o f the area where vegetation is thought to 
be without selecting too many pixels outside this area which are considered noise’. Although 
the statistical methods are considered more ‘scientific’, field checking suggested they 
produced too dense a level o f irrigation. The NDVI appeared closest to the field situation and 
the TVI image appeared too ‘sparse’. These observations could not be verified by detailed 
field/image correlation however. The NDVI image was selected for identifying irrigated area 
for input to the water balance model. The total irrigated area in the modelled part o f the Al 
Hayma valley by the NDVI method was 3.7km2 for 1986 and 4.3km2 for 1995 indicating a 
16% increase in irrigated area over the modelled period as well as the more obvious huge 
upstream shift in irrigation (Figure 3.10).
Table 3.7. Approximate irrigated crop portions in the Al Hayma valley derived from 
discussions with farmers and used in the evapotranspiration model (area divisions are shown 
in Figure 3.7):
Area in AI Hayma Summer (Supplementary) Winter
Top 1986 & 1995 50% Qat,
25% Sorghum/Millet, 
25% Maize
50% Qat, 50% Maize
Upper 1986 & 1995 50% Sorghum/Millet, 
37.5% Maize, 12.5% Qat
50% Potatoes, 25% Maize, 
12.5%Tomatoes, 12.5% Qat
Central / Lower 1986 50% Sorghum/Millet, 
50% Maize
75% Maize, 12.5% Potatoes, 
12.5% Tomatoes
Central / Lower 1995 50% Maize, 25% Qat, 
25% Sorghum/Millet
37.5% Maize, 25% Qat, 
25% Potatoes,
12.5% Tomatoes
The summer images and the field checking indicate that the whole valley is cultivated in the 
summer, thus areas not cultivated during the winter are assumed to support rain-fed 
sorghum/millet during the summer. The proportions of these crops applied to the irrigated 
areas identified by the satellite imagery are used to calculate the areal distribution o f 
evapotranspiration with time which forms an input to the groundwater models in section 3.5.
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3.4,6 Model Checks
a) Modelled and Observed Irrigation Frequencies
The extent to which irrigated crops fall below the threshold (Allen et al 1998; 169) is a useful 
check on the model, since, assuming farmers recognise when the crops need irrigating, this 
should happen rarely and to an insignificant amount.
Table 3.8 indicates the proportion o f the growing season o f each crop in which the soil water 
content falls below the threshold in a mean rainfall frequency year as determined by the 
evapotranspiration model:
Irrigated /
Supplementary Irrigated 
Crops
% of season below 
threshold
Maximum deficit 
below threshold 
(mm)
Sorghum / M illet 8 10.1
Winter Maize 10 9.2
Summer Maize 8 10.0
Potatoes 50 18.8
Tomatoes 18 10.6
Qat 42 55
Table 3.8 suggests that the combination o f irrigation intervals noted in the field (and used in 
the model) and soil moisture availability / rooting depths advised by Allen et al (1998) and 
Smith (1992), that were used in the model, appear reasonable. Potatoes appear either to be 
irrigated too infrequently or the suggested soil moisture availability / rooting depths are too 
low, or both. Certainly the limitations for irrigation imposed by the system o f turns does 
result in periods o f stress especially in the summer if rains do not fall in adequate amount, 
and, more importantly, frequency.
b) Total Amount o f  Water N eededfor Irrigation
The amount o f water which the model predicts should be applied by irrigation provides a 
rough check for comparison with the amount the farmers could use based on the number o f 
wells and the typical yields. The UNDDSMS well inventory located 123 dug wells and 5 
private boreholes in the modelled area, many o f which are now dry. The anticipated yield o f 
these particularly during the early stages o f the development o f the resource would have been 
o f the order o f 6-10 lit/sec suggesting a maximum total possible yield o f 34,000 to 56,000 m3 
per 12-hour day. The irrigation demand suggested by the evapotranspiration model for the 
total irrigated area in the valley (discussed later) could, in broad terms, have approached a 
maximum of 15,000 m3/day in the dry season and 6,000 m3/day in the wet season. It would
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therefore appear that there was sufficient pumping capacity to provide irrigation for the 
demand indicated by the evapotranspiration model even allowing for small irrigation 
efficiencies.
Irrigation rates predicted by the evapotranspiration model and also runoff quantities added to 
the rainfall and applied to the runon areas in the transient water balance model require high 
infiltration rates if the fields are not to be flooded for long periods. The mean measured 
infiltration rates (Dar El Yemen, 1997;28) are 180mm in a three hour period and can 
approach twice this amount. Typical furrow depths observed in the field are o f the order of 
150mm. This is adequate to infiltrate nearly all o f the model-generated irrigation depths. Even 
excessive over-irrigation or the maximum, 400mm model-generated irrigation depths, could 
therefore be infiltrated within three hours. The maximum runoff (spate) depth from the entire 
thirteen years o f data is lm. The high observed infiltration rates could also cope with this 
amount within a day especially when it is considered that the wadi bed materials will have 
even higher rates.
3.5 Groundwater Flow Modelling
In this section groundwater flow modelling attempts to match the observed hydrographs. A 
unique solution o f the water balance equation is not possible due to error margins in the 
variables. However the five aims mentioned at the beginning of this chapter can still be 
addressed within those error limits.
Table 3.9: Variation in evapotranspiration and runoff inputs to the groundwater modelling:
Scenario Model Used to Generate 
the Scenario
Wind velocity data are used from:
i) Ta’iz airport, and
ii) 50% o f this velocity
Evapotransp iration
Runoff is calculated by:
i) the SCS-TS-HWC method
ii) As above, with a maximum o f 10% runoff/rainfall ratio
Runoff
3.5.1 Steady-State Groundwater Flow Model
The first step towards matching the observed hydrographs involved attempting to reproduce 
the groundwater heads when the Al Hayma alluvial aquifer was essentially undeveloped. The 
widespread development o f well construction and pump installation was triggered by the flow
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remittances from Saudi Arabia, which began in the mid-70’s (Figure 3.17). A groundwater 
head map was produced from 1976 data as part o f  the investigation into the Al Hayma valley 
as a supply source for the city o f T a’iz (Leggette et al, 1981). The 1976 head distribution was 
matched by constructing a steady-state model using the GW Vistas-Modflow software. The 
development o f  the inputs to the model is described below.
Aquifer geometry was determined from the extent o f  cultivated land on the alluvial floor o f 
the valley indicated by the Directorate o f  Overseas Surveys 1981 maps and the satellite 
images o f the area. The base o f the aquifer was determined from borehole information and 
from the results o f a resistivity survey carried out by (Leggette et al, 1981) and matched to the 
borehole data. The survey and boreholes were located in the central part o f the valley and the 
lower (Miqbaba) part. The level o f the base o f the aquifer in the upstream, northern part of 
the valley was estimated by extrapolation. The valley was modelled as comprising one aquifer 
(the alluvium) because the volcanics are much less permeable (the mean permeability o f the 
volcanics is around 300 times smaller than that o f the alluvium, Dar El-Yemen, 1997;91).
Permeability o f the alluvium was determined by those who conducted borehole pumping tests 
at the time o f their construction by Jacob and Theis recovery analyses. The occurrence o f 
some discontinuous silty and clayey bands presumably led them to use confined methods, 
although a semi-confined method may have been more appropriate. No observation well data 
were available, however, storage data are not required for the steady-state analysis. Values of 
hydraulic conductivity from the more reliable pumping tests ranged from 333 to 3m/day with 
a mean o f 42m/day and a median o f 29m/day.
Wadi inflows were represented in the model by constant heads. Although the software has the 
facility to model stream flows, the extremely ephemeral nature o f the wadi flows precluded 
their representation by this method in a steady-state analysis, and instead, flows from constant 
head sources located at the entry points o f  tributaries to the Al Hayma valley were used in 
calibration. Constant heads were located between ground level and the base o f the aquifer. In 
attempting to calibrate heads and flows in the model it was found that the heads could not be 
varied by more than +/- 2.5m and in the case o f the major wadis by not more than +/- lm  
without the model failing to converge. This relatively tight control meant that the resulting 
wadi flows did not vary greatly. The occurrence o f a marshy area at the narrow outlet o f the 
central part o f the valley was modelled as a drain with a water level equivalent to ground 
level.
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Recharge was applied using the rainfall o f 1987 (0.00126 m/day, the closest year on record to 
the mean of the modelled period) to all the cells in the model. The valley perimeter cells also 
received the extra equivalent rainfall contributed as runoff from the east and west flanks in 
accordance with farm er’s observations. The rainfed crop and bare soil evapotranspiration and 
evaporation were deducted from the rainfall to give net recharge. As a rough estimate at this 
initial stage o f analysis, the evapotranspiration from a 300m-wide strip potatoes and maize 
irrigated for three seasons per year and extending the full length o f the wadi was deducted in 
the calculation o f net recharge. Again this was an approximation o f the farm er’s observations 
regarding the extent o f irrigated agriculture prior to significant well construction.
On the basis o f Table 3.9, two main scenarios were explored:
a) a driest case in which evapotranspiration was based on the wind velocities recorded at 
T a’iz airport and a runon from the eastern and western flanks based on the SCS-TS- 
HWC model but with a 10% maximum runoff/rainfall ratio,
b) a wettest case in which evapotranspiration was based on 50% of the wind velocities 
recorded at T a’iz airport and a runon from the eastern and western flanks based on the 
SCS-TS-HWC model.
Table 3.10 gives the net recharge (m/day) contributed to the valley as runoff from the eastern 
and western flanks (+ denotes net water gain, - denotes net water loss):
Case Flanks 
(882 cells)
Central Zone 
(742 cells)
Balance
Dry: Airport wind velocity and SCS-TS- 
HWC
+0.00018 -0.00054 -0.00015
Wet: 50% Airport wind velocity and 
SCS-TS-HWC with 10% max Q/P ratio
+0.00049 -0.00041 +0.000079
Groundwater heads and wadi flows were used as model targets. The target head distribution 
was within 5m o f the observed 1976 levels over the full 240m range in head values from the 
northern to the southern end o f the valley (Figure 3.11). Wadi flow targets were within the 
range given in Table 3.3. Recharge was varied according to Table 3,10 and intermediate cases 
were also considered. Wetter cases failed to reach a solution and dryer cases caused the 
model to ‘run dry’. Permeability was varied to determine the limits in which a solution could 
be obtained with a water balance o f better than 0.01%. The head convergence criterion was 
1mm.
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Table 3.11: Steady State Model Sensitivity
Scenario Dry Intermediate Wet
Solution & Balance OK OK OK
Permeability m/day 10-100 20-25 34-38
Comment on heads 
and flows
Best when 
K=15 to 20
Best when
recharge=0,00007 m/day
Flows too high
A net recharge of minus 0.00007 m/day +/- 15% and a permeability range o f 20-25 m/day 
gave the best fit. Over this range the modelled outflow from Miqbaba varied from 4100 
m3/day to 11300 m3/day. For comparison, the average flow from Miqbaba monitored by 
Montgomery (1975) in 1974 was 5,600 m3/day, and by Leggette et al (1981) was 10,400 
m3/day, [Their records had to be extrapolated assuming a declining flow during the dry 
season.] Leggette et al acknowledge that their readings were in a period when groundwater 
levels were particularly high (1977-1980), whereas this model was being calibrated against 
1976 levels.
Table 3.12 gives the range o f wadi flows (m 3/day) determined by the steady state model for 
the ‘best fit’ range o f recharge and permeability and the ‘target5 flows generated by the runoff 
modelling (Table 3.3):
Wadi Flows Tan if Ja’ashin Hajib Miqbaba Total Inflows**
Target 1700-5000 2000-5600 1500-4100 5600-
10400*
6200-17500
Steady State 2018-4200 1900-4000 900-1900 4100-11300 6034-12300
* observed flows, ** including minor wadis
The steady-state analysis suggests that the driest case analysed was ‘too dry! and the wettest 
‘too w et5. The best fit solution lies between. The two combinations o f T a’iz airport wind data 
with the SCS-TS-HWC runoff method, and 50% reduced wind speed with a 10% maximum 
runoff/rainfall ratio in the SCS-TS-HWC method also lie between the wettest and driest cases 
and are considered in the transient water balance modelling.
3.5.2 Transient Water Balance Model
Recreating the field observed hydrographs by modelling requires a time-series analysis such 
as that provided by the transient methods available in the GW Vistas-Modflow package. It 
was decided, however, not to use this method for two reasons. Firstly, because o f the 
problems o f cells ‘running dry5 (as has happened in reality), large head differences occur in
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adjacent cells during successive iterations, resulting in the model failing to converge. 
Secondly, abstractors export water to different parts o f the basin. Thus, although wells in the 
deeper, central part o f the valley remain operative for longer, the farmers away from the 
centre import water because their wells have run dry as the aquifer was depleted. In trying to 
model this, a dry cell ceases to function and cannot receive recharge or lose abstraction even 
though these processes are taking place in reality. Because of the problems o f cells ‘drying 
up’ and farmers importing water, a model was adopted which summed water inflows and 
outflows on a basin scale.
Rather than the constant head representation o f wadi inflow runoff used in the steady state 
model, the transient model applied the runoff water to the areas described as receiving spate 
flows by the farmers. These areas are different for the dry and wet season both in the Field 
and in the model. For the modelled period (1983-1995), the area receiving spates has 
decreased from that in the 1970’s when there had been little groundwater development. In 
particular, groundwater sources had been developed immediately prior to, and during, the 
modelled period in the Ja’ashin catchment for irrigation and the city supply, and in the Hajib 
catchment for irrigation. In Wadi Hajib this has resulted in a notable decline in the number o f 
spates reaching the Al Hayma valley. In Wadi Ja’ashin there was an almost immediate 
interruption o f the perennial flow and only very major rainfall events result in spates reaching 
the Al Hayma valley today. As mentioned above, in an attempt to model this decline in the 
number o f spates, only the runoff from the wettest month (August) has been used in the 
model for these two wadis.
Water levels have been monitored for the modelled period in wells clustered in the central Al 
Hayma basin and the M iqbaba basin (Figure 3.7). Because the limited areas o f water level 
monitoring coincide with the two areas which have a basin geometry with a lip at the exit, a 
model comprising the two basins with a small interconnecting channel and a large input 
channel was developed (Figure 3.12). It was assumed that the basins were horizontal with a 
horizontal piezometric surface equivalent to that at the geometrical mid-point o f  the basin. It 
was also assumed that the level o f the ‘horizontalised’ basin outlet lip is at the same level 
below the mid-point basin start water level as the actual outlet lip is below the starting water 
level at the outlet. A third assumption was that any excess water in channels (that is, which 
has not been used by the crops) drains to the basins. This last assumption is not valid because 
the water takes time to drain into the next basin and during this period is effectively in storage 
and available for pumping to the overlying crops during a period o f deficit. However, because 
the time steps are quite long (annual wet season and dry season) any excess will tend to be
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drained from the channels. In any case, the amount o f water which crops in the channel areas 
needed in the deficit periods has been calculated separately and is discussed below, where it 
is referred to as the ‘channel deficit’. Changes in groundwater level are caused by volumetric 
inflows and ouflows, thus outflows from the basins and water levels in the basins are 
interdependent. By taking into account the changing surface area o f the piezometric surface at 
each time step from the aquifer geometry, water levels and outflows could be calculated 
iteratively for each time step.
Transient M odel A: 1987 x  5
Before attempting to match hydrographs from the full time series, the rainfall, runoff, 
agricultural and city abstraction data for 1987 (the year closest to the average rainfall) was 
run for five years consecutively. Model drawdowns were calculated using the ‘static’ level 
from the steady-state model. The target five-year drawdown was the average drawdown 
measured in the observation wells in the larger Al Hayma basin during the first five years o f 
the operation o f the city supply. There were three main reasons for choosing the five-year 
period. Firstly that the period would be long enough for the impact o f development o f the 
aquifer to be significant. Secondly it was desirable that the modelling should run from a point 
prior to abstraction for the city. Thirdly, monitoring in the intervening period was very scant 
and the five-year period offered the first reliable observed heads to calibrate against.
Although pumping tests may show a semi-confined or even confined response, the draining of 
the aquifer on a large scale comprises the actual replacement o f water by air in the pore 
spaces and a specific yield value is more appropriate to represent storage. A rudimentary 
variation in specific yield covering the range indicated by the major soil type (14% to 10%) 
was used.
Table 3.13. A summary o f the analyses and results o f the Transient Water Balance modelling 
o f the Al Hayma basin (1987 x 5):
Variables Al Hayma
Runoff Wind Run Data Specific Yield Drawdowns (m)
SCS with 10% max Q/P 50% Airport 0.1 4.2
SCS with 10% max Q/P 50% Airport 0.14 3.5
SCS-TS-HWC Airport 0.1 3.1
SCS-TS-HWC Airport 0.14 2.3
Target five year drawdown: 4.0
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Transient M odel B: 1983-1995
On the basis o f the results o f model A (1987 x 5) three scenarios were selected for attempting 
to match the complete 13-year record (Table 3,14). The abstraction record was not complete 
for this period, however. The first two years had to be generated by extrapolating back the 
yields o f wells to their commissioning dates and the last five years o f data by extrapolating 
forwards linearly on the basis o f declining yields to the date o f their eventual failure or their 
1995 yields. Irrigated areas were determined for 1983-1987 from the 1986 satellite image and 
from 1991-1995 from the 1995 image. The intervening period was taken as a 50/50 mixture of 
the 1986 and 1995 irrigated areas.
Table 3.14. Three scenarios tested by the Transient Water Balance model (1983-1995):
Model la lb 2
Runoff 10% max Q/P 10% max Q/P SCS-TS-HWC
Wind Run Data 50% Airport Airport Airport
Specific Yield 0.1 0.14 0.1
The hydrographs for each method are compared with the target hydrographs for Al Hayma 
and Miqbaba in Figure 3.14. A mass balance error o f approximately +/- 10% might be 
expected.
Model 2 gave the closest match to the observed data. The other two models ‘dried up’ in 
1991. It should be noted that matching the Miqbaba water levels was particularly difficult. 
Because o f its relatively small size and low storage, slight changes in the amount o f water 
flowing from the input channel to the Miqbaba basin produce a large change in head.
The discussion up to this point has focused on understanding the natural water movement 
processes. In summary, the SCS method modified by the Technical Secretariat o f the High 
W ater Council for Yemen appears applicable in this instance. However, it is not possible to 
determine conclusively whether a 10% runoff/rainfall cut off should be used or not due to the 
error margins o f the variables.
3.6 Who took the water?
Leggette et al. (1977;8-18) estimated a ‘total quantity available for potential export’ for the 
city o f 9 Mm3/yr +/- 20% and proposed an abstraction o f 10 Mm3/yr (and an effective end to 
irrigated farming) as a ‘reasonable objective’. In their estimation, the As Sahlah basin
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accounted for 2Mm3/yr o f  this supply. This leaves 8 Mm3/yr for abstraction from the area 
included in this study (Habir to Miqbaba excluding As Sahlah).
From the steady state analysis it is possible to estimate the impact development o f the Al 
Hayma basin has had since the relatively undeveloped situation o f 1976.
If no outflow from Miqbaba were to occur, thus negatively impacting agriculture downstream 
of this point, the potential yield o f the is obtained from the sum of the Miqbaba outflow and 
the evaporative loss from the marsh, viz.: 3.0 Mm3/yr +/- 15%.
Assuming, like Leggette et al, the complete demise o f irrigated agriculture, the potential yield 
is obtained from the sum of the evaporative loss from the marsh, the Miqbaba outflow and 
evapotranspiration from crops receiving irrigation in 1976. This yield would be 3.8 Mm3/yr 
+ /-  15% .
3.8 Mm3/yr is only 50% of the 'reasonable objective5 o f Leggette et al.(1977). With hindsight 
it can reasonably be stated therefore that the failure o f the Al Hayma supply scheme was 
guaranteed at its planning stage.
To assess the relative significance o f different human water use activities and to determine 
the physical causes o f the 1995 crisis (and earlier crises), abstractions from model 2 were 
examined (Figure 3.15). Although the design abstractions for the city supply were never 
achieved, the over-estimates o f Leggette et al. resulted in groundwater mining from the 
outset. At the commencement o f abstraction for the city in 1982-1983 irrigation activity alone 
in Al Hayma was already affecting outflows from the Miqbaba basin. Right from the outset of 
the city scheme competition for the dwindling resource between the city and the farmers 
made aquifer depletion inevitable. Effective complete depletion had occurred by 1991, if not 
by 1988.
In reality, farmers will not stop irrigating if technology, land and water are available and 
affordable, and farmers did increase the irrigated area in Al Hayma after 1976. However the 
abstraction for the city on its own would have exhausted the resource, except it would have 
taken a little longer if irrigated agriculture had stopped as the original scheme unrealistically 
envisaged.
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[The channel deficit mentioned in Figure 3.15 refers to the excess amount o f  water which has 
been drained from the channel areas to the basin downstream, usually in the wet season. If 
this water had not drained to the basin by the following dry season it could have replaced any 
irrigation deficit in the channel areas in the dry season. It is considered that during the early 
1980’s the storage in the channel areas was sufficient to meet this deficit, but that as 
depletion progressed, the 'channel deficit’ has approximated the actual deficit. The 'channel 
deficit5 thus represents an unknown in the model that could be added to the agricultural 
consumption o f water in the earlier years o f the model to get a more accurate assessment o f 
the agricultural consumption. In the later years o f the model (when the deficit is larger) it 
contributes less, if at all, to the estimate o f agricultural consumption. In any instance, the 
overall picture o f ‘who took the water?’ is clear.]
3.6.1 Aquifer Recovery: the hydrogeology of potential resource reconstruction
The establishment o f a calibrated mathematical model permits the tentative exploration o f 
future trends. It has been used to predict how long it would take the aquifer to return to its 
1976 steady-state condition if groundwater abstraction for the city remained at the (low) 1995 
level and if irrigated agriculture ceased. Under these conditions the M iqbaba basin would 
recover after five years and the Al Hayma basin after ten years (both +/- 20%).
The history o f the Al Hayma valley water resource has been examined as a case study which 
provides a necessary introduction and background to the issues o f water management in the 
wider T a’iz area. The reason for selecting Al Hayma is that the demise o f this particular 
resource has had the single biggest impact on many of the wider water management issues 
and a better informed discussion o f them in the following chapters is possible.
3.7 Water Resources Pollution
‘those who destroy the earth’ 
Revelation 11:18
This section assesses the impact o f water use practices in the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment 
on water quality. One consequence o f falling groundwater levels has been reduced base 
flows, which in turn has resulted in less dilution of pollutants, that is, higher concentrations in 
surface and groundwaters.
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3.7.1 Methodology
A survey o f surface water electrical conductivity (EC) was conducted as part o f this study 
during November-December 1995, September and November 1996 and March 1997.
Analyses o f groundwater and surface water were also obtained from sampling undertaken as 
part o f the NW RA well inventory (1996) and a study by van der Welle (1997) in autumn 
1996. The NW RA well inventory analyses (1996) were undertaken in the NW SA laboratory 
in T a’iz and the ionic balance was usually worse than +/- 20%. Only where their analyses 
were better than this, have they been used in compiling Figure 3.16 Although the level o f 
error in the inventory analyses is unacceptable, for many locations it comprises all that is 
available and their data are consistent with those o f van der Welle. Van der Welle also 
encountered problems o f laboratory analytical reliability and only where the data from her 
study were considered reliable have they have been included in this discussion. The samples 
reported in this study were collected at various dates in the hydrological year. However, it 
should be noted that concentrations generally reach levels around 50% higher at the end of 
the diy season in February / March than in most o f the rest o f the year. Sampling was 
generally not conducted immediately after a rainfall event when concentrations would be 
appreciably lower than ‘normal’.
3.7.2 Polluted Areas
Figure 3.16 indicates that apart from a few upper reaches o f streams and Wadi Ad Dabaab the 
only water courses which flow for more than 6 months per year are heavily polluted. Using 
the irrigation salinity hazard criteria, Figure 3.16 divides the valleys into those whose 
groundwater or surface water exhibits a high hazard (750-2250 pS/cm EC) and those with a 
very high hazard (>2250 juS/cm). This division is even higher than the WFIO limit for 
drinking water o f 1500 pS/cm which has been adopted by NWSA. The EC o f rainfall in the 
area has been measured at 20 pS/cm and spring and surface water flows in the mountainous 
areas are as low as 300 pS/cm. However, all samples from wells and streams in wadi 
alluvium are above 750 pS/cm. The area o f >2250 pS/cm EC is confined to the east to west 
flowing central zone o f the Upper Rasyan catchment.
Dar El Yemen (1997) also noted this central zone as having groundwater containing high 
concentrations o f sulphate, sodium and chloride. O f the ions commonly analysed, sulphate is 
often indicative o f urban pollution and nitrate o f agricultural use o f fertilisers, but can also be 
indicative o f sewage pollution. High sulphate concentrations in groundwater can also occur 
naturally through the dissolution o f minerals such as gypsum. Apart from three spurious
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analyses, all the analyses o f NWRA (1996) and van der Welle (1996) containing sulphate in 
excess o f the EU limit o f 250mg/l were located in the central zone defined by EC >2250 
pS/cm. The areas with groundwater o f nitrate content greater than the EU maximum of 22.6 
mg/1 were located both in the central zone and outside it, particularly in the agricultural areas 
in the western edge o f the study area (Wadi Dabaab, Ar Rubay’i and Shar’ab). The 
distribution o f nitrates, sulphates and high EC strongly suggests the presence o f urban 
pollution in the central zone and pollution by agriculture in the areas mentioned.
3.7.3 Pollution Sources
Tying down the specific sources o f urban, particularly industrial, pollution is hampered by the 
occurrence o f ‘natural’ pollution around the ‘headwaters’ o f Wadi Mawsatah that is 
upstream o f any industrial or other sources. This groundwater source flows towards Wadi 
Hawban and then Hawgala. In 1974, prior to significant industrial or urban development in 
the Wadi Hawban catchment the EC was already at 3 75 OpS/cm (Montgomery, 1975) though 
this has been further affected by industrial and urban pollution so that in Wadi Hawban it 
exceeds 5000juS/cm today.
Domestic Waste Water
Contaminant levels have increased in the Wadi Hawban and Hawgala areas because they lie 
directly downstream of the city and receive industrial and urban waste that is either not 
intercepted by the sewerage system, or has leaked from it. Sanitation provision is estimated 
by NW SA at 48%, although when illegal connections and billing irregularities are taken into 
account this figure may be higher (Handley, 1999a;9). Certainly sewerage provision has not 
kept pace with water connections (Figure 5.5) and the water shortages in the city further 
exacerbate the problem by providing less dilution for the sewage which results in greater 
corrosion o f the sewage mains and hence greater leakage o f sewage. The sewage which does 
find its way into the sewerage system and does not leak out ends up in the stabilisation 
lagoons in Burayhi from whence it flows down Wadi Malih. The net result is that the surface 
water and groundwater downstream of Hawban/Hawgala and Burayhi are polluted by the city 
effluent. Farmers use this water for irrigation but can only grow millet because of its high 
salinity resistance and even then they notice a rapid deterioration in yields and soil quality. In 
the absence o f any other sources, the inhabitants o f the downstream areas are forced to use 
this water not only for irrigation but also for domestic purposes (Photo 1) and even drinking 
in some instances, knowing full well its origin. Waste water flows from the main city sewers 
have been measured at 10,000m3/day in the dry season.
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Industrial Waste Water
Table 3.15 summarises the major industrial waste discharges in the T a’iz area:
Factory Treatment Discharge
Location
Discharge
Method
Waste Type
Hawban 
Factories 1
Activated Sludge Wadi Mawsatah Partially
submerged
pipe
Food Production 
Waste
Hawban 
Factories 2
None Adjacent to 
Factories
Lagoons and 
Cess Pits
Sewage and 
Plastics Waste
Soap and 
Ghee
New Treatment? Hidran Lagoons Oils and Fats
Paint Factory None Adjacent to 
Factory?
Pit? Paint Waste
Sheibani 
Food and 
Drinks
None Bir Basha Pipe Sewage, Food and 
Drink Production 
Waste
Soft Drinks None Wadi
Dumaynah
Wadi bed to 
Lagoons
Sodium
Hydroxide
Proctor and 
Gamble
None Adjacent to 
Factory?
Pit? Not Known
Figure 3.16 groups together the industrial complexes o f Hayel Said at Hawban (including 
Nadfood, Genpak and YCIC) and Sheibani (including Food Products and Paradise Juice).
Occasionally, factories, which normally pipe waste away, have been known to dump water in 
depressions near to the factory when pumping equipment has failed. Heavy metal content 
(mg/1) o f groundwater samples near to three factory discharge points confirms the occurrence 
o f industrial pollution:
Table 3.16 Heavy metal pollution (from van der Welle, 1997):
Sample location / pollution source
Parameter WHO
Guideline
Wadi Rubay’i / 
Paint Factory
Wadi Mawsatah / 
Hawban Factories
Wadi Hidran / 
Soap and Ghee
Aluminium 0.05 0 .2 2 -0 .1 4 0.13 0.19
Lead 0.05 0 .1 4 -0 .1 3 0.34 0.37
Cadmium 0.005 0.01 0.03 0.03
Manganese 0.05 4.7
Nickel 0.05 0.08 0.07
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The well from which the paint factory pollution was detected, and those immediately 
downstream of it, are used by approximately 1000 people for drinking water collection. Local 
inhabitants complain about the odours from the discharge point in Wadi Mawsatah. When 
they complained previously, the factory extended the discharge pipe to its current position. It 
would appear that the activated sludge treatment o f this waste source is inadequately 
maintained or is insufficient for the demand load. Although some form o f waste treatment has 
apparently been installed at the Soap and Ghee factory since these samples were collected, it 
is as yet unclear whether the treatment has reduced the level o f pollution significantly. 
Discharge from the Soap and Ghee factory has been to lagoons perched above a small wadi 
immediately to the north o f Ta’iz city dump (Photo 6). Seepage and evaporation 
approximately keep pace with supply. There is a seepage face at the base o f  one o f the lagoon 
dams. Concentrated liquid waste from the city is also tankered to the dump. The 
environmental damage caused by years o f subsurface seepage cannot be undone by whatever 
waste water treatment is undertaken now. The build up o f heavy metals and other toxins in 
the food chain in the agricultural areas of the Rasyan catchment downstream of the city and 
the factories has not been investigated.
3.8 Summary: Environmental Impact on the Upper Wadi Rasyan Catchment
Groundwater Levels
The environmental impact of abstraction levels in the Upper Rasyan catchment have been felt 
most in Al Hayma as described in sections 3.2-3.6. The development o f the wellfields in Al 
Hayma have been felt as far downstream as the sewage lagoons at Burayhi with declining 
wadi flows and groundwater levels and the resulting drying up wetlands or xazaga. This latter 
effect has been perceived as a positive one by locals who have been able to increase the area 
o f land available for agriculture. The reduction in wetland has also been accompanied by a 
local decline in malaria and bilharzia. Groundwater development also affects upstream areas 
in that agricultural development, in search of dwindling sources of water moves upstream, as 
the satellite imagery demonstrated in Al Hayma (Figure 3.10).
Water levels have also notably declined in the Hawban area o f the Hayel Said factories, lower 
Wadi Dabaab adjacent to the Soap and Ghee factory and in the area o f T a’iz city itself.
Pollution Levels
Nearly all o f the streams in the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment which flow for at least six 
months o f the year are polluted by, or entirely comprise, domestic and industrial waste water.
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Groundwater pollution extends even further (Figure 3.16). Domestic waste water accounts for 
most o f the total pollutant load by virtue o f the large volume o f untreated waste, a significant 
proportion o f unsewered properties and leaking sewers. Some industrial waste water is known 
to contain heavy metals but levels are not monitored.
3.8.1 Conclusions
Falkenmark and Lundqvist’s (1995) correlation o f the regions with the most rapid population 
growth and stagnating food production, coinciding with extreme vulnerability due to 
hydroclimatic constraints, aptly describes T a’iz. That vulnerability is expressed in declining 
water availability and quality.
W ater Quantity
The Al Hayma aquifer took approximately four years to deplete and will take nine years to 
recover if no more irrigation takes place and the city abstracts current minimal quantities. 
Section 4.1 attempts to put a value on the loss o f agricultural production and livelihoods if 
resource degradation were to be reversed (section 4.1).
W ater Quality
The full cost both now and to future generations o f the pollution in the T a’iz area is, perhaps, 
impossible to estimate (Allan and Karshenas, 1996; 125). The loss o f soil fertility, the increase 
in toxin levels and especially heavy metals in the food chain and the legacy o f polluted 
groundwater and surface waters o f the area are severe. The impacts o f pollution on surface 
and groundwaters was immediate, and the prolongation o f polluting activity over the past 
twenty-five years has ensured a significant build-up of pollutants in the unsaturated and 
saturated zones. Although some o f these environmental impacts may be reversible, many of 
them are not (Karshenas, 1992;2, Feitelson and Haddad,1998, Pearce, 1993;50). Others would 
take a long time to rectify and need a lot o f fresh water to dilute the impacts to acceptable 
levels. That water is simply not available.
As with many Yemeni urban areas, an environmental ‘time-bomb’ has been set o ff which will 
leave its mark on generations to come. Even the ‘reversible impacts’ may, in reality, be 
irreversible due to the deficit o f economic capacity and political will. The socio-economic 
and socio-political aspects that have contributed to this environmental disaster and which 
might contribute to any resource renewal are considered in chapters four and five 
respectively.
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Chapter 4 A Socio-Economic Map of W ater Allocation and Use
The depletion o f the water resources o f Al Hayma analysed in the previous chapter exhibits in 
microcosm the national picture. The annual renewable water resources o f Yemen have been 
estimated at 2.1 Bin3, or 125m3/capita/year. This is equivalent to about 10% of the regional 
MENA average and compares with a world average o f 7500m3/capita/year (World Bank,
1997; Davies and Sahooly, 1996). The reason is not so much climatic (the area has a higher 
proportion o f rainfall than the regional average) as demographic. By the year 2025 it is 
estimated that population growth will result in renewable water resources per capita o f 72 
m3/capita/yr (ibid.). As a reminder, this compares with individual human water needs of 
around lm 3/yr for drinking, 100m3/yr for domestic purposes and 1000m3/yr to feed her.
In the context o f such shortage, it is suggested that the survival o f Yemen during the next 
century depends, not so much on how much water is available, but on how well the scarce 
water resources are used. This purpose o f this chapter is to:
a) evaluate the relative returns to water o f  agriculture and industry in economic and
livelihood terms,
b) describe the socio-economic impacts o f the water scarcity and pollution problems
described in the previous chapter particularly in the urban area
c) demonstrate the adaptive capacity o f households and water-related businesses to
the scarcity in the context o f equity.
The chapter is ordered in this sequence. The area under discussion in this chapter is Upper 
Wadi Rasyan (Fig. 3.2) which comprises 930 km2 and had a population o f nearly 700,000 at 
the 1994 census.
4.1 Agricultural Sector Water Use
‘She said... “Since you have given me the land of the Negev,
give me also springs of water.” 
So he gave her the upper springs and the lower springs’
Joshua 15:19
4.1.1 National and Governorate Context
The most impressive feature o f the Yemeni landscape is the terracing. In North Yemen this 
agricultural system dates back to at least 1000BC when, it is thought, 300,000 people derived
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livelihoods from 20,000 hectares o f terraced land, Yemen is one o f the few places on earth 
where rainwater harvesting and runoff agriculture has been practised continuously since 
earliest settlement (Prinz, 1994).
The shift from rainfed and runoff-fed agriculture to irrigation, particularly groundwater based 
irrigation indicated in Table 4,1 is very recent, and was part financed by remittances earned 
by up to one million Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia and the G ulf from the mid-seventies 
up to the Gulf War in 1990. With so many people absent from their home villages, the same 
period witnessed a sharp decline in the proportion o f labour available for agriculture. Some 
authors suggest this was the cause o f degradation in the traditional rainwater harvesting 
infrastructure (Varisco, 1991).
Today agriculture occupies about 5% o f the land in Yemen, though there has been some 
reduction in cultivated area since 1970, the loss being from rainfed arable land (Bamatraf, 
1987;595). Table 4.1 indicates the decreasing agricultural proportion o f GDP and the 
decreasing proportion o f the labour force and o f the population involved in agriculture. 
Because o f the underlying population growth, however, the rural population dependent on 
agriculture have doubled from 5.8 million in 1970 to 11.5 million in 1990 (World Bank 
1993). Despite the increasing availability o f labour to work decreasing areas o f land, and 
despite increasing mechanisation and use o f fertilisers and pesticides, yields have declined or 
at best remained static. Growth areas in agriculture have been confined to fruit, vegetables 
and qat production. These comprise the main crops that use groundwater and the increase in 
their production has been the major factor contributing to unsustainable groundwater 
consumption. The huge growth in the irrigated areas (250% growth between 1970 and 1996) 
has been outstripped by the population growth so that the irrigated area per Yemeni is now 
about 17.5m by 17.5m. The T a 'iz  governorate accounts for about 10% o f the total cultivated 
land in Yemen but 16% of the population.
4.1,2 Methodology of the socio-economic surveys of rural water use, 1995 & 1996
Surveys were designed to obtain the data that would provide an understanding o f  water use in 
descriptive terms and also permit an evaluation o f returns to water. Mainly due to limitations 
in transport availability, it was necessary to employ an essentially ‘rapid rural appraisal’ 
(RRA) method in examining water use in agriculture (Chambers, 1992, Cromwell, 1990;23, 
Pretty et al, 1989;54-62, Chambers and Carruthers,1986). This was supplemented by 
participatory PRA methods (ibid.), mapping o f wadi areas and the use o f satellite imagery 
described in chapter 3. The field work was conducted within the context of,
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T a b le  4.1 Y e m e n  N ational Agricultural S ta t i s t i c s
Units 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1996
YR:$US YR 6 8 100
% of Labour % 71 66 62 59 58 58
in Agriculture
% of Population % 78 71 67 65 63
in Agriculture
Agricultural % 45 20 17.8 15
share of GDP
Cultivated Land Area
Cultivated Area M ha 1.3 0.9* 1.1
Irrigated Area M ha 0.21 0.49,
% irrigated area % 16 17 45
Cereal 000 ha 1080 850 860 850 700
Fruit and Vegetables 000 ha 39 75 69 92 136
Qat 000 ha 8 70 75 80 91
Production
Cereal 000 T 845 491* 731
Fruit and Vegetables 000 T 20 73 595 835 1007 1094
Qat Million 35.2 154 352 387 501 592
Bundles
Yields
Maize Kg/ha 2250 2140 1510 1149 1274 1240
Sorghum/Millet Kg/ha 795 800 888 416 764 800
Potatoes Kg/ha 12364 11830 12840
Tomatoes Kg/ha 15528 15210
*1991
Sources: Bamatraf (1987), World Bank (1993), Statistical Yearbook (1996), World Bank (1998)
i n
and with the financial and logistics support of, two UNDP surveys, in November/ December 
1995 and September/ December 1996. More detailed accounts o f the surveys and their 
findings are reported in Handley (1996a) and Dar El-Yemen (1997) respectively.
The 1995 Survey
Aspects o f the survey discussed within this section include:
a) The overall physical, demographic*, and occupational*, aspects o f five villages.
b) Land ownership and tenure*.
c) Water availability and use from surface and groundwater sources.
* Although the methodology was determined and the survey carried out by the author, the 
development o f the methodology for the RRA part o f the survey included valuable 
sociological inputs regarding these aspects from Cecile de Rouville, the international 
consultant attached to the UNDP project, and are gratefully acknowledged. The survey 
obtained other information than that directly relevant to agriculture, some o f  which is used in 
other sections.
The five villages were selected to give a representative agro-ecological coverage o f the 
governorate excluding the Tihamah. Their locations and names, together with those o f other 
nearby villages included in the survey are shown in Figure 4.1. They all comprised less than 
500 people. Criteria determining the agro-ecology were selected as rainfall, soil type and 
irrigation method. Within that context areas which had supplied T a’iz with water, or which 
are being considered for future supply to the city, were included. The villages chosen varied 
in rainfall between around 300 and 700mm/yr. Although the USAID satellite imagery-based 
soil map (1983) indicated a variety o f soils, in the field the soils o f the cultivated parts were 
quite similar, comprising immature, deep light loamy loess soils with horizons o f pebbles and 
cobbles and occasional clay layers. Adjacent uncultivated runoff areas were rocky with little 
to no soil and wadi bottom areas comprised fluvially deposited sands and gravels.
Because o f the distance from T a’iz, it was necessary to stay in each o f two of the villages for 
a week (Al Aadan and Al Khums). This permitted:
a) a greater awareness and appreciation o f the village activities throughout the daily 
cycle, which could not be achieved by day visits (such as the pressure for well access 
at sunrise and sunset) and a greater degree o f observer participation.
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b) greater access to the villagers -  many people made visits during the evenings and often 
talked about issues that were o f  more concern to them than those they had been able to 
talk about during the day in a group context.
The other three villages were visited on a daily basis.
Undertaking the survey during the dry winter season meant that although there was less 
agricultural activity than in the summer, the areas o f irrigated land and rainfed land were easy 
to distinguish which helped observation and comprehension o f the water management 
activities which is the main emphasis o f the study.
Six main activities were conducted during the survey:
a) observation o f the physical, especially hydraulic, setting o f the village by walking 
around it
b) discussion with farmers (usually found in the market place up to 12:30, or in the fields) 
regarding basic aspects o f village structure, place names, important people and main 
crop types. Village problems and water-related issues were then discussed. A venue 
for afternoon discussions over qat was arranged.
c) At the qat chews a checklist o f questions was used covering all the aspects o f the 
survey.
d) On the second day, at the qat chew the villagers were asked to prepare a map o f the 
village.
e) Short impromptu excursions were arranged by the villagers to places they considered 
hydraulically important.
f) In the evenings individual villagers came to ask questions and clarify or correct
comments they or others had made during the day.
The following points were noted regarding the methodology:
a) Although interview sampling would have been much more straight forward if the 
desired interviewees (farmers) could have been isolated, in Arab society opinions are 
often public property and they are to be developed by consensus and expressed by 
those considered worthy. Market place and qat chew discussions were dominated by 
one or two spokesmen but with perhaps 20 men listening and discussing what was 
being said amongst themselves and often the speaker was corrected on points. The
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discussions were often heated and were dominated by the visibly active males 
(typically between 20 and 50 years old). When the local shayx was absent the role o f 
spokesman was taken by an influential farmer / well owner. When the shayx was 
present he was sometimes too old to hear or understand.
b) Another bias came with the ‘technical’ questions involving measurements and numbers 
generally. Although efforts were made to simplify them as much as possible using 
various RRA techniques, these questions were really only understood by those 
between 15 and 30 years old and sometimes only crude estimates had to suffice. On 
occasions it appeared that numerical answers were purposely left as vague as possible, 
perhaps from fear that the survey was part o f  a government tax assessment or plan to 
take their water. Sometimes fear o f the shayx appeared to hold people back from 
answering. Because the survey was linked to the UNDP, questions could be answered 
in a manner more likely to attract foreign aid.
c) During the visits to hydraulic locations considered important to the villagers it was 
possible to visit homes on a more individual basis which permitted a refinement and, 
on occasions, a complete reversal o f previous comments.
d) In preparing the village map the local school teacher was usually chosen as the 
cartographer. Other men would direct what he drew and teenage boys often had the 
best grasp o f the details. In nearly all the villages, and without prompting, the map 
focussed on the wells, the routes o f spate flows / streams and the alignment o f fields.
The shapes and sizes o f features were less important.
e) The absence o f a woman interviewer prohibited the interviewing o f women, although it 
was sometimes possible to talk to older women at the well head.
1996 Survey
This survey comprised mapping the land use o f the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment in 
September and December 1996 to field check the extent of rainfed and irrigated agriculture 
noted on the satellite imagery. A brief field visit to key areas was also made in spring 1997 to 
check the extent o f third season irrigation. Because o f the high intensity o f cultivation in wadi 
areas indicated on the satellite imagery, the wadis were surveyed in detail to determine crops 
grown and irrigation methods. Farmers were also interviewed regarding aspects o f  farm 
inputs and outputs to permit a rudimentary assessment o f farm budgets.
114
4.1,3 Survey Results
Land Chvnership and Tenure
This field o f study does not contribute directly to the evaluation o f returns to water or the 
description o f water use practices, however it is included here because it forms relevant 
background regarding agricultural water users. Table 4.2 summarises the main findings 
regarding rent, zakaat and tenancy agreements.
The non-contiguous distribution o f owned land and extreme fragmentation o f land made an 
evaluation o f land ownership and tenure very tenuous (a problem also noted by others, 
Mitchell and Escher,1978). Average holding sizes o f 1.2ha with 4.6 parcels per holding were 
noted for the T a’iz governorate (Bamatraf, 1987). NWRA (1999a) also notes that the majority 
o f farms are under lha in size. Individual plots (haql, hawd or faddaan) are demarcated 
(tahdiid). The non-dividing up o f fields upon inheritance leads to confusion o f ownership but 
permits easier farming. Lack o f land division may also be putting off the fateful day of 
deciding who owns what. Resolving the latter occupies most o f the time o f  the shuyuux 
(plural o f shayx), uses up most o f the bullets that are fired in Yemen in earnest, and is further 
complicated by daughter’s inheritances which should be half that o f the sons but is often 
withheld by force. Since the G ulf War, migration to the cities does not result in fewer people 
to farm the land because rural population growth still outstrips migration. However, lack o f 
work on the land appears to lead to a higher rate o f migration. There is little incentive to 
measure land except for the purpose o f sale. However sale is quite rare. Selling land was 
described as similar to the ultimate dishonour o f ‘exposing one’s women folk’. Remittances 
from Saudi Arabia and the G ulf were spent on houses, vehicles, wells/pumps and businesses, 
but not on land purchase. Only under times o f great financial stress do people sell land, as 
occurred in Al Jahaaza during hard times under the reign of ‘imaam ‘ahmad.
The average proportions o f farmer-owned and sharecropped land in T a’iz -  Ibb (World Bank, 
1986;Annex I) were 84.1% and 4.5% with mixed holdings accounting for 11.4%. This 
compares with 60.2% owner-farmers and 13.2% pure tenants in the Upper Rasyan catchment 
(NWRA,1999a). The average for North Yemen (Bamatraf, 1987;581) is 77.4% owned, 3.5% 
sharecropped, 0.3% w aqf and 18.8% mixed ownership. NWRA ( 1999a; 17) suggest a greater 
proportion o f share cropped land and fixed-rent land is irrigated than is the case with owner- 
farmed land.
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Table 4.2 Rent, Zakaat and Tenancy Agreements:
Sharecrop Rent Zakaat Who
Pays?
Length of 
Agreement
Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Land
Rent
Water
Rent
Land
Rent
Al Aadan 1/4 1/3-1/4* 0-1/5* 3-5% 3-5% Semi-permanent
AlJahaaza 1/3 1/3-1/4* tenant
Al 'anjud Semi-permanent
Aadan As Safaa 1/3 1/3 3% owner >5yrs
AI Xums 1/4 1/4 2.50% 10% owner l-20yrs(av.5yrs)
Ar Rahayba 1/4 1/4 1/2 5% 10% tenant 5-12 yrs
Ar Riwaas 1/4 1/4 1/2 3%* owner 20 yrs
Al Malika 1/4 hourly 100-200YR 100-200YR tenant 1 season
A! Malika (waqf) 1/4 hourly 10% 10% tenant hereditary
*see text
In the villages included in the 1995 survey very little hired labour is used, although some 
landowners employ help during harvest and wealthier landowners hire labour for ploughing, 
sowing, harvest, irrigating and tree trimming, with some employing labourers on a full time 
basis. Labourers may sharecrop and own small portions o f land. Most farmers repair terraces 
themselves but skilled labour, particularly ploughmen, are hired for their skill and equipment. 
Payment for hire may be in crops, though it may be in cash from the few who have access to 
cash through the sale o f water or qat.
The zakaat (tax) is supposed to be 10% for rainfed production and 5% for irrigated crops 
(Mitchell and Escher,1978;40) and paid to God. In reality, 3-5% is paid to the government on 
irrigated or non-irrigated crops via the local leadership, although this reallocation and 
reduction is seldom remarked upon or even noted in the literature. Cases o f  enforced payment 
o f zakaat are reported (Handley, 1996a; 17) and the system is not free from irregularities.
Rent is paid as a proportion o f the crop by the sharecropper to the landowner. It seems to 
make no difference whether the rent is paid in cash or crop in the case o f grains, but rent for 
cash crop land and water rent (particularly for qat) are paid in cash. There was no indication 
o f different rents being paid for different crops. W aqf rental payments used to be paid to the 
mosque or designated charity (Mitchell and Escher,1978;95) but it now appears to be paid to 
the state. W ater rent in Al Aadan and Al Jahaaza is reduced from one third to one quarter if 
the land was gayl (stream) fed rather than supplied from underground sources. Share croppers
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sign rental agreements in the presence o f two witnesses and the ‘amiin (local officiary), who 
stamps the document. If  the sharecropper stops paying then the contract is terminated. 
Although similar rental figures to those given in Table 4.2 are widely quoted, some frank 
conversations suggested that, in reality, the rainfed land sharecropper pays as little as 
possible. If  the crop is poor he gives a token amount and if good, and depending on how 
tough the landowner is, he may give as much as 20%.
Sharecroppers have to obtain permission from the landowner to dig a well. The owner cannot 
take the well from the renter who dug it if permission was obtained. The landowner can only 
buy the well from the renter if the latter agrees. If the landowner wishes to sell the land and 
move the sharecropper o ff then he has to pay for the digging o f the well. Similar rules apply 
to planting trees and repairing terraces.
Irrigation practices
Because o f the seasonal rainfall variation, rainfed cultivation (daahi) is restricted to one 
summer season. With irrigation, two, or even three cultivation seasons are possible. Because 
the rainfall events are intense and o f short duration, rainwater harvesting o f the spate (sayl) 
has to be self-regulating and adequately robust. Diversion o f the spate from a feeder wadi bed 
(saa’ila) to the fields is via a diversion structure (masqa, pi. massaaqi) (Photo 3). If the sayl is 
too strong there may be destruction o f the massaqi and erosion (injiraaf) o f the land (Photo 4) 
The masqa is constructed to reduce the erosive power of the sayl as well as to obtain the 
water, and it is reconstructed if it is destroyed. There are two types o f masqa, one is the runoff 
routes from the mountains to the main wadi, the rights to which are ancient and are attached 
to the land. On a smaller scale, in the main wadi floor, the spate water derived via the masqa 
from the main wadi bed appeared to be the right o f whoever could manage to divert the spate 
flow.
The other gravity-fed form of irrigation is the spring-fed stream (gayl). These may be 
seasonal or perennial, usually depending on the degree o f exploitation upstream. In some 
instances, the spring source was controlled by the solid geology such as at Al Tinjud and Al 
Aadan where the Tawilah Sandstone outcrops with artesian flow (Photo 5). The gayl is 
diverted in open channels to fields in fixed rotation referred to as ‘‘ ‘al ‘awwal bil ‘awwal” or 
“ ‘al Aala bil Aala”, that is, ‘highest first5.
The valley alluvium constitutes the most important source o f water for pumped irrigation. 
Exploitation begins with hand dug wells which are successively deepened as the resource
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declines until the rockhead is reached. As water levels decline further the well may be 
extended by up to 20m using pneumatic tools. After that those wealthy enough have to resort 
to drilling. Dug wells are typically 1 to 2m in diameter and are reinforced-concrete lined 
using corrugated iron or plywood formwork. Construction proceeds downwards, concreting 
about l-2m  at a time. Caving o f the unsupported sides during construction may result in 
ground surface subsidence o f up to 2-3m around the shaft. Wells are dug in winter to ensure 
maximum depth which is typically 5m below the summer water level. Dug wells may reach 
up to 70m deep. Pumping from permanent dug wells in wadi floors is usually by shaft pumps 
belt driven by 24 to 36 HP diesel engines. The pumps are connected to 3-inch or sometimes 
4-inch steel pipe distribution networks via gate valves. More temporary arrangements may be 
used, especially if the groundwater level is not very deep, utilising 2-inch petrol driven 
suction pumps lifting water to a maximum elevation o f 30m above the pump from a 
maximum depth of 5m below pump suction. The rising main and distribution is by 2-inch 
flexible hose. The wells may be abandoned and re-dug after spates.
Wells drilled by farmers are usually between 100 and 300m deep and, like the dug wells, are 
deepened as water levels decline. They are usually finished in 8-inch casing and are open hole 
below the water surface, although torch-slotted casing is sometimes used. As with the 
permanent dug wells, shaft driven pumps and piped distribution systems or open channels are 
used. NW RA (1999a) note that the preference for open channel or piped systems is largely 
determined by whether the topography permits the construction o f channels rather than other 
factors. With piped systems a flexible hose is typically used at the field to direct flow more 
easily, particularly in larger fields.
Table 4.3 gives a summary o f the different hydraulic regimes which are used for irrigation 
and the different regimes in which the regimes are found, Working down the table, the 
hydraulic regimes are cumulative, the land irrigated by a seasonal stream, for instance, will 
also receive water from the spate and be rainfed. The villages can be considered to be at 
various stages in a process o f exhausting the aquifers. Large differences in wealth are 
attached to being able to cultivate three seasons o f cash crops as opposed to only one season 
o f subsistence crops. As the water level falls in an alluvial aquifer penetrated by shallow dug 
wells, the wells diy up. In this situation, the only way a farmer can maintain cultivation for 
two or three seasons is to drill a deeper well into the underlying rock. The costs and potential 
for conflict o f doing this may deter him. It was observed that conflict over water access is 
concentrated in this situation where the water level had reached the base o f the alluvium. By 
contrast, both when groundwater
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resources are plentiful, and when they are insufficient for all but the few farmers who were 
able to drill deeper wells, the potential for conflict decreases. Uphoff et al. (1990;27) 
expected user participation in water resources management to be most readily forthcoming in 
the middle range o f resource availability, and Thompson thought a ‘bounded egalitarian 
group’ most likely to emerge where there is resource depletion (1988;67). However, the 
Yemeni experience is the opposite, with resource depletion producing the greatest conflict 
potential.
Whether a farm has a surplus o f water relative to land or land relative to water availability has 
been directly correlated with farm practices regarding cropping, the extent o f supplementary 
irrigation and feasibility to sell water (Handley, 1996b; 11). By their cropping practices 
farmers clearly demonstrate their aim to achieve a balanced use of land and water without 
underutilising one or the other. A surplus o f water is rarely the problem since there are almost 
bound to be some surrounding farmers with water deficits to sell to. A surplus o f land is 
usually the case. This underscores the principle that greater productive efficiency o f water use 
through improved irrigation techniques, for example, will only result in use o f  more land and 
will not in itself reduce groundwater withdrawals.
Ploughing is mostly by oxen, and the furrows (tilm) are spaced according to crop, for 
example cereals 40cm and potatoes 50cm, although there is considerable variation in this. 
Around 10 tilm make a sabba. The sabba is formed by raising the soil higher than the furrow 
crests so that an enclosed irrigation basin is formed. In some areas the sabba is called a tilm 
and comprises 4 to 6 furrows. The individual sabba is filled with water to the height of the 
furrows (10-15cm) and the water is then switched to the next sabba. The fields are irrigated 
from upstream downwards. Kuraath (everlasting onion) is grown in a separate rectangular 
tilm without furrowing. Although it was consistently stated that women played no role in 
irrigation activities, women, including axdaam (servant caste) were occasionally observed 
controlling the flow of water into fields.
Irrigation efficiencies o f 35% are reported in an area o f open channel irrigation in the At 
Turba district (World Bank,1986;Annex I; 13). Total (well to field) irrigation efficiencies o f 
72% and 60% for piped and open channel systems in the study area have been estimated 
(Zagni, 1996). No volumetric measurements o f water used in irrigation are made, all sales are 
by the hour and flow rates are always mentioned in terms o f pipe diameters only, 2-inch, 3- 
inch etc.
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Water Use
The land use map (Figure 4,2) for the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment was compiled from a 
combination o f satellite imagery interpretation as described in section 3.4.5 and field 
observation conducted as part o f the 1996 survey. A summary o f the major crops grown, the 
number o f harvests and cropping areas in the field study area in both the major wadis and the 
non-wadi areas is given in Table 4.4 to 2.5ha and 0.5 km2 accuracy respectively. The crop 
types are estimated from field checking and the areas o f major crop types may be in error by 
up to +/- 10%. The calculation o f areas o f summer grains and qat assume observed 
approximate intercropping ratios o f 1:2 respectively in the lowland areas and 2:1 in the 
highland areas.
The theoretical water use by agriculture has been calculated by the following procedure:
1. The rainfall distribution pattern (Figure. 3.2) has been applied to the cropped areas in 
50mm/yr gradations.
2. Cultivation intensities were applied according to field observations o f the extent of 
fallow, unused land, roads and tracks within the areas identified by the satellite 
imagery thresholding method (see section 3.4.5). An error o f +/- 10% is estimated.
3. The effective rainfall on fields during the period crops are growing is calculated as: 
Effective Rainfall = Rainfall x Rainfall Efficiency x Seasonal Proportion o f Annual 
Rainfall x Cultivation Area x Cultivation Intensity
4. Field Irrigation Requirement is calculated as:
(Net Irrigation Requirement-Effective Rainfall) x Field Application Efficiency
The values used for Rainfall Efficiency, Net Irrigation Requirement and Field Application 
Efficiency were taken from Zagni (1996, who used CROP WAT 7, described in Smith, 1992) 
for Wadi Warazan and Dhi Sufal, although the rainfall efficiencies may be rather high.
In calculating the pumping requirements for well irrigation a sensitivity analysis was carried 
out using:
Runon-Rainfall ratios o f 0 to 35% (after Eger, 1986; 102-105 and 
Zagni, 1996; 15). [This ratio is based on the runon relative to the rainfall 
falling directly on the cropped areas, not the total area]. From the observation 
o f runon-rainfall ratios described in section 3.3, ratios o f 0.1 to 0.2 are 
considered more likely.
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Table 4.4: Agricultual Land Use
a) Areas of Intensive Land Use 
in Major Wadis (ha)
Cultivated Estimated Summer Crop Areas (ha) 
Summer1 Qat Sorghum SI Sorghum Maize
or Millet or Millet
SI Maize Fruit Veg
Total 2735 182.5 1152.5 322.5 182.5 810.5 47 37.5
Cultivated Estimated Winter Crop Areas2 (ha)
Winter1 Qat Maize Sorghum Potato 
or Millet
Fruit Veg
Total 1352.5 182.5 562.5 160.5 292.5 47 107.5
Cultivated Estimated Third Season Crop Areas2 (ha)
Third Qat Maize Sorghum Fruit Veg
Season2 or Millet
Total 609.5 182.5 77.5 195 47 107.5
b) Excluding Major W adis1
(Categories Based on Land Use Map Legend)
Land Use 
Summer
Land Use 
Winter
km2 km2
Upper W adi Rasyan
Uncultivated3 486.0 789.7
Rainfed Summer Cultivation of Poor Quality Grains 191.8 0.0
Rainfed Summer Barley 6.0 0.0
Rainfed Summer Cultivation Only 8.9 0.0
Small Scale Rainwater Harvesting 55.0 0.0
Qat growing areas irrigated by tanker 18.0 18.0
Intensive Summer Cultivation 37.5 0.0
Irrigated Winter Crops and SI Summer Grains 4.5 0.0
Highland Qat 70.9 70.9
Major Urban Areas 23.5 23.5
Total 902.1 902.1
1 Areas determined from satellite imagery
2Crop area estimates based on field checking during Sept-Dee 1996 and March 1997 
determ ined from D.O.S. Maps 1981.
SI Supplementary Irrigated
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Irrigation efficiencies o f 0.9 to 0.6. The average irrigation efficiency o f 
irrigation activities in the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment is thought to fall 
within this range for the following reasons:
Although average well head to field conveyance distances are quite large (287m from dug 
wells and 457m from boreholes, NWRA,1999a;37), on average 85% o f this distance is piped 
(ibid.). Doorenbos and Pruitt (1977;Table 44) define conveyance efficiency in terms of 
supply from a main (open) canal which has no real equivalent in the T a’iz instance. Field 
ditch efficiency equates more closely to the T a’iz situation. With the given proportion of 
piped to unlined delivery systems (85:15) the field ditch efficiency is likely to fall between 
0.9 and 0.6 (ibid. and NWRA,1999a;38), Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: The agricultural water requirements (Mm3/yr) o f the wadi areas o f the Upper Wadi 
Rasyan catchment (areas given in Table 4.4) can be summarised as:
Major Wadis: Effective Rainfall = 6.89 Field Irrigation Requirement = 24.04
Pumping Requirement
Field Ditch Efficiency: 
Runon : Rainfall Ratio
0.6 0.75 0.9
0 40.7 32.05 26.71
0.05 39.27 31.42 26.18
0.1 38.47 30.78 25.65
0.2 36.88 29.50 24.59
0.35 34.49 27.59 22.99
As a cross check o f the amounts of water required from pumping a comparison with well 
abstractions can be made. The NWRA well inventory (1996) for the area indicates there are 
1310 wells in the area (1073 dug and 237 drilled) which are not dry or only accessed by 
bucket. Applying mean measured discharges and operation periods gives a total abstraction o f 
36.9 Mm3/yr. If only the wells actually operating when visited are considered the total 
abstraction would be 24.6 Mm3/yr. A sensible estimate lies somewhere between these two 
values and gives reasonable agreement with the values in the above table.
Irrigation from stream flow is particularly important in some wadis. The irrigation 
requirement from the stream has been calculated on a pro-rata basis from the proportion o f 
wadi cultivation served by the stream relative to the total cultivated wadi area (Table 4.6) 
using the satellite imagery to determine areas o f seasonal irrigation. The irrigation 
requirement compares reasonably with the measured wadi flows, that is, wadi flows balance 
the requirement o f the areas served. An irrigation efficiency for the stream o f 0.6 and a
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runon:rainfall ratio o f 20% have been assumed. The maximum annual abstraction assumes the 
irrigation requirement is fully met by the stream in the areas using stream water. The 
minimum assumes the minimum flow recorded is available. The likely water use from 
streams is thought to approximate the maximum since spates have not been taken into 
account. The excess flow at the end o f the rainy season provides the outflow o f Wadis Malih / 
Hidran and M iliha from the area, to Wadi Rasyan.
Table 4.6: Stream irrigated land in the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment.
Stream
Cultivated
Area
Irrigation Requirement Wadi Flows Abstraction from 
Streams
Summer Winter Summer Winter Summer | Winter Mini­
mum
End
Rainy
Season
Max Min 
Annual Annual 
Abstraction Abstraction
ha MmVseason I it/sec lit/sec MmVseason
222.5 172.5 1.85 1.44 215 168 193 393 3.31 1.71
Crop water requirements in major wadis are essentially met by groundwater abstractions and 
saaqiya irrigation. In the rest o f the area this requirement is not met. Although runon 
alleviates the deficit somewhat, evidence o f  deficiency is seen in the low quality o f sorghum 
and millet from the rainfed areas which incur an estimated 93% o f the total deficit. Often, 
these crops are only adequate for animal fodder, a grain head not having formed.
In the non-wadi areas the effective rainfall is 65 Mm3/yr leaving a field irrigation requirement 
o f 112 MmVyr. If  the runon:rainfall ratio in the catchments supplying the non-wadi areas is 
0.2 then runon would provide another 31.5 MnrVyr, totalling around 100 Mm3/yr 
consumption by rainfed agriculture.
Based on the above discussion, total water use in the Upper Wadi Rasyan area is estimated as 
comprising:
Rainfed Agriculture 100 MmVyr
Groundwater Irrigation 30 MmVyr
Stream-fed Agriculture 3 MmVyr
Human Use 2.5 MmVyr
Livestock* 0.3 to 0.4 MmVyr
(*Dar El Yemen, 1997; 145 and AI-Dubby and Taher,1998;8)
The estimated total is around 135 MmVyr (+/- 20%),
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On the basis o f the number o f tankers and wells observed supplying water for tanker-irrigated 
winter crops (NWRA well inventory, 1996) this use cannot account for more than 0.3 Mm3/yr 
+/- 50%. This is equivalent to an estimated 3 percent o f the total possible demand if the 
cultivation o f only one winter crop is assumed. An amount o f water not exceeding this may 
also be pumped from boreholes in wadi bed areas to highland qat farms.
4.1.4 Returns to Water
In examining agricultural returns to water the NWRA (1999a) data have been used. The 
NWRA study comprised a survey o f 21 villages to examine socio-economic aspects o f 
agriculture and irrigation in the Upper Wadi Rasyan Catchment. Crop yields quoted in the 
literature (Table 4.7) are somewhat contradictory although the NWRA data are the most 
recent, local and from the largest sample. Yields in T a’iz approximately reflect the national 
average but suggest scope for the use o f improved varieties.
Table 4.7: Crop yields (Tonnes/ha):
NWRA
(1999a)
Draft
Statistical
Yearbook
(1996)
Mitchell
&Escher
(1978)
Bamatraf
(1987)
El-Lakany
(1978)
Area T a’iz National T a’iz National (National) T a’iz
SI Sorghum Grain 1.1
RF Sorghum 
Grain
1.1 0.8 2.8 (0.8) 0.9
SI Maize Grain 
Stalks
1.3 1.2 4.4
8.8
RF Maize Grain 
Stalks
1.3 3.6
8.0
2.5 (1.1) 1.0
RF Millet Grain 
Stalks
0.8 1.3-3.4 
4.9-12.5
(1.0) 0.6
RF Wheat 1.2 1.5
Potatoes 14.4 12.8
Tomatoes 11.5 15.2
Qat RF 974*
Qat SI 1414*
*Unit = M andil/ha 
RF Rainfed
SI Supplementary Irrigated
Farm costs and incomes from the NWRA survey combined with the water use assessment 
from the preceding section and for the same area (Table 4.8) permits an analysis o f water use 
and costs. A rudimentary assessment o f the costs of wells, irrigation and farm budgets was 
made during the 1995 and 1996 rural surveys. The latter data were within +/- 50% of the farm 
budget obtained by NW RA and are well within the variation noted in NWRA (1999a).
125
Because the NW RA sample was much larger than this survey’s, the former data have been 
used as the basis for analysis.
Based on the labour inputs, Table 4.8 indicates the relatively small number o f people needed 
to produce the crops. This calculation assumes continuous full employment for 270 days/year 
and is included to permit comparison with industrial returns to water discussed in the next 
section. In fact labour demand is seasonal. The minimum ‘man seasons’ needed to produce 
the crops is 6200.
Table 4.8 also indicates the large proportion o f costs incurred by irrigation relative to income. 
This is explored further in Table 4.9. Table 4.9 assesses costs and returns for the irrigation 
sector alone and also the affect o f variations in irrigation costs for the agricultural sector as a 
whole:
a) at current costs,
b) if the price o f diesel for the pumps were to increase to border parity levels,
c) if border parity price diesel'and capital depreciation are included.
[The method o f calculation o f the current cost o f  water in Table 4.9 is different in ‘a)
Running Costs’ from parts b) and c). The former figure is derived from the data in Table 4.8 
whilst the latter two are calculated using the assumptions given in Table 4.9. As a check o f 
the validity o f the latter method the ‘current water cost’ was calculated for section a) using 
the method for b) and c) and resulted in a cost of 95MYR ($0.73M) which agrees 
satisfactorily with the former method (102MYR, $0.78M).]
Summary o f  Economic Analysis
With only diesel charged at border parity levels, the profitability o f irrigation is reduced 
almost to nil. [If farm costs or income were to vary by plus or minus 50%, as data error might 
tolerate, then irrigation would become unprofitable at current income levels.] Although 
current costs estimated by farmers do not include capital depreciation (and neither do World 
Bank estimates; 1993, Annex 2, Moench,1997;12), when these costs are included, the returns 
to water become negative. This conclusion is maintained even if the field averages in Table 
4.8 underestimate farm income or overestimate expenditure by 50%. The argument that 
Yemeni farmers could grow irrigated crops at a loss becomes plausible only because much o f 
the well digging/drilling and purchase o f pumps and pipes occurred when remittances from 
Saudi Arabia and the G ulf were being invested in the farms prior to the G ulf War. Because of
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Table 4.9: Cost of water to agriculture in the Upper Wadi Rasyan Catchment - Yemeni Riyals
Water Used Current Water Current Water Net Income Returns to
a) Running Costs1 Cost Cost Water
Mm3/yr MYR YR/m3 MYR YR/m3
Irrigation Only 30 102 3.39 54.69 1.82
Total Agriculture 133 102 0.76 467.74 3.52
b) Future Running Costs? Cost with diesel at border Net Income Returns to
parity & without depreciation Water
MYR YR/m3 MYR YR/m3
Irrigation Only 30 151 5.03 5.38 0.18
Total Agriculture 133 151 1.14 418.43 3.15
c) Real Costs? Cost with diesel at border Net Income Returns to
parity & with depreciation Water
MYR YR/m3 MYR YR/m3
Irrigation Only 30 406 13.53 -249.62 -8.32
Total Agriculture 133 406 3.05 163.43 1.23
1 Using Farmer Estimates of Water Costs ie current diesel prices and excluding depreciation
Assum ptions in calculating depreciation:
Borehole Items depreciation 5Price 3Average 3 Number
Period Depth m of Wells
Casing & Riser-Dug 15 years 20000 YR/m 15.3 1073
Casing & Riser-Drilled 15 years 10000YR/m 150.0 237
Pump and Motor 10 years 1.5 MYR
3 Operating Period 5.8 hours/day 6.5 days/week
Current 4Border Parity
Diesel Price 10YR/lit 18YR/lit
5 Diesel Consumption 2.75 lit/hr
5 Oil Expenditure 50YR/day
3 NWRA Well inventory (1995)
4 World Bank (1998;Annex 2 pg3)
5 Handley (1997;6)
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Table 4.9a: Cost of water to agriculture in the Upper Wadi Rasyan Catchment - $ US
Water Used Current Water Current Water Net Income Returns to
a) Running Costs1 Cost Cost Water
Mm3/yr M$ $/m3 M$ $/m3
Irrigation Only 30 0.78 0.03 0.42 0.01
Total Agriculture 133 0.78 0.01 3.60 0.03
b) Future Running Costs? Cost with diesel at border Net Income Returns to
parity & without depreciation Water
M$ $/m3 M$ $/m3
Irrigation Only 30 1.16 0.04 0.04 0.00
Total Agriculture 133 1.16 0.01 3.22 0.02
c) Real Costs? Cost with diesel at border Net Income Returns to
parity & with depreciation Water
M$ $/m3 M$ $/m3
Irrigation Only 30 3.12 0.10 -1.92 -0.06
Total Agriculture 133 3.12 0.02 1.26 0.01
1 Using Farmer Estimates of Water Costs ie current diesel prices and excluding depreciation
Assum ptions in calculating depreciation:
Borehole Items depreciation 5Price 3Average 3 Number
Period Depth m of Wells
Casing & Riser-Dug 15 years 154 $/m 15.3 1073
Casing & Riser-Drilled 15 years 77 $/m 150.0 237
Pump and Motor 10 years 11500$
3 Operating Period 5.8 hours/day 6.5 days/week
Current 4Border Parity
Diesel Price 10YR/lit 18YR/lit
5 Diesel Consumption 2.75 lit/hr
5 Oil Expenditure 0.39 $/day
3 NWRA Well Inventory (1996)
4 World Bank (1998;Annex 2 pg3)
5 Handley (1997;6)
the omission o f capital depreciation, the current running costs in Table 4.9 relate to the 
economic awareness o f  the irrigator which are much less than his ‘real costs’. The sensitivity 
o f the depreciation period was analysed by doubling the ‘lifespan5 o f the borehole / casing to 
30 years and the pump and motor to 15 years. In this instance the irrigation returns to water 
indicated in the ‘real costs’ part o f Table 4.9 would be minus 5.2 YR/m3 (-0.04$/m3) and 
average returns to water for the whole sector would be 1.9 YR/m3 (0.015$/m3).
4.1.5 Ten year shift in irrigated area
Comparison o f summer and winter satellite images o f the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment 
from the 1985/6 and 1994/5 suggests changes in agricultural water use. Due to cloud-free 
image availability it was not possible to get images from the same summer months for the two 
dates. One was for October and the other for June. For most o f  the summer cropped area this 
is not thought to be a problem since field work suggested there is only 1% difference in 
cropped area between June and October. One reason for the similarity is that a second maize 
crop has been planted and occupies nearly the same area but in different fields. Qat occupies 
the same locations and sorghum has not been harvested by early October. Apart from the 
differences in cultivated area noted in A1 Hayma (section 3.4.5) between the m id-‘80’s and 
the m id’-90’s the total area o f cultivation in the major wadis increased by around 16% 
although the area under winter cultivation has declined by 38%. Areas o f reduced cultivation 
are downstream from A1 Hayma as far as Burayhi and Wadi Malih, from lower Wadi 
Dabbaab to Wadi Rasyan (see Figure 3.16 for locations). These declines coincide with the 
areas downstream o f city and factory abstractions. Declines in winter cultivation are also 
noted in upper Wadi Maliha, Wadi Rubay’i and upper Wadi Sawaami. A decline in winter 
irrigation intensity in Wadi Dabbaab, and an increase in Wadi Hidran to Wadi Rasyan, lower 
Wadi Miliha and lower Wadi Sawaami are also evident.
The cost o f  depleting the A l Hayma aquifer.
Combining the assessment o f crop areas from this study with the agricultural economics data 
of MWRA (1999a) for Wadi Al Hayma permits an estimation of the cost o f returning the 
aquifer to its pre-development state (less the current abstraction for the city) as discussed in 
section 3.6.1. The value o f profitable irrigated agriculture and the labour lost if no irrigation 
were to take place until full recovery would amount to 1.8BYR ($14M) which includes the 
labour costs o f around 1000 directly related lost livelihoods (Table 4.10), These returns to 
water are contrasted with industrial returns in section 4.2.2 and are discussed further in 
sections 4.6 and 5.1.
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4.2 Industrial Sector W ater Use
The development o f industry in Yemen has been steady and the sector is approaching the 
share o f GDP enjoyed by agriculture (Figure 4.3). In the Yemeni context the Upper Wadi 
Rasyan catchment o f the T a’iz governorate has been at the forefront o f industrial 
development with the larger companies alone accounting for an estimated 14% of the national 
workforce compared with a 4.4% share o f the population (Ta’iz Chamber o f Commerce 
figures CSO;1997;39,20). This assumes that the major factories o f the Upper Wadi Rasyan 
area account for 80% o f the industrial activity in the governorate.
4.2.1 Methodology
During the summer o f 1995, visits were made to the larger factories in the immediate vicinity 
o f T a’iz. Several different sources concurred that these factories accounted for between 90 
and 95% o f the industrial water users that do not depend on the public supply. Some o f the 
larger factories were revisited on occasions between 1996 and 1998 as opportunity permitted. 
Although coverage o f industrial water users was high, the number o f factories using that 
water is small and precludes statistical analysis o f responses. Because o f the size o f the 
sample and the nature o f the questions, key informant interviews were conducted with 
technical and managerial staff. Checklist questions were used in a discussion format to cover 
the following topics:
a) Number o f employees
b) Attempt to assess the total amount o f water used
c) Sources o f water and means o f abstraction and distribution
d) Costs involved in supplying water
e) Uses o f water
f) Means o f waste disposal
g) Problems encountered
The purpose o f the questions was to obtain data that would permit an assessment of:
a) water uses and problems,
b) the financial and livelihood returns to water, and
c) awareness o f and willingness to address equity and environmental issues in source and 
disposal areas.
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Technical staff were usually very willing to give a conducted tour o f the source and disposal 
areas as well as the main water use points in the factories. The tours permitted some contact 
with the inhabitants o f the source and disposal areas. If not contacted during the tour, then an 
attempt was made to meet with them on another occasion. Apart from the observations given 
below, it was noted that managerial staff were less aware o f the problems o f  the water supply 
and disposal systems and environments than the technical staff and that the technical staff 
were less aware o f the equity issues involved. Technical staff were also less aware o f any 
steps taken to remedy or contribute to problems related to those issues.
In assessing returns to water, data has been obtained from national industrial statistics and 
applied on a pro rata basis according to workforce. It is recognised that company income may 
be falsified to national bodies for tax reasons, but they might also be to a foreign researcher, 
such as the author. To ensure the rest o f the questions were answered willingly, it was not 
considered information effective to pry into financial aspects.
4.2.2 O bservations
Water Use
Most o f the major water consuming industries o f T a’iz are involved in the processing of 
foodstuffs and drinks, however the soap and ghee and paint factories also use substantial 
amounts. As well as using water in the products, the factories use water in the manufacturing 
processes, particularly for cooling, for steam production and in cleaning equipment and 
surfaces. Water is also used for general consumption by employees.
The main water related problems noted by the companies were firstly inadequate water 
quality for the industrial processes involved, particularly high levels o f Total Dissolved 
Solids and hardness leading to scale problems in the cooling systems. Problems with 
particular constituents, such as alkalinity, sodium, calcium and magnesium and bacterial 
content were mentioned. Some factories faced problems o f water scarcity, particularly where 
their own wells did not provide water o f adequate quality and they have to bring water by 
tanker. Queues at the supply wells have resulted in delays and loss o f production, especially 
during dry periods. Problems o f waste water disposal and conflict with surrounding rural 
communities over abstractions were also noted and these aspects are discussed in later 
sections.
National statistics (CSO,1997) indicate that the following proportions o f larger industrial 
establishments (that is, o f more than ten employees) face difficulties due to rising water costs
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(18%), continuous cut off of water (13%) and lack o f water from the public network (26%). 
Due to the public water supply problems, it is considered that the proportion o f the latter 
category in the city o f T a’iz would be even larger than the national average. Table 4.11 
summarises the water use and employment data for the major water consuming industries of 
T a’iz.
Table 4.11. Industrial Water Use in T a’iz.
Company Water Use Employees Consumption
m3/day
Jobs/m3/day
Soft Drinks Drinks 32 175 0.2
Bottled Water Drinking Water 37 200 0.2
Soap & Ghee Processes 900 1000 0.9
Nadfood (Food and Drink 
Products)
Product and 
Processes
850 900 0.9
Ice Ice 10 10 1.0
Paradise Juice (Juices) Drinks and 
Processes
100 60 1.7
Shebani Food (Food Products) Product and 
Processes
700 140 5,0
Genpak (Food and Packaging). Processes 1100 220 5.0
Paint Product and 
Processes
160 25 6.4
YCIC (Food Products) Product and 
Processes
1850 285 6.5
Total 5739 3015
Source: Key Informant Interviews
Proctor and Gamble, NCSPI and Bilqis Plastics and Red Sea Detergents account for around 
another 140m3/day water consumption (Haskoning, 1990) and from a brief survey o f stone 
cutters, a further 275 nrVday of water is used in their work. These industries also depend on 
either their own wells or on tanker deliveries. CES (1997) estimate that around 20% o f the 
public supply is used for small industrial and commercial companies. If the industrial 
component comprised half o f  this, that is, around 1800 m3/day, the estimated total industrial 
consumption for the Upper Wadi Rasyan area would be 5230 nrVday +/-15%. This total 
includes 150 m3/day imported into the area from the Wadi Warazan catchment and 7 m3/day 
exported from the area to Al Mocha. A total industrial water requirement o f 150% to double 
the amount mentioned above has been calculated (As Sayagh;1998) however the calculation 
is based on standard formulae and not fieldwork.
The annual value o f production and profits o f the industries in the Upper Wadi Rasyan 
catchment, assuming the national average and estimated pro rata rate on the proportion o f the 
national workforce, are 20,900MYR and 7,950MYR respectively. Unlike the agricultural
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water users described in the previous section, industrialists include the cost o f providing 
water within their accounting in the long-term, however the allocation o f funds for future 
investment tends not to be addressed until a ‘water problem’ arises. On a day to day 
operational basis, the only aspect o f water costs that managerial and technical staffs were 
aware o f how much their tankers had to pay at the well, or, if they received water from the 
public utility, how much the monthly bill was. Although more data were available to them in 
their accounts departments, there was no awareness o f the actual costs o f water in terms of 
costs o f well, pump, pipes and tanker depreciation, staff and running costs. There was, 
however, a general awareness amongst most technical and managerial staff that water is a 
costly facet o f production especially if production was lost due to the constraint o f water 
supplies. Water conservation measures, including training o f staff in water conservation and 
investigation o f water reuse potential were being undertaken by the two larger groups of 
companies.
Assuming that the Upper Wadi Rasyan area accounts for 80% of the industrial activity in the 
governorate, the total direct employment in the industries would be 12,700. It is considered 
this figure is considered accurate to within +1-5%,
Comparison with Agriculture
A comparison o f financial and livelihood provision returns to water between irrigated 
agriculture and industry provides a stark contrast:
Table 4.12: Returns to water: Irrigated Agriculture vs. Industry in the Upper Wadi Rasyan 
catchment.
Water Used 
Mm3/yr
Net Income 
MYR/yr. 
(M$/yr.)
Returns to Water 
YR/m3 
($/m3)
Jobs
Provided
Jobs/
Mm3/yr
Irrigation 30 29.08 1.8 600 20
(0.22) (0.014)
Industry 2 7950 4180 12700 6350
(61) (32)
Source: fieldwork
These figures are based on current operating costs for agriculture. When depreciation on 
boreholes and pumping equipment is taken into account the returns to irrigation water become 
negative and the contrast is even more stark. The errors built into the above values through 
the assumptions involved in calculating them do not detract from the conclusion that industry 
makes far, far better use o f water than irrigated agriculture in both income generation and
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livelihood terms. The trickle-down benefits these industries impart to the service industries 
would make the contrast greater again.
Industrial Waste Water Disposal
None o f the factories visited measured effluent quantities, and management and technicians 
had no idea o f the quantity o f their waste water or its concentration and constituents, although 
the larger groups were aware that pollution is a problem. Surveys by Haskoning (1990) and 
Water Care Associates (1995), instigated by the Environmental Protection Council and the 
Hayel Sa’id group respectively, o f half the factories included in this study's survey indicated 
that around 65% of the water supplied to the factories was returned as waste. This would 
suggest a total o f 4400m3/day waste water o f which at least 75% is not disposed o f in the 
sewerage system.
Apart from an inadequate aeration treatment works at Hayel Sa’id’s Nadfood site and a 
treatment works purported to have been completed at the same group’s Soap and Ghee 
factory since this survey was competed, none o f the factories treat their waste water. Disposal 
is typically to lagoons or wadis near to the factory although Nadfood and Soap and Ghee 
pump their ‘treated’ waste to more remote locations. An assessment o f the environmental 
impact o f waste water disposal in the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment was given in section 3.7.
Equity Issues
Because the larger industrial plants are located near agricultural land, they affect the 
downstream rural communities. Depending on the exact locations the neighbouring rural 
communities are affected by both abstraction for the factories and by their waste water 
disposal. In some instances complaints about the smells near the discharge areas have led 
industrialists to pipe their waste further and further away from their factory, simply 
transferring the problem to another area. Some industrialists recompense farmers for loss of 
crops at the discharge point and offer to buy their (now polluted) land. It has been suggested 
that the polluting o f land can be used as a tool to force people to sell it. The farmers 
expressed feelings o f powerlessness in this situation.
Some farmers think the location o f industrial discharge near their land is a convenient source 
o f water for irrigation and appear oblivious to the dangers o f degrading their soil and toxins 
entering the food chain. Where water is abstracted some factories try to compensate the 
affected rural communities by providing jobs, electricity and water, and defaulting on 
compensation has resulted in conflict in some instances. In other instances the provision o f
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services by the factories has led to opportunistic behaviour by the rural communities. The 
equity issues raised by these situations are discussed further in section 5.6.
4.3 Rural domestic water supplies
Access to water for domestic use in Yemen provides great contrasts, particularly between 
urban and rural water access, and forms part o f the distinction between urban and rural 
environments. The following table summarises the provision of water supply and sanitation in 
Yemen and in the T a’iz governorate.
Table 4.13: Types o f  W ater Supply and Sanitation in Yemen and the T a’iz Governorate.
National National National T a’iz T a’iz T a’iz
Average Rural Urban Average Rural Urban
% % % % % %
Water Supply
Public Piped Supplies 21.1 6.4 67.5 17.0 3.8 79.5
Co-operative Project 11.9 11.9 11.6 12.1 13.2 6.6
Private Project 5.9 6.0 5.5 3.3 3.2 3.6
Well 37.7 45.8 12.7 48.6 57.2 7.9
Sanitation Provision
Sewerage Network 10.5 1.2 39.8 11.7 1.2 61.2
Covered Pits 22.7 15.9 44.1 23.3 23.6 21.8
Uncovered Pits 18.2 21.9 6.7 25.9 29.9 7.1
Nothing 49 61.0 9.3 39.0 45.2 9.9
Source: CSO, 1996b.
Nationally, the proportion o f rural dwellings is 76% of the total whilst that in the Ta’iz 
governorate is 83%. Based on the national survey, the urban dwellers in the T a’iz governorate 
are better served by piped water supply and sanitation than is common nationally, whereas 
rural inhabitants in the governorate have less provision of these services than the national 
average. [In the urban situation almost all co-operative and private water supply projects pipe 
water to the houses whereas in the rural environment the supply may be to a communal tank 
in the village or may be piped to houses.]
The rural survey described in section 4.1.2 included checklist questions regarding domestic 
water supplies and sanitation. The villages included in the survey demonstrated a wide variety 
o f water supply sources and problems (Table 4.14).
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The villages o f  Al Aadan, Al Jahaaza, Al ‘anjud, Ar Rahaybah and Al Malika have piped 
supplies (Figure 4.1 indicates locations). The schemes supplying Al Aadan and Al Jahaaza are 
called the Eastern and Western systems respectively. Both are supplied from wells drilled into 
the artesian Tawilah Sandstone in neighbouring valleys. They both comprise storage tanks 
located above the villages they serve which distribute via pipe to individually metered houses. 
Permission to drill for the Western scheme was delayed due to disputes over water rights. It 
delivers to 4000 households and was established by local businessmen working in Saudi 
Arabia. M ost people respond to demand management and stop using water from the tap when 
their consumption for the month reaches 6m3, at which point a higher tariff is applied. After 
this point the locals resort to women and donkeys to bring their water needs. Both the Eastern 
and Western schemes also charge 50YR/month (0.38$/month) maintenance charge and 
although the Eastern scheme does not apply an increasing block tariff average, consumption 
remains at around 6m3/month per connection. The main problem facing the Eastern scheme is 
a lack o f spare parts for the pump. This has caused the community to want to hand the scheme 
back to SURDU who constructed it. This scheme is one of the 92 constructed by SURDU in 
the T a’iz governorate by 1986 which at that time served an estimated 220,000 people 
(FAO/World Bank, 1986:23).
At Aadan As Safaa, the community-managed domestic piped water supply scheme was 
administered by a government-appointed shayx who used the income to his own ends. A 
subsequent village-appointed operator also took the revenues. In Ar Rahayba GAREW drilled 
the well and the local council and local shayx paid half each o f the distribution system. The 
well supplying a private piped scheme to the upper, larger part o f Al Malika has dried up, 
although six houses are connected to another well in the village. Everyone else has to fetch 
water. The shayx at Ar Riwaas paid for the village to be connected to the government 
(NWSA) supply and others from much further afield take water from it when their wells dry 
up.
Where households are not connected to a piped scheme, women and children, with or without 
the help o f donkeys, make two to three trips per day to the well. Because jerry cans are 
considered too expensive (150YR, 1.15$ for 20Iit) and can get punctured by thorns, people 
often collect water in ex-corn oil containers. NW RA (1999b) estimate that on average women 
walk 1.7km to collect water each day and spend 2 hours walking and waiting their turn at the 
well.
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Assessments o f rural water consumption for domestic purposes consistently suggest 201/c/d 
even where there is a communal piped scheme (Mullick,1987, Handley, 1996b and 
NWRA, 1999b). This would suggest a consumption o f around 2.5Mm'7yr based on the 1995 
Upper Wadi Rasyan rural population. In addition to drinking water, this study estimates a 
further 901itres per household per day (1 ,5Mm3/yr for the area) are collected for cooking and 
other household duties. This quantity is 70% of the NWRA estimate (ibid.). Over 80% of the 
NWRA survey respondents considered the amount of water available was inadequate and that 
they had to spend too much time collecting it (ibid.).
Although no householders interviewed in this survey boiled their water, when the EC exceeds 
around 1000-1500jaS/cm water quality awareness causes them to change source for drinking 
purposes if feasible in terms o f cost and transport. Most o f the houses had some form o f water 
storage facility and in some instances 90% o f the village had galvanized steel tanks on the 
roof or adjacent to the house. Wealthier families and small businesses that depend on water 
(such as chicken farms) bring water by tanker. Water disposal was nearly always to a nearby 
open pit, minor wadi bed or covered pit.
4.4 Urban Domestic Water Supplies
A summary history o f  urban water supply in T a ’iz
Water supply is a crucial factor, if not the crucial factor, in the development o f  any 
settlement. Records o f water supply facilities in T a’iz go back as far as its history. Neibhur in 
the seventeen-sixties (Hansen,1983;272) describes large excavations to facilitate rainwater 
collection. Tradition has it that an aqueduct brought water from Jabal Sabir to the ancient 
water tank on the west side o f  Al Qaahira. Water channels dug into the side o f the mountain 
are still evident lower down. A qanat runs from the old Jewish area at the head o f Wadi Al 
Madam into the footslopes o f Jabal Sabir. Some think there is also an ancient qanat running 
from the foot o f Al Qaahira due north under Tahriir through the centre of the city to the 
Imam’s pool at Ausayfra.
The twentieth century has seen a huge population increase in the urban area in particular 
(Figure 4.29) and a commensurate increase in urban water supply problems. The search for 
solutions goes back at least to 1917 when Cornwallis et al reported that the population of 
4000 was supplied by piped water from Jabal Sabir. To this day the Muthaffar mosque 
continues to receive water from the foot o f Al Qaahira and also from its own well.
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The first major water supply network, the ‘Kennedy Memorial’ system was constructed 
during 1962-1965 and was supplied from shallow wells in the Hawbaan area (Figure 3.1). At 
that time the population was about 60,000. The Hawjala wellfield was connected in 1970.
The next major scheme was the construction of a water supply and sewerage system between 
1977 and 1982, utilising the Al Hayma wellfield. The depletion o f this field sparked off an 
emergency drilling programme in 1987 and 1988 immediately to the north o f Al Hayma, with 
extension o f the conveyor. Further depletion o f the Al Hayma field resulted in the piped water 
delivery frequency declining to once every 40-days and considerable water stress amongst 
consumers and at the offices o f the public utility, NWSA. The most acute period occurred 
during summer 1995 and is often termed ‘the crisis’.
In order to try to improve the delivery frequency, NWSA increased abstraction from the 
Hawjala and Hawbaan fields located immediately downstream from the city. These wells 
receive the sub-surface seepage from the cess pits, leaking sewers and water mains o f the city 
together with the surface run-off during storms. The groundwater in the Hawbaan catchment 
is also naturally o f poor quality. The abstractions from these two fields are therefore of 
inadequate quality, typically around 5000 p.S/cm, and increases the level o f  pollutants in the 
city supply as its proportion in the supply mixture increases.
The crisis sparked off another ‘emergency’ drilling programme, with 18 wells being drilled 
inside the city in 1995. The production o f these wells and the efficiency o f their operation are 
less than might be desired. During 1996, and after 10 years of negotiations with local shayxs 
and farmers, six wells were drilled in Habir, further north o f Al Hayma. The conveyor was 
extended again, and three wells were connected. They provide good quality water, but are of 
disappointing yield.
4.4.1 M ethodology
Besides the inhabitants o f Lower Al Hayma, none have felt the water shortage more than the 
people o f the city o f T a’iz -  400,000 o f them. So far, the water shortage was most closely felt 
during the summer of 1995 when water was available from the public utility once every 40 
days. This period is often termed the ‘crisis’. The shortage continues to today, although not so 
acutely, with availability once every 20 days (Figure 4.4). Such water stress presents a unique 
situation and makes it possible to consider:
a) who is affected,
b) what are their adaptive responses,
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c) how this affects their attitudes and perceptions to water-stress and
d) analyse the data from the aspect o f the equity.
The analysis examined wealth/income and gender and included the role o f children. As part 
o f answering points a and b above, it was also advantageous to know the basic education and 
employment levels o f the households.
Because by its nature the shortage has a historical context, and in order to consider historical 
trends it was necessary to select a hydraulic event which was distinct in interviewees 
memories against which to contrast the present situation. The crisis period o f summer 1995 
served this purpose by being not too far in the past for people to remember, and an event that 
most o f the present population had experienced.
The socially fragmented nature o f T a’iz shows much less cohesion than its rural counterpart 
and people communicate and interact much less regarding their commonalities. Where RRA 
and PRA can provide a reasonable view o f aspects of rural life because o f the interaction and 
shared views there, by contrast, individual responses seem more accessible in the urban 
context. However, in order to more closely approach a ‘representative’ urban sample many 
users have to be interviewed. For this reason, and because many o f the questions required a 
numerical or ‘quasi-numerical’ answer, the use o f a questionnaire seemed the most 
appropriate method o f data acquisition.
The main part o f the survey sought to answer the following questions:
a) How has household water use behaviour changed as water has become more 
available from the public system?
b) How much water do people use and how much did they use in the crisis?
c) How much time is spent on water related tasks by men women and children and 
how has this changed since the crisis?
d) What proportion o f income is spent on water relative to other expenses and how 
much was spent in the crisis?
e) What is the relative importance of the following aspects of water supply: price, 
quality, adequate quantity, reliability, ease o f  access?
f) To what extent do people relate minimum water use to good health.
The issues listed above had been identified as key areas to be addressed in an assessment of 
urban domestic water use at the planning stage o f this study and during the first two years of
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field work. The original intention had been to conduct a survey o f around 250 questionnaires, 
however the UNDDSMS study (Handley, 1999a) provided an opportunity to conduct a much 
larger survey (1250 questionnaires) covering wider issues. Those issues are reflected in the 
questionnaires. Discussion o f the questionnaires with Peter Mawson (on contract to 
UNDDSMS to define the TOR for the urban domestic water use survey) and Alex McPhail 
(World Bank) and input from them are gratefully acknowledged. A questionnaire was 
developed that would address the issues listed above, disguise income related questions, 
present the questions in a socially acceptable order and manner and be as brief, relevant and 
easy to comprehend as possible (Figure 4.30). Random sampling o f 1028 houses was carried 
out with separate male/female interviews in 222 households. The sampling permitted analyses 
on the basis o f  income (Table 4.16) and tests for significant differences between male and 
female responses. Copies o f the Arabic and English questionnaires used in the main survey 
are contained in Appendix A and details o f sampling and analysis are given in Appendix B.
Table 4.16. Skewed distribution o f household income.
Bracket Income Sample (No of Households)
1 Lowest 149
2 442
3 215
4 80
5 52
6 40
7 Highest 50
Source: Fieldwork
4,4.2 Results Summary
In reading this section it should be borne in mind that the analyses are no better than the 
quality o f the answers to the questionnaire. The relatively poor correlation coefficients 
obtained from the expenditure analysis described in appendix B were symptomatic of the 
quality o f the numerical data. The tests for significance did however suggest that the 
following observations could be made.
Demography
There are many factors contributing to and resulting from differences in wealth and 
opportunity in T a’iz. Demographically, the highest income bracket households comprise 
twice as many men and almost twice as many women, and fewer children than the lowest 
income bracket households (Figure 4.5). These trends contribute to increasing incomes and 
decreasing costs among the wealthier. However, from the paired gender data (analysis b in
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Appendix B) women gave significantly lower estimates (at 5% level) o f  the number o f men 
per household and the number o f men finishing primary school. Paired data indicated that the 
women gave a higher estimate than the men did o f the number o f men with jobs.
Women gave a lower evaluation than men of the number of women in the household. The 
difference was only slightly significant at the 5% level, but the same variation was indicated 
in the paired data and was significant at the 0.1% level. Similarly the women in the paired 
sample gave a significantly lower estimate (at 5%) than the men did for the number of 
children, and for the number o f children who could read and the number o f children who had 
finished primary and secondary school. Enumerators noted that women generally took more 
care over answering the questions related to household members than the men. W omen’s 
responses were considered more accurate.
Expenditure
The highest income bracket ranked expenditure on qat two ranks higher than the lowest 
bracket, rent three ranks lower (because they mostly own their houses), health one rank lower 
and education one rank higher (despite having fewer children) than the lowest income 
bracket.
The proportion o f expenditure on water as part o f the items listed in Table 4.17 is around 4%. 
Per capita expenditure on water increases slightly with income (Figure 4.6, see section 4.5.2 
regarding the proportion o f income spent on water for different income brackets), and 
consumption may also increase slightly with income bracket.
Table 4.17: Differences in female and male ranking of expenditure by gender analysis 
(Methods a and b defined in Appendix B, figure gives female rank minus male rank.)
Item Food Rent Education Qat Electricity Water Clothes Health T ransport
Rank a) +0.16 -0.23 -0.12 -1.06 +0.22 -0.27 -0.23 +0.29 -0.20
Rank b) +0.52 +0.25 -0.30 -0.05 +0.74 + 1.16 -0.11 -0.44 +0.33
Source: Fieldwork
The table suggests women think more is spent on food and electricity than the men think.
Men think more is spent on qat, education and clothes than the women think. Because the 
purse strings are usually held by males, their view is considered more accurate.
Figures 4.7 to 4.10 indicate that there are more adult readers and more employed people in 
the higher income groups, although the proportion o f people in the household with jobs peaks
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in the middle income brackets. Men have received significantly more education than women 
at all education levels and incomes. 10% o f the households sampled had no one with a job. 
Most o f the households without employed persons were in the lower income groups. 10% of 
the lowest income group households had no adult readers.
The poor may be characterised in general terms as not owning land, houses, or a variety of 
consumer variables that are owned by the rich. Number o f rooms in the dwelling also 
correlated strongly with income category. Most o f the villas are occupied by those from the 
upper income groups. The axdaam (servant) caste forms a portion o f the lowest income 
group. All those occupying temporary housing were in the lowest income group and many of 
them were axdaam. They typically have no wastewater disposal facility. The lowest income 
group not only includes axdaam, however, and other poor families also were without any 
sanitation.
Water Use Patterns
Other differences between rich and poor highlighted by the survey include the presence or 
absence o f water-related facilities (Figure 4.11). In particular the number o f wash basins, the 
amount o f water storage capacity, particularly in expensive ground tanks, and the presence of 
flush toilets instead o f non-flush all indicated wealth. Households not connected to the public 
utility tend to be poorer, and those connected to a private supply, wealthier (Figure 4.12). 
There are six main sources o f water in the city:
a) Public Utility, NWSA. (Coverage is indicated in Figure 4.13).
b) Private Piped Supplies. (Coverage is indicated in Figure 4.13).
c) Tanker Supplies. (Wells supplying them and tanker centres are indicated in Figure 
4.14).
d) Free water (which can be obtained from government, private and mosque 
standpipes at various locations around the city).
e) Bottled water (available from grocery stores).
f) Jerry can water. This water is distributed to grocery stores where it is purchased as
treated drinking water. It can be also be purchased from the companies which treat 
the water and their branches, however it is not referred to here as ‘treated water’ 
because it may not have been treated.
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Table 4.18: Mean water prices from the different sources.
Jerry Can Bottled Free Tanker NWSA Private
Price YR / m3 ($/m3) 2687
(20.7)
26,000
(200)
0 285
(2 .2)
24
(0.18)
63
(0.48)
% Using Source 74.4 4 35.2 33.5 84* 4.5
* Best Estimate 
Source: Fieldwork
Water has to be obtained from all o f the non-piped sources and this takes time. The time spent 
is related to income, poorest income bracket families spending nearly three times longer than 
those in the wealthiest bracket (Figure 4.15). A higher proportion o f wealthy families obtain 
tankers, and the collection o f free water is much more significant amongst poorer families 
(Figure 4.12). Poor families sometimes share NWSA connections in order to reduce 
connection fees. However this can result in water consumption being pushed up into the next 
block o f the tariff and, in the end, both families pay more for their water. Water collection is 
mostly done by children. A higher proportion o f children from poorer households collect 
water than from the wealthier households (Figure 4.16). Women think more time is spent 
collecting water and that more children and women are involved than the men think.
Table 4.19: Percentage o f men, women and children responsible for collecting water, 
(according to men and women).
Responsibility for Collecting 
Water Men Women Children
According to Men 48 3 40
According to Women 37 7 52
Source: Fieldwork
Although the number o f women collecting water is much less than the number o f men, the 
women’s views are considered more realistic. All other water related tasks are almost entirely 
done by women, apart from watering gardens, which is evenly shared between men and 
women. Lower income households are more likely to keep livestock than wealthier ones and 
hence spend time watering them. In contrast, more wealthier families have gardens than 
poorer families, and have to spend time irrigating them, There is a significantly higher 
consumption o f NW SA water for watering gardens amongst the rich.
Although around 75% of all income brackets use jerry can water for drinking, the rich also 
use it for cooking.
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less willing to pay for a regular daily supply o f water than men are, and are also less 
interested than men in a private supply. More essential water uses, such as drinking and 
cooking, become less important to users in higher income groups and more important to lower 
income households and vice versa.
Consumer Attitudes and Household Social Adaptive Capacity to Water Stress 
The current water shortage is considered to affect convenience primarily, followed by 
cleanliness and health, and still fewer people think it has no effect on them. A similar 
sequence was indicated when respondents were asked what the effect on them would be o f a 
future increase or decrease in supply. A greater proportion o f wealthier people than lower 
income households consider there is no impact on them from the current water shortage 
(Figure 4.23). A greater proportion o f wealthier people than lower income households also 
think there would be no effect on them in the future if more or less water were available. It is 
inferred that the wealthy are more cushioned from the water stress than poorer households.
60% o f respondents considered they would change their water use practices if there were a 
change in water availability. Fewer wealthy than poor thought they would change their 
practices if water supplies were reduced, More men than women think less water would be 
used in household activities if less water were available. However, a higher proportion o f 
women, who do the tasks, think the water use would be the same. Men seem less aware than 
women, perhaps, o f the difficulty o f reducing water consumption in these tasks below the 
current, suppressed demand level.
A greater proportion o f NWSA supplied households than private or non-supplied would 
reduce consumption if less water were available. More privately supplied households than 
NWSA supplied households thought they would use the same amount o f water if the supply 
decreased. Thus, the NWSA-supplied households appear to have a greater awareness o f the 
consequences o f reduced supply, confirming they experienced the impact o f  the NW SA water 
crisis (measured in terms o f decreasing supply frequency) much more.
The effect o f water shortage or abundance on health and cleanliness were considered less 
important than the effect on convenience. The impact o f current or future water shortages or 
increases in supply on health, cleanliness and convenience was considered less significant by 
the rich than the poor (Figure 4.23). 90% o f the poorest category o f those interviewed thought 
lack o f water was detrimental to health. This proportion declined to 70% o f the wealthiest 
category. The current water shortage was blamed by some for their health problems.
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Consumers are well aware o f the increase in reliability, quality and amount spent on NWSA 
water since the crisis, and access to water in general has been perceived as easier since the 
crisis. Trends o f less water being used, more time spent collecting water and less time spent 
in water-related activities during the crisis relative to now were noted more by women than 
men. Lower income households were more aware o f using less water during the crisis 
compared with water consumption now than were higher income households. A greater 
proportion o f NW SA supplied households than non-NWSA households responded to the 
crisis by:
a) changing their water use practices,
b) getting more water and using less during the crisis, and
c) now using more water than they did during the crisis.
These observations suggest that the NWSA-supplied households felt the impact o f the crisis 
more than the non-NWSA-supplied households.
The water crisis o f  summer 1995 highlighted some of the problems and issues o f water supply 
in consumers’ awareness. Although the proportion o f people utilising jerry can and tanker 
water supplies was the same as now, the amount o f water obtained from them was 
significantly greater (Figure 4.24). More people were accessing free water, and were also 
accessing more o f it, during the crisis. When the public utility supply failed to provide, many 
more people received a quantity o f water in the flat rate part o f the tariff structure. As 
consumption falls below 10m3/month (the maximum within the flat rate tariff), people end up 
spending more per m3. Thus for 1 lm 3/month the consumer paid around 270YR, 2.1$ (water 
and sewerage) that is, 24.5YR(0.19$)/m3. If  the supply rate falls below 5m3/month the cost 
per m3 exceeds this. For instance 3m3/month at the flat rate o f 120YR(0.92$) minimum 
charge is equivalent to 40YR(0.3 l$)/m 3. Thus, more is paid per m3 when the water cannot be 
delivered! Consumption o f NW SA water was more strongly related to income during the 
crisis, with higher income groups consuming more than lower income groups, than is 
currently evident. Estimated consumption o f NWSA water was reduced by around a third 
during the crisis relative to the time o f the survey.
A lower bound estimate o f consumption o f NWSA water during the crisis should be based on 
NW SA records o f water sold. The mean monthly NWSA water sales for 1995 was 196000m3 
with an average delivery frequency o f 21.5days giving 138350m3 delivery on each occasion.
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A 40 to 45 day delivery interval suggests approximately half this consumption. Assuming 
20% is supplied for non-domestic use (CES et al, 1997), and 75% or 90% NW SA coverage, 
the household consumption from NWSA would have been 2.14 m3/month or 1.78m3/month 
respectively, equivalent to 7.8 or 6.5 1 it/capita/day.
4.4.3 Conclusions
There are large differences in wealth and opportunity between rich and poor in T a’iz. Many 
o f these differences are reflected in water use patterns and in attitudes and perceptions 
regarding water. Tanker, private piped, bottled and to some extent, public utility water 
sources are all accessed more by wealthier households and free water by poorer ones. 
However, the overall low level o f supply, close to the WHO recommended minimum, has 
suppressed the demand for water. Although the wealthy have a much greater capacity for 
storing and using water, this capacity is not fully realised, and any future increase in supply is 
likely to be used disproportionately by this sector. Poorer households prefer water, from 
whatever source, primarily on the basis o f price, and will spend much more time fetching it. 
Wealthy people are more interested in quality.
Most o f the water provided by the public utility to the city supply operates on a system of 
recirculating polluted water. Water is pumped from the Hawjala wellfield to the city where, 
after use, it seeps from the cess pits and leaky sewers back to the well field. Low quality 
supply from the public utility has led to the sharp increase in the number o f drinking water 
treatment companies. With 75% of the population drinking treated water, a dual supply 
system is effectively operating. Although people would prefer a high quality piped water 
supply, they are not willing to pay much more for it. In the absence o f large amounts o f high 
quality groundwater being discovered in the area, dependence on a dual supply is likely to 
continue for some time. People had to obtain more water from alternative sources during the 
1995 crisis o f  the public utility supply. These sources (apart from free water) are more 
expensive. Because o f the expense and the loss o f convenience, people changed their water- 
related activities considerably.
Consumers are acutely aware o f differences in time and money spent on the various water 
related activities and water sources as availability changes. They are also well aware o f 
variations in water quality and to some extent o f health implications o f declining water 
availability and quality. The private sector has shown its ability to adapt and evolve to the 
need for improved quality drinking water and to provide in times o f shortage.
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4.5 W ater Markets
As indicated in the previous sections, water is widely bought and sold in the T a’iz area, that 
is, water markets exist. It is the purpose o f this section to examine their size and how they 
function. Three fundamental types o f water market are identified:
Table 4.22: Types o f Water Market in T a’iz.
M arket Type Specific Markets
Rural - Rural Irrigation (Described in agriculture section)
Rural - Urban Public Piped, Tankers, Private Piped, Free Water
Urban - Urban Jerry Can, Bottled
Because o f the distribution o f water resources nearly all o f the water used in the city is 
sourced from rural areas, however jerry can and bottled water could be considered separately 
since this is ‘produced’ and sold in the urban setting.
4.5.1 Methodologies and Descriptions
Private Piped Supplies
Each o f the operators o f the six private schemes operating in the city were interviewed. Each 
is essentially operated by one man and in total they supply not more than 230m3/day piped 
water to small, specific parts o f  T a’iz (Figure 4.13). This estimate is considered accurate to 
+/- 20% and is based on tank sizes for the borehole schemes, and header reservoir sizes in the 
case o f the spring-based schemes. Table 4.23 records some of the key data obtained from the 
private piped water suppliers.
Four o f the schemes are located on the slopes o f Jabal Sabir where they tap spring sources. 
The declining yields o f the spring-sourced schemes is considered to be due to the increased 
use o f water upstream in the villages o f Jabal Sabir for domestic purposes or qat irrigation.
An increase in qat irrigation on the Northern slopes o f Jabal Sabir during the period 1986- 
1995 has been confirmed by satellite image studies (Leung, 1999). Although o f good overall 
quality, the spring water is rich in fluoride, and accounts for the characteristic brown ‘T a’iz 
teeth’. Apart from in Saalah, households connected to the other schemes also receive NWSA 
water and are dependent on it for their non-potable supply. Yields from the schemes barely 
cover the potable water requirements.
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Because o f the limited supply, the spring water is used only for drinking, except for the 
Saalah scheme where there is no alternative non-potable NWSA supply. No new connections 
are being added to the spring-based schemes. The limited supply causes consumers even to 
supplement their drinking water needs with jerry can (dabba) water.
In all the schemes the customer arranges and pays for the physical connection between his 
house and the main, and no connection fee is charged. In each o f the spring-based schemes, 
except Al Haadi, the customers are assessed by the operator for their ability to pay and are 
charged accordingly. A similar system operates when repairs are needed. In calculating the 
cost o f production o f the spring-based schemes, the reservoir and distribution systems have 
been valued at 1MYR and 1MYR per Km o f mains, discounted over 30 and 20 years 
respectively. All three schemes only allow for the operating costs including a small allowance 
for the operator and have no funds allocated for capital works replacement. The Saalah 
scheme is the largest, and operates as an essentially non-profit co-operative.
The Al Haadi scheme theoretically belongs to the ‘awqaaf (religious endowment ministry) 
but no one pays for their water. Appropriation o f water by force by some o f the wealthiest 
sections o f the Ta’iz community combined with a declining resource, has discouraged the 
person responsible for its upkeep and the system has fallen into disrepair, the number o f 
connections declining from 520 to 120. All four spring-based schemes are running at a loss 
and, in the absence o f maintenance, are steadily deteriorating. O f the two schemes based on 
well supplies in the city centre, one only serves the houses o f the immediate family and the 
other sells water to about 50 houses at a profit.
In summary, the private piped schemes are in decline due to failing water resources and 
unsustainable institutional arrangements and form a negligible contribution to the water 
supply o f T a’iz.
Private Wells
Apart from the springs supplying the private piped supply schemes described in the preceding 
section, all water consumed in the city is derived from wells, most of which are located 
outside the city. Eighteen o f the main wells that account for supplying at least 95% of the 
tankers were visited, and operators were interviewed regarding water sales. The main findings 
are summarised in Table 4.24 and the well locations are indicated in Figure 4,14.
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The well discharge was determined from the time required to fill a tanker. It is suspected that 
well operators may exaggerate the number o f hours per day the wells are operating, and, for 
the wells outside the city, the operation time given in Table 4.24 includes the time the well is 
used for irrigation. For a variety o f reasons the wells are not operated every day o f every 
month. The well operator’s estimate o f  running time is given without taking into account 
over-(or under-) estimates. Obtaining a reliable figure regarding the number o f tankers 
supplied per day from well operator responses to survey questionnaires is also hazardous.
Fear that the survey is for taxation purposes might lower the estimate, or a desire to be 
considered the owner o f the most important and reliable well to prospective customers might 
raise the estimate. For these reasons the number o f tankers per day collecting water from the 
well is only considered accurate to +/- 25%. Wells which do not have a storage tank o f 
significant size in which to hold the water pumped from the well when tankers are not being 
filled are particularly limited in their delivery capacity. Wells are also limited in delivery 
capacity, even if they do have a storage tank, if they lack more than one delivery hose. The 
T a’iz wells have neither storage tank nor more than one delivery hose. A well yielding the 
typical 5 lit/sec cannot turn round more than 50 tankers of 3m3 capacity in a 10 hour working 
day with no lunch or qat breaks.
There is no seasonal variation in price, although some wells increased the price slightly 
during the water shortage o f summer 1995. The only wells yielding good quality water are in 
Wadi Ad Dabbaab and there is a slight recognition o f this in the price paid by the customer. 
The income generated by sales to the tankers is indicated in Table 4.24.
In calculating the diesel and oil costs, it has been assumed that the motors use 200YR(1.5$) 
o f diesel and 100YR(0.77$) o f oil in a 12 hour day (well operator estimates, summer 1997 
prices). This amount has been applied on a pro-rata basis according to the operating period 
calculated necessary to fill the tankers. Maintenance costs have been estimated at 20% o f the 
depreciation. None o f the private well operators do sufficient business to warrant employing 
others so no deduction for salaries has been made in calculating running costs. Although 
these assumptions are based on discussions with well owners, they should be considered 
rather approximate.
Table 4.24 indicates the difference between pre-depreciation profits versus the real loss all 
the wells are incurring when depreciation is taken into account. This difference is particularly 
marked for the drilled wells (those greater than 90m) where the construction costs are 
significantly greater than for dug wells. The dug wells are located outside the city and are
159
also involved in agriculture (and, in some instances, block manufacture). To them, the income 
from the tankers represents immediate cash as opposed to the seasonal income from the farm. 
Many o f the private wells were constructed with remittances from Saudi during the pre-Gulf 
W ar boom, a factor which could contribute to depreciation not being ‘felt’ or accounted for 
by the operators.
Water quality is poor in most o f  the wells except those in Wadi Ad Dabbaab and there is no 
regular monitoring o f the resource in terms o f water levels and abstractions. The ability o f the 
wells to maintain a service was severely tested during the water crisis, with some wells 
running dry. However they provide a vital supply line both for low quality water when the 
public utility fails and, more importantly, providing the main source o f 75% of the 
population’s good quality drinking water.
Water Tankers
Water may be obtained from vendors who usually own small tankers o f approximately two to 
two and a half cubic metres. There are a few larger ones o f four to five cubic metres. The 
tankers fill up at wells mostly outside the city and congregate at the six centres indicated on 
Figure 4.14. Each centre is organised into a rota by an elected, overseer who is paid by the 
driver. During August 1997, a survey o f water tankers was carried out. Five tankers at each of 
the depots (a sample o f 30% of the total number o f tanker operators) were interviewed 
regarding:
a) the wells they obtain water from,
b) how much they pay for the water,
c) where they deliver to,
d) how many trips they make,
e) how much they sell for,
f) what their running costs are,
g) what new equipment costs, how long it lasts, and what maintenance is needed.
In most instances, each driver owns his own tanker and there are no indications o f cartels in 
operation. The tankers deliver to the area surrounding their centres and are not usually asked 
to deliver further afield due to increasing cost with delivery distance. One exception is 
tankers which fill up with high quality water from Wadi Dabbaab, which may be asked to 
deliver to any part o f the city. Results o f the survey are presented in Table 4.25.
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Table 4.25 gives averages for the five tanker operators interviewed at each depot. In 
calculating depreciation drivers estimate the new price of the basic truck, tank, pump and 
hose at 1.1MYR(8500$), 50,000YR(385$), 60,O00YR(462$) and 15,000YR(115$) 
respectively. These prices have been discounted over ten, five, five and three years 
respectively. Running costs were obtained from the drivers for petrol and oil and averaged 
4500YR(35$)/week and 2400YR(18.5$)/inonth respectively. No labour costs are incurred. 
Maintenance has been estimated at 20% o f the purchase price spent over the depreciation 
period. After deduction o f running costs, maintenance and depreciation, a very adequate 
income is provided if the demand for tanker water remains high (at five, or more, trips per 
day). When demand is high, tanker driver income is considerably more than the average 
income (as determined from the expenditure survey). However, when the NW SA supply 
improves, there is a prompt decline in work for tankers. To offset this risk, the tanker drivers 
can remove the tank and pump and become general hauliers instead.
The tankers are providing between 30% (for the lowest income group) and 55% (for the 
highest income groups) o f the city with water. A major issue with the tankers is the water 
quality. Apart from incorrectly informing the customer regarding where they get the water 
from, tankers have been observed emptying cess pits and dumping it in the nearest wadi. 
Whether they are cleaned out before delivering the next load o f ‘clean' water is not known. 
Although they are supposed to be cleaned out regularly drivers often bribe the ‘baladiyya’ 
inspectors not to bother them. There is, therefore, a need for legislation, spot checks, and for 
enforcement o f quality standards.
Despite some shortcomings in the tanker service, they form a very effective safety valve to 
cover times o f shortage. They rapidly adapt to changes in demand and maintain a round-the- 
clock service. They are also much more efficient at delivering water than the public utility, 
with little to no losses, and are more consumer aware.
They do not, however, cater for the poor, and, in fact, they typically prove more expensive for 
poorer clients. One reason for this is because there are proportionately more poor living in 
multi-storey apartments, and if there are more floors to lift the water up, tanker drivers charge 
more. A second reason is that many o f the poor are located at the edges o f the city. The 
outskirts are the main areas receiving new arrivals from the countryside and where land and 
rents are cheaper. These are the same areas which are not covered by the public utility and 
therefore need the tanker supply, but they are also further from the tanker depots and are
162
often not served by asphalted roads, so, again, tanker drivers charge more to deliver to these 
areas.
Drinking Water Treatment Companies
All eighteen drinking water treatment companies were visited during the summer o f 1997 and 
their operators interviewed regarding water supplies, processing, distribution and sales. Their 
responses to the interviews are presented in Table 4.26. Water is collected from good quality 
wells, either in Wadi Dabbaab or from Dhi Sufaal (near Al Q aa’ida) in owned or rented, 
dedicated tankers. The tanker brings water to the plant where it is processed first through a 
sand filter, then a fine cotton filter to reduce particulate matter and lastly through one or more 
Du-pont reverse osmosis (RO) cylinders to reduce salinity. For micro-organisms chlorine is 
claimed to be used. Although a chlorine bottle was often noticed at the plants, they were not 
generally connected because any hint o f  chlorine in the taste reduces sales. Some plants also 
add chemicals to the water in an attempt to precipitate salts and control pH. The key to 
processing the water is the RO equipment which is brought (or smuggled) from Saudi. The 
RO plant has some wastage, and ideally should be cleaned at periodic intervals to maintain 
efficiency. However this is seldom carried out, and rather than the manufacturers design 
wastage o f 15%, the actual is around 50%.
A wide range o f product quality can be found. Some operators manage to reduce the salinity 
whilst others actually manage to increase it. In fact the sources are o f reasonably good quality 
and were no treatment, except filtration, carried out, would produce an acceptable product for 
the public palate.
W ater distribution is either direct from the plant via 5, 10 or 20 lit plastic jerry cans carried 
by pick-ups to the shops. Alternatively, many o f the processors have branches and distribute 
to them by tanker (either the same tanker that brought the water, for low production plants, or 
another, usually smaller tanker, if the water-fetching tanker is busy). The jerry cans may be 
owned by the drinking water treatment plant, the shops or the customer. Processing plants 
also sell a small amount o f water direct to the public who live in the immediate vicinity. The 
branches contain a storage tank and a few taps for the public to fill from in a small room 
fronting onto a road. There are also various unofficial branches which receive water from one 
or more drinking water treatment companies. The water is sold for 15YR(0.115$) per 10 lit 
jerry can and 7.5YR(0.058$) per 5 lit to the shops and branches who in turn sell it for 
20YR(0.15$) and 10YR(0.077$) respectively to the public. Jerry can water prices are 
relatively fixed throughout the city, though more is charged per litre for smaller quantities
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and if the water is cooled. The price has been monitored from summer 1995 to spring 1998. 
After steadily increasing, the price levelled out in summer 1996 (at 25YR(0.19$)/10 lit) 
falling for the first time in autumn 1996 with the seasonal decline in demand and it has not 
risen since. This may suggest that the market is now saturated as a result o f the very rapid 
increase in the number o f  suppliers between 1994 and today (Figure 4.27). Some drinking 
water treatment companies have recently started to sell bottled water.
Consumption o f jerry can water indicated by the household survey is eight times greater than 
the stated production o f the drinking water treatment companies. There could be an 
‘underestimate’ o f production by the companies for tax or other reasons. Drinking water may 
be also sold by vendors (shops or company branches) which is, in fact, untreated. This latter 
alternative is thought to take place rather often. The discrepancy may also result from 
households overestimating the quantities consumed, though this is thought less likely. Some 
water companies may have been overlooked in the survey, although efforts were made to 
include all the processing plants. The data given in Table 4.26 are based on stated sales and 
do not include the higher consumption o f ‘jerry can’ water indicated by the household survey. 
The amount o f water stated as sold to the drinking water treatment companies by the wells 
included in the well survey should be less than that claimed to be bought by the companies 
since some water is also brought from the Dhi Sufal area which was not included in the well 
survey. The fact that the amounts are approximately the same suggests that the water 
processing companies have underestimated their water sales and purchases.
Companies were not readily forthcoming with information regarding equipment costs. In 
calculating the costs o f the drinking water treatment companies, plant has been depreciated 
over ten years and vehicles over 15. Operating costs were estimated on the basis o f a monthly 
rate o f 20,000YR(154$) for building rental, 10,000YR(77$) for RO tube maintenance, petrol 
and oil at 22,OOOYR(169$) per vehicle, electricity at 3,000YR(23$) per month and salaries at 
8,000YR(62$) per tanker per delivery per day. Other equipment maintenance was based on 
20% of the depreciation rate. Only one rented building has been assumed for each processing 
plant. Often the branches are rented under a separate agreement by the branch manager who 
effectively operates as a financially separate business. If  the water sales figures are to be 
believed, most o f the drinking water treatment companies would operate at a slight loss if 
depreciation, calculated by the method used above, is taken into consideration. However, this 
loss is offset in some instances where the main building is owned rather than rented, by 
owning only one vehicle to collect and deliver water and by not maintaining the RO tubes. 
The latter is a false economy, resulting in the loss o f up to 35% o f their potential income.
165
Company profitability appears to be rather variable, and depends on careful management and 
good technical know-how. Four companies have ceased to operate in the past two years 
probably through being unprofitable because o f inefficient operation.
The market for jerry can water in T a’iz is huge, with 75% of the city buying jerry cans, 
mostly daily. The water processing companies exist because the water from the public utility 
is perceived as inadequate for drinking.
Although there are generally few complaints regarding jerry can water quality, the fact that 
water sales stated by the companies are only one eighth of the quantity claimed to be 
purchased by the public suggests that much o f the water bought has never been near a 
processing plant. Branches can be tempted to fill people’s jerry can from the public supply, 
especially when they have not received a delivery from the processing plant.
Because o f the potential for incompetence and cheating the public, monitoring and some 
command and control measures are needed. There is also a need for technical help in 
optimising the equipment operation. As with the tankers, there is no provision for the poor, 
and jerry can water is the largest part o f the monthly water bill. Although the price has 
remained steady, because o f the dependence o f so many on the source, and, in the absence o f 
significant finds o f good quality water in the area, the consumer needs some kind o f 
protection from profiteering. On the whole, the need for a potable water supply in Ta’iz has 
been met reliably and relatively cheaply by the water processing companies. Although the 
price o f the drinking water is very cheap by global standards, it is still unaffordable to 25% of 
the population.
The Public Water Supply Utility - NW S A
The supply o f water to the urban population by the public utility NWSA differs from the 
other providers discussed above. Where this supply is different and where it is similar are 
worth noting. Regarding similarities, water is sourced from rural areas and the public utility 
competes with the other suppliers in a market for water in terms o f price, water quality and 
reliability / ease o f access. This competition is perhaps not immediately apparent in what is 
usually considered a monopoly. The monopoly, however, applies only to the piped nature o f 
the NWSA supply (the private piped suppliers are almost insignificant in terms o f their 
contribution to providing for the water needs o f the city). Other differences between non­
piped suppliers and NW SA relate to their ownership (private as opposed to public), and, if the 
water shortage is not too acute, the quantity o f water they bring (that is, less than NWSA).
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Coverage & Amount Provided
The estimation o f per capita water consumption from NWSA supplies is difficult to assess for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the mean number o f people per family in the census o f Dec 1994 
was 6.5, whilst the number per NWSA connection in this survey was 9.7. Secondly, the 
volume o f water supplied from the water authority was 7123m3/day as estimated by NWSA 
versus 16878m3/day as estimated from household monthly water bills determined by the 
domestic water use survey. NW SA estimated 75% coverage in 1995 and 61% in 1998. These 
estimates are based on a simple model o f one family (Tisra) per connection and 6.5 persons 
per ‘usra (1994 census figures and definitions). This assumes that a family is equivalent to a 
connection, that all houses are occupied and all connections legal. The random survey o f 
1028 households estimated 90% coverage and included illegal connections (2.5% actually 
admitted to this) and shared connections (another 4% admitted to this). The survey found an 
average o f 9.7 persons per meter and excluded empty dwellings. An issue of whether the 
growth o f the population o f the city has been matched by a proportionate increase in the 
number o f houses or whether there really more people per household is also raised by the 
conflicting persons per household statistics. All these factors lead to an underestimation o f 
coverage by the NW SA method. Public utility underestimation o f supply has been suspected 
from other surveys, such as San’a (Dar Al Handasah, 1997).
Similarly, the difference between the NW SA estimates o f sewerage coverage (48%) and those 
o f the urban domestic water use survey (68%) may result from a combination o f illegal 
connections and also respondents assuming they were connected to NWSA sewers when in 
fact they are not. As well as cess pit sewerage, it is possible that there are some small private 
sewer networks, that is, a few houses connected to a common cess pit, or to the wadi, where 
there is no NWSA coverage.
Table 4.27: Effect o f assumptions on per capita consumption. 1997 figures of 382000 
population and 35808 connections.________
Scenarios
People / 
Connection
9.7 6.5 9.7 6.5
% of total pop 
with connection
91% 61% 91% 61%
Water supplied 
(in3/day)
5700* 5700* 16878 16878
Lit/cap ita/day 16.4 24.5 48.6 72.5
m3/capita/yr** 5 8 16 35
* according to NWSA. Assumes 20% is sold to institutions and commercial enterprises (CES, 
1997). ** WHO minimum 10m3/capita/yr.
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Regarding the quantity o f  water supplied by NWSA, the figure o f 16878m3/day is based on 
household bills. However there is a possibility that NWSA is over-charging, as indicated by 
the average charge o f 24YR/m3, equivalent to an impossible 15m3/month delivery. Together 
with an average storage capacity o f around 3m3 indicated by the survey, the argument leans 
towards the lower quantity o f water delivered and is likely to have been below the WHO 
guideline for some time (Figure 4.18).
As well as the problem o f insufficient water supplies from NWSA, there is a problem of 
water quality. Although both aspects deteriorated during the 1995 water crisis and have 
improved somewhat since (Figure 4.4) the quality in terms o f Electrical Conductivity remains 
below the European Economic Community maximum o f 1500 pS/cm.
Free Water
There are two main sources of free water in the city o f Ta’iz. One is to collect rainwater. This 
is income related with a higher proportion o f poorer households collecting rainwater 
(Handley, 1999a). A second source of free water is obtained by queuing for water at the 
mosques, public standpipes and outside the houses o f a few wealthy households that make 
water accessible to the public. The time involved in collecting free water (Figure 4.15) 
suggests that the poor spend time to save money and the rich vice versa. The trade-off 
between time for money indicates that ‘free’ water is actually a market and the water carries 
an opportunity cost at least. For this reason it is suggested that free water should not become 
easy or quick to obtain, otherwise those in less need o f it will use it. The quality o f free water 
can be very variable and because it is free, be the least amenable to minimum quality 
standards and its users, the poor, are hence the most vulnerable.
4.5,2 W ate r M ark e t O verview
Table 4.28; Quantities o f water (m3/day) consumed by the city from non-NWSA sources.
Supplier Estimates Consumer Estimates
Jerry can purchase by households 93 790
Water tankered to water processing 
companies
180
Water sales to tankers by wells 1262
Tanker sales to houses 1218
Water purchase from tankers 2318
Free water consumption (1548) 1548
Total 2859 m3/day 4656 m3/day
Per capita based on population o f 
382,000 at the time o f the survey.
7.5 Iit/cap/day
2.5 m3/cap/yr
12,2 Iit/cap/day 
4.5 m3/cap/yr
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Besides the estimates o f consumption o f NW SA-supplied water given in Table 4.27, Table 
4.28 estimates the consumption o f non-NWSA water.
The per capita water consumption lies somewhere between the supplier and consumer 
estimates and, because it is not possible for NWSA to provide the amounts indicated by 
consumer billing, the actual consumption is considered to be nearer the supplier estimate (lb - 
24 1 it/capita/day). This quantity is very low and when added to the provision from other 
sources only approaches the WHO recommended minimum (28 1/c/d). This quantity is not 
considered unlikely and similar estimates have been deduced for other Yemeni towns (for 
instance Amran and Yarim, Handley, 1997a and Davies 1997 pers com.). Despite the 
discrepancies in the estimates, the importance o f non-NWSA water sources are apparent 
(Figure 4.24). Alternative water supplies to NWSA comprise up to 37% by volume o f all 
domestic water use.
The failure o f NW SA to provide water o f better quality in terms of salinity than the European 
Economic Community recommended maximum has led to the city depending almost entirely 
on a separate supply for drinking water. This need has been met by a rapidly growing jerry 
can drinking water market. Although the volumetric quantity o f ‘jerry can’, bottled and 
private piped water is not great, it does comprise over 85% o f the drinking water. Around 
20% o f the non-potable water used is tankered water, which is the direct alternative to NWSA 
water. The proportion o f tankered water increases notably above this level when NWSA 
production declines. Those who do not have the option to access alternative sources tend to 
be the urban poor.
Based on consumer estimates o f household expenditure the average cost o f water is 
calculated at ju s t over 4% o f household income. Although the poor pay a much higher 
proportion than the wealthy (Figure 4.25) 89% o f the population are thought to pay more o f 
their income on water than the World Bank recommended maximum o f 2% (quoted in 
Allan,in prep;5.22).
The mean costs o f  water production from the different suppliers (inclusive o f depreciation) 
and the sale prices are summarised in Table 4.29 and Figure 4.31.
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Table 4.29: Cost and sale price o f water for various water sources YR/m3 ($/m3).
Wells to 
Agriculture
NW SA
Supply
Private
Piped
Wells to 
T ankers
Tankers 
to Public
Jerry Can 
Water**
Bottled
W ater
Cost 33 to 35* 48 43 33 to 35* 65 1,017 ?
Price (0.25-0.27) (0.37) (0.33) (0.25-0.27) (0.5) (7.8)
Sale 15 24 32 31 285 2,687 26,000
Price (0. 12) (0.18) (0.25) (0.24) (2 .2) (21) (200)
^Higher cost for shorter depreciation period o f well and equipment.
**Based consumer estimates o f purchases, not drinking water treatment company estimates o f 
sales.
Based on summer 1998 data, and the national tariff applicable at that time, the price elasticity 
o f demand for NW SA water in T a’iz is -6  (Figure 4.26). The national tariff was 
25.5YR(0.20$)/m3 water and sewerage charge for 0-10m3/month water consumption, 
42.5YR(0.33$)/nr3 for 1 l-20m 3/month, 68YR(0.52$)/m3 for 21-30m3/month and 
85YR(0.65$)/m3 for more than 30m3/month. The average monthly charge was 
24YR(0.18$)/m3 (Table 4.29).
Although private piped supplies and NW SA simply run at a loss, the drinking water treatment 
companies have mostly been established since the G ulf War brought a virtual end to the 
remittances (Figure 4.27). The other private water suppliers make an immediate profit that 
they live o ff and chew off, but it would need another remittances boom for significant 
replacement o f plant and equipment or reinvestment.
The production, sale price and water quality from each source are contrasted in Table 4.30 
and production and price in Figure 4,28.
Table 4.30: Quantity, Quality and Sale Price o f Water,
Quantity Quality Price Price
m3/day p.S/cm YR/m3 $/m3
Wells to 
Agriculture
8200 1000 15 0.12
NW SA 5700 1750 24 0.18
Wells to Tankers 1250 3500 31 0.24
Private Piped 230 800 32 0.25
Tankers 1250 3500 285 2.20
Jerry Can W ater 200 600 2687 21.00
Bottled Water 2 400 26000 200.00
The relationship between quantity supplied and water price for most sources lie on an 
approximately linear trend (on Iog-log scale). Notable exceptions are the private piped
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supplies, which now provide very small amounts o f water and the sales by wells to tankers 
that do not cover their costs. Table 4.30 suggests the quality o f water sold by the tankers to 
the public does not warrant the price charged. The loss o f economies o f scale by this method 
does not permit significant price reductions for tankered water and the lack o f availability o f 
wells providing good quality water from all but Wadi Ad Dabaab sources precludes an 
improvement.
4.6 S um m ary  and  O bservations
Agricultural Water Use
Rainfed agriculture topped up by spates in wadi areas and small areas o f stream-fed 
agriculture was the traditional form of cultivation until the mid 1970’s. Since then the 
technological impact o f boreholes and pumps financed by remittances from Saudi Arabia and 
the G ulf has led to the depletion o f groundwater resources and hence also spates and stream 
flows.
Despite the growth in groundwater development, the same period has seen a decline in the 
agricultural proportion o f GDP and a population increase even in both urban and rural areas. 
The result has been a sharp decline in per capita water availability.
Land holdings are small and fragmented which forms a major cause o f disputes. Relative to 
their urban counterparts the rural population is poorer. Rural wealth differentials are 
accentuated by water allocation which determines both the number o f cropping seasons and 
the type o f crops that can be grown. The wealthiest are those who control the headwaters o f 
streams and groundwater flows and water resource development moves progressively back to 
this point. In the few locations where surface flows still occur many have been polluted by 
urban and industrial development.
Areas o f volcanic rocks are not very productive and alluvial tracts dominate the agricultural 
economy. The conflict over declining groundwater levels is concentrated in wadi areas at the 
base o f the alluvium / top o f the volcanics. As the groundwater level declines below this point 
only the few farmers with deep enough drilled wells can obtain water and maintain two or 
three cash crops per year at this inequitable final stage in the tragedy o f the groundwater 
commons (Table 4.3). The direct cost of ultimate groundwater depletion has been evaluated 
for Al Hayma.
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Since there is more cultivatable land available than water resources, improvements in 
production efficiency are only likely to result in more use o f land rather than conservation o f 
water. Although the irrigation methods are inefficient the main loss is in (cheap) diesel as 
water is recirculated to the aquifer. Efforts to reduce irrigation inefficiency are more related 
to the potential that the topography gives for the installation of piped distribution systems 
than to any other factor.
Although two restricted areas have seen a decline in agricultural production over the past ten 
years due to abstractions o f  groundwater for industrial use, declines have also been noted in 
non-industrial areas. A decline in rainfall over the period is possible but statistically 
unprovable.
Rainfed agriculture accounts for around 75% o f the agricultural water use in the study area. 
Because o f its distribution, this water cannot be used for any other purpose. The water 
derived from stream flows accounts for less than 10% of the water use and is difficult to 
appropriate for any other purpose since much is polluted and the remainder falls within strict 
allocative rules. The only water which could be reallocated to other sectors is the 
groundwater which comprises around 30M m 7yr in the Upper Wadi Rasyati catchment or 
22% o f the total agricultural water use. Even this modest amount includes a portion o f 
overexploitation. Hence, right at the outset of this discussion, a severe limit is set on the 
potential for water reallocation.
Considering that economic and livelihood returns to water in agriculture are meagre and, if 
depreciation on boreholes and pumping equipment is considered, returns are definitely 
negative, one might ask if  remittances were really a good thing? Despite these realities the 
Yemeni’s heart remains in his soil.
Industrial Water Use
Although Yemen is a relatively unindustrialised country, the manufacturing contribution to 
the GDP is increasing and, compared with the rest o f the country, the Upper Wadi Rasyan 
catchment is more industrialised. Water quality is a problem for some industrial processes 
and managers are aware o f the problems o f water shortages for production and are making 
some efforts to reuse and conserve water. Industrial returns to water are in marked contrast to 
those o f agriculture both in the provision o f livelihoods and in economic terms. However this 
is not without cost. The growth in industrial pollution is essentially unchecked and attitudes
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towards it are rather ambivalent. Although there is an awareness o f pollution problems there 
is very little action to rectify them and some may even use them as a means o f land 
acquisition. Certainly specific manufacturers allow pollution to become an externality.
Domestic Water Supplies
A greater proportion o f people in the T a’iz governorate live in a rural setting than the national 
average and those people are worse served by water and sanitation than the rest o f the 
country. In contrast the urban population is served better than the national norm. In most rural 
areas water is fetched by women and/or donkey and consumption is very low at around 20 
led. In some areas where there are adequate water resources and people live close together 
enough to make a piped network economically feasible the private sector can and does 
provide adequate water. A major problem facing piped schemes whether private or public is 
the supply o f spare parts. Another problem in ‘community-run’ schemes is the potential for 
corruption, much depending on the quality o f the local shayx.
In the city o f T a’iz, there are very distinctive differences between the poor and the wealthy. 
The differences not only are seen in the more obvious forms of jobs and income, possessions, 
housing and level o f education, but also in the water-related activities. Hydraulic differences 
are accentuated in the high water stress situation exhibited in T a’iz. The wealthy have more 
water using facilities (Figure 4.11) and the poor, especially children o f poorer families, spend 
more time collecting water (Figures 4.15 and 4.16). The rich can better afford tankered water 
and the poor are more dependent on queuing for free water from standpipes (Figure 4.12).
The wealthy were much more cushioned from the affects of water shortage (Figure 4.23) and 
could afford the luxury to place water quality higher on their priorities than poorer people 
(Figure 4.22).
The quality o f piped and tankered water is below WHO drinking water guidelines for over 
95% o f the households. The quantity provided by the public supplier is below those standards 
(Figure 4.18) and the total from all sources consumed by the ‘average individual’ is at or 
around that limit. W ater stress felt through severe shortage and declining quality results in 
more time spent collecting water (Figure 4.17). Although less time is spent using it, that time 
is concentrated in bursts o f hydraulic activity particularly in washing clothes on the rare 
occasions that water comes out o f the tap (Box 2). With water from the public utility being 
relatively cheap, the price for that source did not figure as important to consumers as water 
quality (Figure 4.19). Although the city’s inhabitants are conditioned to adapt to water 
shortage those with a single ‘monopoly’ supplier, such as the public utility, are more
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vulnerable to water stress. The differentials described in this section provide the hallmarks o f 
the T a’iz urban hydraulic society.
Water Markets
Private piped supplies are a very small (1%) and declining portion o f water supplies in T a’iz. 
They are a monument to upstream resource capture, lack of monitoring, lack o f regulation, 
commercially unreal administration, and community failure in allocating equitably.
The failure o f the public utility to provide enough water or water o f adequate quality for 
drinking has spawned private sector initiatives. Wells are the source o f the private sector and 
run at a loss, particularly those within the city which are effectively subsidised by mosques. 
W ater tankers provide an inequitable, expensive, alternative source o f poor quality water to 
the public utility. The loss o f  economies o f scale in the tanker delivery method is the ‘flip 
side’ o f being a good job  provider. Irregularities in the quality o f water provided by tankers 
beg enforced regulation of standards.
The drinking water treatment Companies have proliferated as the quality o f water provided by 
the public utility has declined. Although a reasonable price is charged, the proportion o f 
income spent by most o f the population on water is well above the World Bank recommended 
level o f 2% o f household GDP, and for the poor is above the maximum o f 5% (Figure 4,25). 
Most o f household expenditure on water is for drinking water.
NW SA supply water for 10% o f the time, at 18-30 day intervals. Although a block tariff is 
used by the NW SA the wealthy probably gain access to greater quantities o f this government- 
subsidised source o f water. Inconsistencies in the evaluation of public utility water provision 
make this observation uncertain, however, it may be stated that the NW SA water supply is 
inadequate in terms o f quality, quantity and reliability, as well as being inequitable, 
inefficient, and financially unviable (see also section 5.4.2).
It must be asked whether the opportunity cost o f queuing in the free water market is equitable 
and whether ‘free’ water should be exempt from water quality standards simply because it is 
free. Despite the failings o f the private sector in maintaining quality standards and providing 
for the poor, the private suppliers have proved themselves adaptable to water stress and have 
provided water when the public utility has failed -  but at a price.
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Figure 4.3 Sectoral Share of Yemen's GDP. 
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Fig. 4.24 Proportion of water supplied to  househo lds from d ifferent sources 
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W
at
er
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
as 
% 
of 
In
co
m
e
co CN OCM O 00
jajB/v\ uo juads aujooul jo aBejuaojad
199
Fi
gu
re
 
4.
25
: 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
on 
w
at
er
 a
s 
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
of 
in
co
m
e.
88
(CUJ/dA; aoMd
2 0 0
Fi
gu
re
 
4.
26
: 
Pr
ice
 
El
as
tic
ity
 
of 
De
m
an
d 
fo
r 
NW
SA
 
w
at
er
.
VFigure 4.27: Ta'iz Drinking W ater Treatment Companies Established Annually.
2 0 1
(ew/UA) 9°Md
2 0 2
Fi
gu
re
 
4.
28
: 
Sa
le 
Pr
ice
 
vs 
Es
tim
at
es
 
of 
Q
ua
nt
itie
s 
of 
W
at
er
 S
old
 
in 
Up
pe
r 
W
ad
i 
Ra
sy
an
 
W
at
er
 M
ar
ke
ts
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 
Tr
en
ds
 
in 
Ta
'iz
 
Ci
ty 
an
d 
in 
Su
rro
un
di
ng
 
C
ou
nt
ry
si
de
 
(U
pp
er
 W
ad
i 
Ra
sy
an
 
C
at
ch
m
en
t)
♦
CM
uoj)e|ndod
203
Fi
gu
re
 
4.
29
Figure 4.30: The Relevance o f Domestic W ater Use Q uestionnaires
204
W
at
er
 c
os
t 
an
d 
sa
le 
pr
ice
s 
in 
the
 
Ta
'iz
 
ar
ea
 
(in
cl
us
iv
e 
of 
ca
pi
ta
l 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
es
tim
at
es
)
pW/Sn % • ” !Jd a|*S pue JSOQ
205
Fi
gu
re
 
4.
31
Published
Papers 
Not filmed
for Copyright 
reasons
w m m m
W rtZiiaim M
• i  M 1;W  nn\(Y\P(\Mi/ 
m\n\rf\ir\M
Figure 4.32 Is w ater perceived as an econom ic good ?
Chapter 5 Discussion: Anatomy of a Water Crisis
‘water flows uphill to money and power’ 
Reisner, 1986
In this chapter, the development theory discussed in chapter 2 is tested against the empirically 
derived physical and socio-economic realities o f  the T a’iz situation. These realities were 
presented in chapters 3 and 4. Where appropriate, new data are presented in this chapter to 
illustrate the points made.
The evidence given in chapter 4 suggests that the water shortage in T a’iz not only had a 
significant impact on the social habits o f  the population, but that human activity largely 
contributed to the crisis in the first place. W ater can ‘flow uphill to m oney’ (Reisner, 1986), 
and this chapter begins with a summary o f  the economic context which underlies the social 
adaptations to the water shortage in section 5.1. Reisner continued by suggesting that ‘water 
flows uphill to money and pow er’. Political ecology seeks to unravel the ‘interactions o f 
different actors pursuing their quite distinctive aims and interests’ (Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997;21) and section 5.2 comprises an actor-oriented analysis (ibid;24) o f  the actions 
o f the powerful in determining water allocation in the T a’iz area over the past thirty years. 
Within Bryant and Bailey’s framework o f political ecology (1997;21-24) the T a’iz situation is 
problem specific -  water shortage (reflected in declining groundwater levels and water 
quality) and regionally specific -  that is, T a’iz and the surrounding Upper Wadi Rasyan area.
Coase suggests that the legal system under which a market operates largely determines 
whether the transaction costs o f  making an exchange can be covered (ibid;717). In particular 
he identifies ‘clarity in the law ’, ‘an appropriate system o f property rights’ and whether ‘they 
are enforced’ (ibid;718) as necessary if  trade is to be facilitated. Section 5.3 examines the 
existing legal framework in Yemen regarding water transfers from the specific standpoint o f  
these three issues. Coase (1992;714) also asserts that appropriate institutions are needed to 
govern the process o f exchange in a market economy. Water transfers in Yemen are no 
exception. Section 5.4 examines the existing institutions in the context o f  their 
appropriateness to facilitating water transfers.
An adequate examination o f the origin o f  the aims and interests o f  the political actors that 
operate within, and manipulate, the legal and institutional frameworks, is beyond the scope o f 
this study. However, a few observations regarding some prevailing belief systems concerning 
water allocation and the implications for development are given in section 5.5.
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Finally, the problems o f water resources management and efficient water allocation in T a’iz 
have not occurred in isolation, but rather have attracted a considerable amount o f interest and 
money from the development community. Section 5.6 considers the concept specific aspects 
(Bryant and Bailey, 1997;21-24) o f economic progress, equity provision and environmental 
protection in the water sector in the contexts o f both current debates in the 
development/donor community and their involvement in T a’iz.
5.1 The role and limitations of demand management in Ta’iz and the virtual 
water solution
virtual water is provided ‘at a price as cheap as the cheapest local source of water, 
that used in irrigation, and in amounts ... .almost as large as the total water economy’
‘a litre of wheat for a day’s wages’ 
Revelation 6:6
During the 1990’s the international hydraulic community has progressed in its awareness of 
appropriate measures needed to alleviate water scarcity towards making the water go further 
rather than simply trying to find more water. Those measures are summarised under the 
umbrella term ‘water demand management’ (WDM).
The steps in awareness which take us towards formulating a demand management policy may 
be summarised as:
1. W ater has a value
2. W ater is an economic good
3. W ater should ‘gravitate’ to the highest value use by:
a) Productive Efficiency (promotes the reduction o f waste and the more 
efficient technical use o f water)
b) Allocative Efficiency (promotes intersectoral water transfer)
4. Allocatively Efficient water transfers are facilitated locally via water markets and,
5. On a larger scale via virtual water (international water transfer)
Although the hydraulic actors in the city o f T a’iz, Yemen are mostly remote from the 
international discourse, to an extent, this progression has occurred ipso facto . It is suggested 
that, as a consequence o f the needs and economic realities even if not by conscious 
awareness, the implementation o f WDM principles is directly promoted by increasing water
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scarcity and that more water scarce regions are likely to have progressed further in their 
implementation than many water-rich areas.
5.1.1 Water has a value vs. Water as an economic good
That water has a value and that it should be treated as an economic good appear to be two 
sides o f  the same coin. The first, water having a value, is related to the benefits accruing from 
water. The second, water being treated as an economic good is related to the costs incurred in 
accessing water. They form separate steps in the awareness process, however, simply because 
there seems to be a time gap, if not decision-making gap between appreciating the value o f 
water and being prepared to pay for it. Although many can appreciate some o f the user 
aspects o f water (drinking, irrigating, manufacturing, swimming etc.), the full value o f water 
including its future value and value to non-users identified by Burrill (1998) is impossible to 
quantify. The UK motor industry is said to provide four times as many jobs in related 
provision o f services needed to maintain it as there are people directly employed by it. This 
‘trickle-down’ phenomenon is also observed in the water supply o f T a’iz where its value in 
terms o f livelihood provision to those who trade, transport and treat it (as described in section 
4.5) is considerable. The greater the losses o f  economies o f scale in the private sector the 
more are the benefits in livelihood provision.
When it comes to paying for the water, the current development ethos informs us that the 
economic costs o f its provision should be recovered. However, the awareness that water is not 
free, and, more importantly, should not be free is slow to permeate any society (Figure 4.32). 
T a’iz provides some useful examples o f different aspects o f  the cost o f  water:
Marginal Costs
The public piped water utility is failing to collect adequate revenues to even cover half o f the 
running costs from an average charge o f only 0.17 $/m3. Average incremental costs o f 
alternative supplies currently being considered range from 0.5 to l$ /m 3 from conventional 
potential groundwater sources to 2.5$/m3 for desalinated seawater (Handley, 1999b). These 
estimates exclude the provision o f sanitation and also salaries. In rough terms current tariffs 
are possibly around a quarter o f  the marginal cost. Although the public utility shows little 
indication o f progress in treating water as an economic good, the expenditure by the public on 
water when all sources are considered (Figure 4.25) suggests otherwise. It is considered that 
the price paid by households reflects w ater’s necessity status which forces a willingess-to-pay 
above and beyond capacity-to-afford and also forces water to become an economic good in 
consumer awareness. Pricing by the public utility, and the consumer attitude to the utility on
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the other hand suggest that water is a public right rather than an economic good. This problem 
is perceived by the author to be related to prevailing belief systems and also to the 
institutional and political context. These aspects are discussed in later sections. If  marginal 
cost recovery by the public utility is to occur then significant changes in the utility will be 
needed, though consumer capacity-to-afford may not be enough.
In the agricultural sector, the irrigators o f nearby Wadi Ad Dabbaab who also supply tankers 
were asked whether they would sell bulk supplies to the city o f T a’iz. Although they said they 
would, all made the proviso that in the case o f scarcity irrigation would come first. This is 
despite the fact that returns to water from supplying tankers are better than from irrigation, or 
rather are not as bad. Farmers do not face up to the true marginal cost o f irrigation, but then 
nor does the World Bank (Moench,1997;12). The reason the farmers do not is not that they 
are poor money managers. The 1980’s remittances boom which paid for the wells blinded 
them to the real costs, and subsidies on pumps, irrigation equipment and diesel since has 
tightened the blindfold. The few who still have enough capital / power to drill are spurred on 
by the increasing scarcity o f underground water, the exploitation o f which still remains 
unchecked by regulation.
Opportunity Costs
Two examples are cited as evidencing the preparedness o f consumers to pay significant 
opportunity costs. One is the queuing o f people for water. The social benefits for rural women 
waiting their turn at the well (Ansell,1980, Mactagan,1995) may significantly offset the 
opportunity cost o f being able to spend their time doing something else. The contrast between 
wealthier and poorer peoples’ access to free water by children or men queuing and tankers by 
payment in the urban environment (Figure 4.12) suggests there is a household evaluation o f 
opportunity cost in which time and money are exchanged.
The second example is reflected in the effort made by industrialists to ensure a reliable supply 
o f water. The major industrialists interviewed all consider water provision in the context of 
days o f  production lost due to insufficient water supply. They therefore make opportunity 
cost driven decisions and are perhaps more in a position to do so because water is still a 
relatively small part o f their total inputs budget.
Transaction Costs
The very existence o f  the water markets in T a’iz indicates that the transaction costs incurred 
in these markets have been overcome. However whether the transaction costs o f bulk rural -
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urban transfers o f  water are met is another matter. The transactional cost o f  the World Bank 
‘experiment’ in negotiating water transfers from Habir to T a’iz has cost around $700,000 for 
a supply unlikely to provide more than 20 lit/sec to the city. This amount does not include the 
$8M compensation being paid nor the exploration costs ($2.5M). If  the scheme lasts thirty 
years, the negotiation costs will be around 4cents/m3. If the exploration costs are included and 
a more typical ten year life is assumed, then the transaction costs are 50cents/m3. This cost 
represents around three times the price that the same water is sold for to the city consumer by 
the public utility.
Social Costs
Dellapenna (1995:155) points out the potential social costs involved in selling water and cites 
the potential loss o f tax revenues to a community as an example. This cost might be 
considered a form o f opportunity cost, and would certainly be a factor if, for instance, water 
sales to the city from agricultural use resulted in a decline in crop production, and hence a 
drop in zakaat due from the crops. Under-collection o f zakaat and non-transparent returns to 
the community mitigate against the significance o f this cost, and in any case, under Yemeni 
customs, irrigated crops are taxed at a lower rate than rainfed crops (a wrong economic signal 
to the irrigator). The little tax lost from the agricultural sector could be recovered through the 
water use activity in the sector the water is transferred to (industry more so than domestic 
use). However, the means o f returning benefits accruing via taxes on irrigated products will 
have been lost to the water source communities through the water transfer.
5.1.2 Intrasectoral Productive Efficiency Measures
Discussions o f transfers o f water within the agricultural sector in the development literature 
tend to focus on irrigation methods and crop varieties and there is certainly scope for such 
measures in the Upper Rasyan catchment. The switch by farmers from coffee to qat 
production may be construed as one o f the latter measures , although those who think qat uses 
as much water would contest this (see W eir 1985, Al-Hatndi,1998, Heidbrink,1994).
However, three points are much more salient than the application o f such measures. Firstly, 
regarding irrigation methods, savings in water as a consequence o f switching to a more 
efficient irrigation system will mainly reduce Mosses’ which would otherwise have recharged 
the aquifer. Savings from improved irrigation methods will be mainly in the energy (usually 
diesel) expended in pumping the water rather than in protection o f the water resource itself. 
Secondly, because there is more potentially cultivable land than there is water to irrigate it, 
any savings in water will only result in the irrigation o f a larger area rather than a reduction in 
water use, that is, water is the constraint, not land (Bromley, 1986;593). This was clearly
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demonstrated in farmer decision making in Amran (Handley, 1996b) and leads to the third 
point, that the principle o f the ‘tragedy o f the common’ groundwater is a ubiquitous driving 
force. As one farmer in Amran put it “ if I were to try to reduce my water consumption” 
(specifically by installing drip irrigation in this instance) “my neighbour would get a larger 
slice o f the resource without the expense I, the water-efficient farmer, have incurred” (ibid.).
Traditional rainwater harvesting methods transfer water efficiently from land with veiy poor 
cropping potential to marginal land where but for the extra run-on cropping would not be 
possible. Another ancient, indigenous productively efficient form o f water use is rainwater 
harvesting from land and roofs in the rural and urban areas for domestic and animal use. A 
more recent development in the implementation o f productive efficiency measures is 
industrial water recycling and industrialists are currently exploring further steps in this area, 
The reuse o f  domestic waste-water by agriculture has been poorly managed with degradation 
o f the environment as a consequence (see section 3.7). Waste-water treatment is needed to 
make agricultural use a viable option, but at around 0.6$/m3 the costs are probably 
prohibitive.
5.1.3 Intersectoral AUocatively Efficient Water Transfers via Markets
Table 5.1: Summary o f water users and intersectoral transfers.
Quantity Mm3/yr Price $/m3
Rainfed and Stream-fed Agriculture 103 Free
Irrigated Agriculture 30 0 .0 8 -0 .1 6
Rural Domestic Use 2.5 20 household 
hours/m3
Urban Domestic Use 2.7 0.17
Industrial and Commercial Use 2.5 0 .1 7 -2 .0 *
W ater Transfer:
Rural Agriculture to Urban Domestic via 
tankers
OJi 2.0
W ater Transfer:
Rural Agriculture to Urban Domestic via 
NW SA Supplies (quantity pumped)
5 0.17
W ater Transfer:
Rural Agriculture to Urban Industrial via 
tankers and pipelines
2 0 .5 -2 .0 * *
W ater Transfer:
Virtual W ater imported from overseas to the 
area in grains
100*** 0 j i***
* NW S A / private tanker source
* * Own tanker /  private tanker source 
*** See section 5.1.5.
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With six discernible urban water markets and the reality o f intersectoral reallocation o f water 
resources, awareness and implementation o f  allocative efficiency measures in T a ’iz are surely 
well ahead o f ‘N orthern’ counterparts. However, the volume o f  water being transferred by 
agreement from irrigated areas with low (or rather negative) returns to water to domestic and 
industrial users who pay economically realistic rates is limited to around 2.5M m3/yr (shown 
underlined in Table 5.1)
Despite Falkenmark and Lundqvist’s assertion that ‘reliance on market mechanisms is often 
less than realistic in the 3rd world’ (1995) and Dellapenna’s claim that (1995; 153) markets in 
water have never actually played much o f a role, the very opposite has occurred in T a’iz.
Over 75% o f the population have depended on the private market for drinking water costing 
around 20$/m3 and up to 1/3 on tanker supplies for domestic supplies costing around 2$/m3.
In times o f even more severe shortage participation in these markets increases further.
It might be asked why water markets have become so prevalent in T a’iz and what has 
facilitated the intersectoral allocative transfers that are so difficult to establish in other places 
(Allan,in prep). A shortage o f supply from the public utility, coupled with a decline in its 
quality and accentuated as the water shortage has deepened, has spawned the tanker and 
drinking water markets. The shortage has become so extreme that the physical constraint o f 
moving bulky general domestic use water by tanker, or the local treatm ent o f drinking water 
with all the loss o f economies o f scale involved, can still be funded at least by up to one-third 
and three-quarters o f  the community respectively. The high industrial returns to water 
combined with the significant political power o f the industrialists has enabled them to meet 
their basic water needs through transfers from the agricultural sector.
In the view o f  Ward and Moench (Unpubl.) and this author the T a’iz water markets are likely 
to expand. However, as noted in the instance o f Yarim (Handley, 1997a), the limit to 
expansion is not likely to be the availability o f tankers or pipelines but o f  the resource, and 
water or its food equivalent has to be sought from outside the surface water catchment.
5.1.4 Suppressed Demand Management
It seems rather hypocritical for a Northern expert to espouse the merits o f  demand 
management to a Yemeni, at least to a T a’izi, and then return home to her ‘N orthern’ 
hydraulic lifestyle whilst the Yemeni goes home to his 25-30 1/c/d lifestyle. Suppressed 
demand is defined in the T a’iz instance as the absence o f choice to increase one’s 
consumption. Essentially that choice is not open to most households, they simply have to
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make do with what they can get. A similar situation prevails in the rural areas where a lack o f 
plumbing infrastructure adds to the problem o f inadequate supply and limits consumption to 
25 1/c/d or less. The adaptive capacity o f  Yemeni households in suppressed demand 
conditions to cope with the water stress is remarkable (Box 2). It is difficult to envisage, and 
unrealistic to expect, much improvement in end-user efficiency. I f  more water were to 
become available, then stronger demand management measures would be likely to be needed. 
Although suppressed demand results in, or equates with, reduced demand, it is neither a 
solution to inefficient use, nor a substitute for demand management.
Despite the adaptation to shortage o f individual households there is a need for a similar 
adaptive capacity in the Yemeni institutions and political economy to redress the factors 
which have led to the shortages that have developed under their supervision. These issues are 
discussed in section 5.2&5.4 in relation to their political and institutional contexts.
Box 2: T a ’iz W a te r -  T he R eality  (author quoted in World Bank, 1997)
"W hen the mains water finally arrives, all social engagements are cancelled and the mother 
and daughters will work from 6:00 am to 12:00 p.m. for the one or two days the water is 
connected. The washing has accumulated into a huge pile, some clothes are being worn a 
second time over and there are no clean clothes or bedding left in the house. The next day 
after the water stops is drying day. There is usually not enough room, so clothes are often 
draped on the roof over any object available -  reinforcement bars, water tanks, etc. The next 
event is ironing. The whole cycle is about 4 — 5 days o f constant water related activity by all 
female members o f  the household.”
From the peak o f  the water crisis in August 1995 when water was coming once every 40 days.
5.1.5 In te rn a tio n a l A llocatively E fficient W a te r T ransfers  via V irtua l W a te r
The importance o f imports o f  ‘virtual w ater’ embedded in grain, to the Middle East in 
particular, has been described by Allan (1998). Yemen is no exception, and has steadily 
increased its import o f  wheat and flour since the mid-1970’s (Figure 5.1). In the period 1975 
to 1996, total cereals imports have increased from 0.5M tonnes to 2.5M tonnes whilst 
domestic production has remained relatively static at around 0.5M tonnes (World 
Bank,1998a;Fig.2). That the dependency o f this, one time ‘bread basket o f A rabia’ on the 
international staples market began at exactly the same time as the migration o f workers to 
Saudi Arabia and the G ulf in search o f remittances is no coincidence. However, the return o f 
a large portion o f  those workers in the wake o f the G ulf War has not resulted in a decline in
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the import o f  grains. Local production o f  grains has not kept pace with the huge increase in 
population over the last 25 years, but rather, significant tracts o f land which used to produce 
sorghum are now used for qat cultivation.
Ta iz is no exception to the national picture. The household survey indicated that at least 91% 
of the population o f the city purchased wheat or flour in bulk (50kg sacks) and the average 
household consumption was 24 sacks per year. Despite a preference for home-grown sorghum 
only 15% o f  households brought an average o f 3.7 50kg sacks per year from the village, that 
is, one fortieth o f  the imported grain consumption. T a’iz city population represents 2.7% of 
the national total and their wheat and flour consumption as indicated by the survey is almost 
exactly in the same proportion. If  the city consumes an amount o f wheat and flour close to the 
national average, then rural areas must also (although government subsidies provide 
incentives for leakages e.g. via smuggling). The equivalent quantity and price o f virtual water 
indicated in Table 1 assume 1000 tonnes o f water per tonne o f wheat produced, that 4% o f 
the national total reaches T a’iz and the surrounding catchment o f  Upper Wadi Rasyan, and 
assumes the April 1998 street price o f 770YR(5.9$)/50kg sack o f wheat. That significant 
supplies o f imported wheat and flour are being taken from the city depots to the rural areas, 
would explain the sacks seen on nearly every Toyota Landcruiser returning from city to 
village. Virtual water in Yemen has received two huge subsidies. Firstly the subsidy o f the 
exporters paid to their farmers and secondly Yemeni subsidies to its importers. The result is 
the provision o f virtual water at a price as cheap as the cheapest local source o f water, that 
used in irrigation, and in amounts as large as the water used by local rainfed agriculture and 
almost as large as the total water economy (Table 5.1).
5.1.6 Some Equity Issues
Although the progression towards reallocating scarce water resources to higher value uses 
may make good economic sense, significant equity issues are raised. Among these are:
a) Compensation and the issue o f protecting third party interests. That is, all those who 
had livelihoods dependent on the water sold in the selling community, not ju st the well 
owners.
b) The interests o f those who cannot afford to purchase water from the markets, or who 
have to pay a significant portion o f their income on water in order to survive. That is,
2/3 o f the urban community who cannot afford tankers when the piped water runs out 
and 1/4 o f those who cannot afford treated drinking water when the piped water is o f 
inadequate quality.
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c) Those who miss out on the ‘predetermining allocative logic’ o f a piped supply, 
(Falkenmark and Lundqvist,1995;214), that is, those on the ever-expanding accretive 
edge o f  the city and/or those who cannot afford to connect.
d) Those who access less from the effectively subsidised piped system, that is, those 
without gardens and without many water using facilities available to the wealthy.
e) Those paying the externality o f pollution, that is, those on the receiving end o f  
domestic and industrial waste water and those without sewerage.
These people represent the losers in the water providing processes described in this section. 
Although the issues involved are beyond the scope o f this section, and are reserved for later 
discussion, the inequitable consequences o f  water allocation must be noted.
5.1.7 Summary
It would appear that there is a difference in the application o f WDM principles if  not in 
awareness o f  them in the various water-use sectors o f T a’iz. In the irrigation sector where 
water, as opposed to land, is the constraint, productive efficiency demand management 
measures have little impact due to wider ‘structural’ issues o f the price o f diesel fuel, land 
availability and the commonality o f groundwater. Besides the irrigation sector, those who do 
not act as though water were an economic good include the public domestic supply utility, 
and, it is suggested, the ‘northern’ development fraternity. In contrast, high levels o f 
productive efficiency in water use by rainwater harvesting have been practised since the 
habitation o f Arabia Felix began.
Also in contiast to the irrigation sector and the public utility, in the domestic and industrial 
sectois, where capital is a greater constraint, efficiency measures which come under the 
umbrella o f  demand management are seen to be applied and to work. Urban domestic and 
industrial users pay significant, though not full opportunity and transaction costs. W hether the 
marginal costs o f domestic supplies will be met is perhaps more o f an institutional issue than 
an economic one. Certainly domestic drinking water and industrial process water marginal 
costs are being met.
Those who do regard water as an economic good include the industrialists, those who trade, 
transport and treat it, and those who have to buy it to meet their basic drinking needs. The 
split between those who consider that W ater Is an Economic Resource (W IER) and those that 
do not (W INER, Allan,in prep, terminology), is related to small volume high quality drinking 
water in the former camp versus large volume lower quality domestic /  irrigation water users
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in the latter. The main exception to this rule is the industrialists who need quite large 
quantities o f reasonable quality water and are ready to pay WIER prices. The reason that they 
can be the exception is the far greater returns they achieve from their water use when 
compared with other users (Table 4.12).
The fact that individual households and businesses have turned to the highly need-adaptive 
water market is essentially due to the failure o f the public utility to provide adequate supplies. 
The adaptivity o f  those households and businesses to the water shortages reflects the 
suppressed demand conditions that have led to the proliferation o f alternative water sources in 
adaptive markets. The growth o f the markets has also been helped by the prevailing 
environment o f political interests and legal pluralism that are examined in later sections.
Local water markets are, however, dwarfed by the scale o f involvement in the international 
water market. The amount o f  virtual water imported from overseas in the form o f grain 
underlines Yemen’s dependence on World Water.
Perhaps the most significant problem in both the intra- or intersectoral reallocation o f water 
but particularly the latter is one o f equity. This is particularly so for those in the buying 
community who cannot afford it and those in the selling community who are not direct 
recipients o f  the benefits o f the sale.
This section has demonstrated that there are significant economic incentives to promote the 
transfer o f water from irrigation to domestic and industrial sectors, and food needs are met by 
the import o f virtual water. Water transfers, however, do not occur on an adequate scale to 
meet even the modest current demand and reliance on virtual water is ignored. The reasons 
for these inconsistencies are explored in the next section.
5.2 Yemeni hydropolitical reality: economic sense vs. political expedience
‘bil urf aw bil unf 
by agreement or by violence 
Ali Abdullah Salih, 1995
So far in this chapter, we have discussed some o f the economic incentives and constraints to 
the efficient allocation o f water in the T a’iz region. However, in the water use and allocation 
business ‘economics are an illusion; politics are real’ Reisner (1986). Allan also notes that the 
pursuit o f productive efficiency measures are politically acceptable whereas the much more
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effective reallocative solutions to water scarcity advocated by economists and scientists are 
politically too costly (in prep;6.18). Section 5.1 demonstrated the economic sense o f the 
reallocative hypothesis in the T a’iz instance. This section explores whether the politically 
possible prevails at the expense o f the economically sound.
Aptly describing the hydropolitics o f T a’iz, Migdal (1988) asserts that the accommodation 
between the state and other interest groups, their struggles and manoeuvres constitute the 
‘real politics’ o f the South. In this process, Hajer (1995;39) emphasises the importance o f the 
‘sub-politics’ o f the concealed, individualised, micro-powers as opposed to the acts o f a 
single sovereign. This section seeks to explore the ‘real politics’ and ‘sub-politics’ o f some o f 
the water issues affecting T a’iz. In order to do this the national historical setting is very 
briefly examined. Then, based on the area o f A1 Hayma / Habir which has played so 
prominent a role in the water supply o f T a’iz and its demise, the following questions are 
asked :
a) Who are the actors, and
b) How have they influenced, or controlled water allocation?
c) W hether gains and losses in the resource capture game reflect power asymmetries.
The political influence o f some wider regional, national and international issues on local 
water allocation are then discussed and the capacity to adapt to water scarcity by those 
involved is examined in conclusion.
5.2.1 The Political Map: Historical Roots of ‘North’ and ‘South’ Yemen
The history o f Yemen can be characterised by the recurring theme o f North -  South 
opposition. Dresch (1989; 11) states:
“the northern tribes ... from the end o f the ninth century AD to 1962 were 
associated with a succession o f Zaydi (Shi’ite) Imams ... The southern 
mountains and the Tihamah have been predominantly Shaft’i (Sunni) for 
almost as long, being ruled by a succession o f more or less powerful states 
and sometimes raided or dominated by the northerners.”
T a’iz lies within these southern mountains and has had its fair share o f  northern domination. 
Phases o f northern domination include those o f 1636 (to expel Turks) and 1823 (to avoid 
drought). Each time the northerners moved south permanently they ceased to be tribesmen 
and became landlords or peasants like the people around them (ibid; 13) in a similar manner to 
the Bedouin raiders in Oman (Wilkinson; 1977). Domination has been characterised by the
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extraction o f taxes “by northern tribesmen attaching themselves to government officials in the 
south without any appointment by the state .. and stayed there permanently” (Dresch;229).
The overthrow o f the Imamate in 1962 and the establishment o f “the Republic constitutes an 
obvious fracture with the past with an equally obvious continuation o f the tribal forms within 
it” (ibid;236). That continuation, in the opinion o f many T a’izis, includes the extraction o f 
taxes from the region, particularly from the fledgling industries. They call T a’iz ‘Al baqara al 
huluub’ -  the milked cow. Taxes are widely perceived as the means by which the northern 
tribally-based government officials obtain their ‘layla Aalaw i’ Toyota Landcruiser (or even 
more curvy ‘M onika’ 1999 model). The north -  south divide appears as strong as ever and, 
despite being part o f  North Yemen prior to unification, T a’iz places its affiliations firmly in 
the south.
The demise o f  Russian communism led to the end of effective sponsorship o f South Yemen, 
and unification o f the two Yem en’s followed in 1990. Despite the honeymoon ending with 
the civil war in 1994 and the abolition o f  the southern-led socialist (Ishtiraki) party, exposure 
to socialism has at least left softie notion that equity, instead o f divinely appointed poverty, is 
an option. Indeed, some water projects were undertaken in the T a’iz region under a socialist 
banner. Since 1994 the resurgence o f more overtly Islamic interests in the form o f the Islah 
opposition party has occupied much o f the ruling M u’tamar party’s energies. Border 
bickering with Saudi and keeping the south under the thumb occupies most o f  the rest.
5.2.2 The case history of Al Hayma -  Habir: The Political Actors
Figure 5.2 identifies some o f the interlinkages o f some o f the more prominent actors in Habir 
and Al Hayma according to their area o f influence and Figure 5.3 schematically depicts those 
areas. Box 3 introduces some o f the main aspects o f  the actors in terms o f their location o f 
origin, religious sect, pecking order, party political affiliations and history/motives where 
known. [It should be noted that these are not ‘hard’ data and that the information is also not 
complete. The actors wax and wane in importance, change costumes frequently and do not 
follow a consistent script. Since the data are subjective it may be considered to border on the 
realm o f opinion in some aspects.] Although using some field data o f the author, the work o f 
Abd Ar Rahman Al Iriani in the context o f identifying stakeholders in water transfers and 
possibilities for establishing water user associations, is gratefully acknowledged.
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Box 3: Political Actors in Al Hayma / Habir: Cast according to area and affiliation:
(Underline indicates heads of groupings who reside outside the area)
Habir / J a ’ashin / Al Q aa’ida
Sadiq Amin Abu Ras (Residence — San’a): Minister of Local Administration, ex Minister of Agriculture 
during negotiations over exploratory drilling in Habir. The son of the biggest shayx in the South of 
North Yemen. The most powerful person in the area. The Abu Ras family have supported the local 
population in resisting water supply to Ta’iz. Their dynasty are Zaydis originating from Al Jawf in the 
North and moved into the area in the 19th century. Mu’tamar.
Abdu Karim Abu Ras: quite popular cousin of Sadiq Amin. Mu’tamar. Son of Abdu Karim Abu Ras: 
MP. In a deal between Mu’tamar and Islah during the elections Islah were supposed to win so the 
leadership of Mu’tamar did not permit a candidate from Mu’tamar to stand. Abu Ras therefore 
nominated his son as an independent and won against the odds. In the post-election manoeuvres he 
joined Mu’tamar. His victory was a significant blow to both Islah and shayx Mansur (see below).
Mohammad Ahmed Mansur ibn Nasr (Residence -  Ta’iz): Whatever party Sadiq Amin Abu Ras 
supports, shayx Mansur (as he is known) will support the opposite. Currently he therefore sides with 
Islah. Originally from Yafa’ he is a Shafi’i. His grandfather was a good friend of the Turks and refused 
to give the zakaat to the Imam after the Turks gave the Imam the right to collect zakaat in Yemen. When 
the Turks left after the first world war the Imam confiscated 70% of the rich land of West Habir in lieu 
of unpaid zakaat and it is now owned by government as waqf (Ward and Moench;unpubl). The 
propensity to not pay governments continues today since he is the largest individual debtor to NWSA 
with an arrears water bill approaching 1 million YR. NWSA debt collectors are turned away at gunpoint. 
His son is an Islah MP for the area.
Abd Ar Rahman Ad Dimnah: Is a shayx for West Habir under the lead of shayx Mansur. Party political 
affiliation is according to pragmatism, so he currently supports Islah candidates. Originating recently 
from north-east of Wadi Nakhlan and before that from Shar’ab (bayt al kamali) he is a Shafi’i but is also 
in marriage ties to the Zaydi Abu Ras clan.
Hamud Lutf: is a low-key shayx who owns most of the wells in the area. He is in the Mu’tamar camp, is 
Shafi’i, but has good relations with Islah. Abdo Amin is the son of the shayx of Al Maqlad. Through 
shrewd dealings he maintains good relations with all sides but supports Mu’tamar.
Abd Ar-Rahim Wazi’: nephew of the late shayx Sadiq al Hamayir (see below) but follows the lead of 
the 26th Sept Association (the main irrigation and agricultural co-operative in East Habir under Sadiq 
Amin Abu Ras).
Al Hayma and Miqbaba
Sadiq Ali Mohammad Nu’man Al Hamayir (deceased) known as shayx Sadiq: used to dominate both 
Upper and Lower Al Hayma and benefited from agreeing to the development of the Hayma wellfield 
(see following section) but the family influence is declining. The clan are Al Alwani and originate from 
Hadhramout they are Shafi’i, but with strong Zaydi sentiments. Shayx Sadiq’s sons are Noman 
(Mu’tamar) and Abas (Islah)
Abdul Karim Ali Abdu and Hamud Sirhan (over Wadi Urayq) are associated with the shayx Sadiq 
grouping and support Mu’tamar.
Al Said Abdul Bary Abdullah bin Husain (under the lead of Abdul Alim Hassan of Jabal Habashi but 
based in Ta’iz): gaining influence in Upper Hayma. He is from west of Hayma. This group of sufis are 
in fierce competition with Islah and are usually Mu’tamar. There is also is small group of sufis under 
Abd Ar Rahman Al Kadahi.
Most of Middle Hayma was Ishtiraki. After the civil war o f ‘94 they converted mainly to Islah. Dr. Al 
Ahdal is the MP. He is from Al Ganad and is Islah. Miqbaba is Islah but is becoming more Mu’tamar. 
With the decline of shayx Sadiq’s influence an association under Mohammed Sadaam has been formed 
in Miqbaba.
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The case history o f Al Hayma -  Habir: The Events: 1976 - 1995
The following account o f water-related events in and around Al Hayma are both the product 
and legacy o f the actors mentioned in Box 3. The account serves as a basis for the subsequent 
hydropolitical discussion and analysis.
During the fieldwork and exploratory drilling in wadi Al Hayma from 1976 to commissioning 
in 1982-1983, several misconceptions seemed to have arisen. Some locals thought that 
NW SA were only to drill seven wells, and now there are over thirty (W ard and Moench, 
unpubl.). The farmers were told that the pumping o f deeper wells drilled for NW SA would 
not affect their shallow dug wells because there was an aquiclude in between. When four 
years abstraction resulted in cessation o f  the perennial flow o f the wadi and the dug wells had 
largely dried up, the absence o f an aquiclude was all too apparent. $10M  compensation for 
loss o f crops had been promised (Tipton and Kalmbach, 1979) but none had been received. 
Local farmers appear to have been at least uninformed or misinformed regarding the 
implications the NW SA abstractions would have on them. The shayx o f Lower Al Hayma, the 
late shayx Sadiq agreed to the drilling and managed to get three deeper, drilled wells out o f 
the deal. They continue to supply his successors’ lucious qat plantation via open channel 
irrigation to this day in the midst o f an otherwise once fertile, now barren, valley (Photo 2).
Prior to the emergency drilling campaign in Al Hayma in 1987 the NW SA wells reached a 
maximum depth o f  100 to 120m. The new wells included in the campaign were up to 500m 
deep, but government did not allow local farmers to deepen their wells. [Shayx Sadiq 
managed to obtain one o f these deeper wells]. The locals then stopped the NW SA drilling. 
The army was brought in and allegedly took the school children hostages in the school (for a 
day) whilst the local men went into the mountains with their weapons. Five shayxs were 
imprisoned by political security in T a’iz for five days. A first attempt to resolve the dispute 
by Sa’id ‘ahmad Sa’id, head o f the co-operatives at mudiiriyya (now nahiya) level, was 
rejected by the army. The local people then approached the governor (Al Yuusufi) and 
contacts in San’a requesting them to mediate. The M inister o f Oil came down and succeeded 
in obtaining the release o f  the five shuyuux on condition that they signed an agreement to not 
hinder the progress o f  drilling. The sons o f the shayxs guarded the drilling rig (part o f 
necessary feigned commitment to the government position and to relieve the situation).
After it became known that the Habir area was o f interest for exploratory drilling, in June 
1992 some locals disconnected one o f the government wells in the Xazaja area immediately 
to the south. It has since been claimed that this action was supported by the socialists who
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were seeking a local grievance from which to generate political mileage. The government 
responded by placing 20 trucks o f soldiers from the T a’iz military camp on stand by. 
Helicopters were sent on reconnaissance missions. Some socialists (Al Aamba) were 
imprisoned. The president’s man in T a’iz ( ‘abd Al Kariim ‘abdu Lillah, the deputy head o f 
security) managed to get the electricity and water reconnected and a co-operation agreement 
from the locals was obtained. The agreement was forced under ‘abd Al K ariim ’s threat “ if 
you do anything more, I am not responsible for the consequences” and the troops were not 
sent in.
The interests o f the Dhi Sufal area immediately to the north-east o f  the area shown on Figure
5.3 had been protected by Sadiq Abu Ras (M inister o f Agriculture at the time). Through his 
efforts, a well drilled previously by military strength as part o f the exploratory campaign for 
T a’iz was connected to supply Al Q aa’ida instead. Exploratory drilling in Habir again met 
with local resistance in Dec 1993. All the main shuyuux in the area were invited up to San’a 
to hear the president’s immortal words “you will co-operate with the drilling “ ‘imma bil ‘urf 
aw bil ‘u n f ’ -  “either by custom (that is, gentleman’s agreement) or by violence”. In June 
1995 Sadiq Abu Ras convinced the government that the five existing wells in the Dhi Sufal- 
A1 Q aa’ida valley were the maximum number it was possible to equitably operate and 
succeeded in getting drilling attention moved to Habir.
In April 1995 a rig arrived to start drilling six exploratory wells in Habir (three in east and 
three in west Habir). The locals threw the drillers off site in the same month using petrol 
torches. Three different visits were made to the area by up to four ministers at once to discuss 
the problem. Visitors included the T a’iz and Ibb governors, the minister o f agriculture, the 
minister o f  water and electricity and the minister o f civil services. All the shayxs involved 
were then summoned to Ibb and asked to promise to protect the drillers. They complained that 
they could not make promises regarding their irate peoples’ behaviour, especially considering 
their people’s mistrust o f  the government, reinforced by the Al Hayma disaster. Three shayxs 
were imprisoned in Ibb and four in Dhi Sufal until they agreed to sign an agreement o f  co­
operation. Given the alternative o f remaining in prison whilst the government used force to 
drill the wells they agreed to sign. The agreement incorporated a compensation package.
Hostilities flared up again in January 1996 when the government (NW SA) failed to deliver 
part o f  the compensation. The drilling was stopped, the governor responded by sending the 
troops in, so the villagers sent women and children to stop the troops. The women threw 
stones and tried to take the weapons from the soldiers and two women were seriously injured
222
when one o f  the soldiers opened fire. Fortunately, further escalation was prevented when the 
local shayxs and the governor o f Ibb intervened. The subsequent involvement in the area by 
the World Bank through the TWSSP (see section 5.4) has witnessed various extensions to the 
compensation package including the provision o f water supplies to the nearby villages. This 
accounts for around 25% o f the total yield o f the three wells connected so far. With 50% o f 
the remainder to be lost through leakages, a costly compensation package and considerable 
civil strife in hindsight it must be questioned whether the whole exercise was worth it.
SURDU had been conducting a dam feasibility study in Wadi Warazan, and in 1995 a rig 
went there to drill a site investigation borehole. Specifically because o f the Al Hayma 
experience, the local shayxs were suspicious o f any drilling, suspecting it was for the purpose 
o f abstracting water for T a’iz. On a pre-arranged day, 5000 armed men converged on the drill 
site and halted the drilling. The governor o f T a’iz came to negotiate and left again having 
agreed with the locals that no drilling for T a’iz supplies would take place and no dam would 
be constructed.
As a final incident for consideration, the handling o f the T a’iz emergency drilling within the 
city during 1995 is worth noting. Although technically poorly planned and executed, with 
resulting poor yields, from a political perspective it was more successful. The governor 
pushed the project to help alleviate the water crisis (or was it to increase in his popularity in 
the city, or both?). Having raised finance for the drilling from local businesses, the major 
outstanding cost was the pumps. The governor requested the money from central government 
under threat o f his resignation if  it was not forthcoming. His bluff was called, he resigned, the 
money appeared and his resignation was refused (Al Ayyam;7/6/95, Yemen Times; 12/6/95).
5.2.3 Some Observations
Although many observations could be drawn from these events some are particularly 
prominent:
Strong Society -  Weak State
The Al Hayma -  Habir incidents have demonstrated how state intervention can go amiss 
locally, and that struggles over environmental and socio-economic issues at the local micro­
level can have a momentous impact on the state and its goal o f predominance (Bryant; 1998, 
Migdal;1988). Compared with many countries the ability o f local communities to resist the 
government imposition o f  wells which would 'steal their water’ demonstrates Yemen as 
having a strong society and a weak state (Migdal,1988). The phrase 'com pared with many
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countries’ is used on purpose because many Yemenis believe that even the consideration o f 
using military intervention to drill, let alone allowing water to be abstracted for the city could 
never have occurred in the North o f Yemen. They equate this high-handed government 
position to be tenable only because the tribes are not as strong in the south compared with the 
north where society is even stronger and the state even weaker.
Principal -  Agent Problems and Knowledge Asymmetries 
The actions o f  shayx Sadiq clearly demonstrated:
a) The potential for principal -  agent abuses which became worse as the as the arena 
grew larger than the immediate locality. The agent (Sadiq) was given scope for 
opportunistic behaviour and received the welfare (water) o f  the principal (the local 
farmers).
b) How central institutions (NWSA) could offer an escape route from the demands o f 
traditional institutions (the shayx role), undermining communal responsibilities.
c) The cause-effect relationship o f the NW SA drilling on existing wells was not 
perceived by the man-in-the-field, in fact he was lied to. The perpetration o f this 
particular principal (farmers) -  agent (NWSA) abuse was only possible because o f the 
knowledge asymmetry between them.
d) The decision to exclude people from using the resource did not result from exhaustion 
o f the resource, but was consciously made beforehand (unlike Bromley, 1986;594).
The net result o f these principal -agent abuses was that the hand dug wells o f  the many ran 
dry whilst the deep drilled wells o f the few, particularly the agent, continue to yield to this 
day. This is a clear example o f  the control o f one actor over the environment o f  others 
(Bryant, 1993; 11) and o f resource capture that directly reflects power asymmetries. The 
declining influence o f the agent’s descendants over the same principals because o f  past 
abuses indicates an underlying ‘democracy’ in the shayx system.
Emblems and the Political Process
Hajer’s concepts (1995) o f  an environmental emblem or rallying point and o f  the long process 
from local environmental problem to political issue status are apparent in the history o f Al 
Hayma. The declining water level in Al Hayma was both an environmental and socio­
economic problem. However, since an urban population with its tarmac, capital biases 
(Chambers, 1983) has a stronger political voice (Falkenmark and Lundqvist,1995), the 
‘problem ’ surfaced as a drinking water supply issue, although it was actually part o f  the same
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problem. In the end, it took politicians (governors and ministers) to recognise the political 
mileage in it and turn a problem into an issue. One o f those politicians (the governor o f T a’iz) 
saw the window o f  opportunity and forced the hand o f the president in getting the pumps paid 
for. A sobering aspect for the windows-of-opportunity adherents is that the very fact that a 
crisis creates the window also means that the decisions taken are crisis-driven. As such they 
may result in only soothing the symptoms and have unpredictable, knee-jerk, non-optimum 
outcomes, as occurred, it is suggested, in the case o f the governor’s emergency drilling. O f 
course, to maintain the knowledge asymmetries, the general public are not informed o f  the 
failures (Yemen Times 21/8/95;Front Page, see Appendix C). The rise o f Al Hayma to 
emblem status is confirmed every time a drilling rig (the most evocative emblem, 
incidentally) turns up on site. Each time a rig appears local leaders specifically mention Al 
Hayma as the reason the rig must depart.
5.2.4 Political ‘Riyalities’: self-interest in regional, national and international contexts
Equitable Local W ater Transfers: Compensation vs. Opportunism 
The distinction between the compensation o f water source-area communities and 
opportunism on their part, particularly by the well owners, is slight. One task in establishing 
equitable water transfers is ensuring that compensation reaches the whole hydraulic 
community in rural source areas, that is, including those without wells but dependent on 
irrigated agriculture for their livelihoods (termed third parties). This is the greatest challenge 
to the World Bank efforts at agreeing water transfers from Habir to T a’iz. The track record o f 
government water transfer methods, with the benefit o f the very few and the misuse o f 
knowledge, has engendered a basic mistrust which may only be overcome by erring on the 
generous side. Being over-generous may be labelled opportunism, but it needs to be over­
generosity to all. Erring on the generous side appears to be the private sector example o f 
Hayel Said’s Soap and Ghee factory in providing electricity, piped water and jobs to those 
affected by their abstractions. In fact, considering water transfers throughout the region, the 
relatively smooth farmer -  tanker / private pipeline transfers are in marked contrast to the 
central government example. The essential difference between them is that the former 
involves money transfer and the latter does not. A commitment to purchase water from 
farmers, so that water flows one way and money the other, would appear to be the way ahead 
if transfers are to be more like market transactions than diplomatic negotiations 
(Sax, 1994; 13). However, shayx Sadiq is not likely to be the last political actor to benefit from 
government attempts to reallocate water at a level disproportionate to his original stake in the 
water.
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National Issues: Diesel Prices and Water Law
It is a curious fact that a well owner can sell water to tankers or farmers for as little as 
0.1 $/m3, whilst NW SA cannot cover basic running costs (exclusive o f maintenance, 
depreciation or salaries) when charging twice that price. The main difference in their running 
costs is the price o f power. In approximate terms it costs the farmer 2YR(0.015$)/m3/100m 
lift (1998 diesel price o f 10YR(0.077$)/lit) compared with 9YR(0.07$) for NW SA to lift one 
m3 o f water 100m by electricity. This difference in cost reflects the price o f electricity to 
NW SA (charged at the maximum tariff) compared with the price o f diesel to the farmer 
(charged at half the international level for oil exporters, Ward; 1998). I f  irrigators made the 
mistake o f  purchasing an electric pump instead o f diesel, the increase in electricity prices 
over the past few years will have forced them to give up irrigating (Handley, 1996b). Very few 
farmers made this mistake. The government is effectively subsidising the power costs o f 
irrigators and over-charging NW SA, who have to pass on this cost to the urban consumer. A 
strange twist in the tale is that the ministry that sells such costly electricity to NW SA is the 
same ministry that pays for it -  the Ministry o f Electricity and Water! Central government 
power pricing subsidises the well owner to use over 90% of the country’s water to grow, 
amongst other things, lucrative amphetamines, whilst charging over four times as much to 
provide a meagre 25 led o f poor quality water for domestic use.
The cessation o f perverse water pricing (M ollinga,1998;254) through diesel subsidies would 
contribute to improving local resource management by changing the net benefits o f  resource 
use (Steenbergen,1996;204). However, Yem en’s stance on power pricing makes both good 
political and economic sense, since those in political power are the landowners. This reality 
has been apparent each time the government (under World Bank structural adjustment 
incentive) changes the price o f  oil products. Since the onset o f structural adjustment, the 
major cost in oil products has been borne by petrol (affecting the man in the street) rather 
than diesel (affecting the ruling landowner class). When the Prime M inister increased the 
price o f diesel price in November 1995, the President appeased the landowner backlash by 
reducing the increase. Diesel price increases in October 1997 to 10YR(0.077$)/lit were an 
attempt at covering the real production cost o f  28YR(0.22$)/lit (Al-Thawra 23/10/97) and 
sparked o ff road blockades by protesting farmers which resulted in three dead (Al Hayat 
22/10/97). “M P’s rejected the rationale forwarded by the M inister o f  Oil and Minerals who 
maintained that the increase in the price o f diesel was inevitable in view o f the government’s 
Economic Reform Programs” (The Daily Chew, 25/10/97), but then, self-interest demands 
they reject it.
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The same political ‘riyalities’ underlie the failure o f attempts at passing a water law and in 
particular the regulation o f drilling and well spacing. Despite water laws being drafted on 
several occasions, they have never even reached parliament. Not only does Yemen have 
M igdal’s problem o f the strong society o f  tribal chiefs resisting the state (1988), those chiefs 
are the state (The President in Dresch;1989;7) acting in self, not state, interest. In Yemen’s 
case it is unwise to try to separate them too much (Steenbergen,1996;24,30,207-8).
International Issues -  Virtual Water
Section 5.1 demonstrated Yemen’s dependence on imported grains. This is an economic 
‘problem shed’ solution for an environmental watershed problem. Allan (in prep) contrasts the 
economic sense o f importing virtual water in grains with the political nonsense o f food self- 
sufficiency and points out that governments reconcile the two by ensuring the former remains 
a silent fact and the latter (only) audible rhetoric simultaneously. This self-deception is 
possible because the truth o f ships, docks, mills, trucks, warehouses and thousands o f people 
collecting sacks is the unsanctioned, and hence, silent partner. A few minutes o f a key speech 
by one man which contains a few stirring words about the harnessing o f water resources by 
our great farmers and engineers is sanctioned and hence audible.
The process o f wheat and flour importation is also highly politicised. Grain and flour 
subsidies through exchange rate differentials on ‘essential imports’ have previously 
selectively benefited those traders and politicians involved (Financial Times, 8/3/95). 
Irregularities have, at various times, reflected an attempt to drive people away from the 
cheaper government distribution points to the more expensive black market. Control o f local 
distribution points, at least in T a’iz, was transferred from opposition to ruling party in the run 
up to the 1997 elections when votes seemed to be won by the sackload (o f flour provided).
5.2.5 Conclusions: Actors, Allocations and Asymmetries
The history o f water allocation between T a’iz and Habir/AI Hayma has demonstrated a multi­
layered political arena in which local and national issues become inextricably enmeshed. 
Despite the party-political exterior, local political reality is about individuals, their grouping 
and splitting over issues and the single constant o f self-preservation and nest-feathering. The 
political networks are complex, clan related and dominated (but not exclusively so). Political 
parties are manipulated by local political actors to their own ends and vice versa and ‘events 
and struggles at the local level can have a momentous impact on ... the state’ 
(Migdal,1988;36). Governors, ministers and even the President have become involved in the 
struggle.
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The issue o f water reallocation has demonstrated that the political boundaries or affiliations 
and initiatives are a) complex, b) are dominated by the ever-changing networks o f 
relationships, and c) always have an historical context. Borders are not watersheds. This is 
particularly apparent with the Ibb-Ta’iz border. Although problemsheds are more appropriate 
than watersheds in the regional context o f  domestic, industrial and food needs, watersheds are 
still the locally immediate context, and typically reflect current upstream -  downstream 
inequalities.
Shifting the potential source area for T a’iz’s water has mainly followed the existing power 
asymmetries, although this argument is somewhat circular in that being able to direct water 
allocation is perhaps the ultimate indicator o f power in a water-scarce region. The legitimacy 
o f water reallocation is the subject o f  the next section.
5.3 Implications of legal pluralism for water allocations in Yemen
‘Abraham reproved Abimelech because of the well of water 
which the servants of Abimelech had seized’
Genesis 21:25
Trade in water is enabled on the basis o f  rules and regulations (Coase,1992;718). A 
complicating factor in Yemen, is the plurality o f legal frameworks under which they operate 
which itself is identified as a weak state /  strong society phenomenon (M igdal,1988). The 
absence o f a water law, the institutions to enact it and the ability to enforce it demand an 
alternative means o f agreed allocation o f Yemeni life’s most vital commodity -  water. This 
section suggests that in Yemen, where local forms o f (customary) law and courts (via the 
shayx) are predominant, legal pluralism is particularly appropriate. This section seeks to 
summarise the different sources o f water law in Yemen and briefly discuss the application 
and effectiveness o f those laws regarding water allocation, the markets they regulate, and the 
rules by which they regulate them.
5.3.1 Sources of Law
Four sources o f law may be identified in Yemen; the Constitution, the Shari’a or Islamic law, 
Civil Articles and Customary Rules (AI-Eryani et al, 1995 and Haddash,1998). The Shari’a is 
the ultimate source o f law and the other sources are meant to be based on it. However, new 
legal problems arise with social and technological changes (Vincent, 1991;200) which the 
days in which the Q ur’aan was given neither foresaw nor legislated for. All four sources are
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therefore dependent in origin on its interpretation, which is a combination o f  qiya (deduction 
by analogy) and ijm a’ (consensus). The four main schools o f Islamic law in Yemen (Hanafl, 
Maliki, Zaydi and Shafi’i) interpret Islamic law differently, which contributes to differences 
in the other three sources o f law. Maktari (1971 ;3) identifies the influences o f these schools 
in Yemen at different times and in different places, the Shafi’i school being o f particular 
significance in his study o f water rights in Lahj. Differences in law between the various 
schools are also identified in Al-Eryani et al (1995;48,50,58),
The Yemeni constitution is based on the Shari’a and the civil law is its formulation. Civil law 
“serves as a legal instrument to implement certain interpretations” which “are disputed among 
the various Islamic schools” (ibid;43). Similarly, customary water rights cannot be considered 
in isolation “since customs have to adhere to Shari’a” (ibid.) and again, some differences in 
customary law occur as a result o f the law originating from different Islamic schools. 
Customary law is portrayed as the local adaptation o f the shari’a and civil law, moulded by 
the specific conditions o f use (historical and geographical) and is defined as:
“the continued repetition o f certain actions or practices by a collectivity in the 
conviction that they are legally binding” (ibid;43)
Maktari identifies two types: ‘adaa:
“The repetition o f a thing [an action] invariably or mostly on the same pattern 
without reasoning” (1971;5,6)
and ‘u rf (which is the usual term used in the literature and in the T a’iz locality, whether this 
meaning is intended or not):
“that which human nature accepts by reasoning, and is acceptable to m an’s nature or 
habit. It is also authoritative, but it is readily understood.”
Codification o f customary law is rare, however the three hundred-year-old ‘Document of 
Seventy’ cited in Al-Eryani et al (1995;44), the law o f Sultan Fadl from 1950 (Maktari 
1971 ;69) and the five-hundred-year old customary laws o f Al Geberti in Wadi Zabid 
(TESCO, 1971 ;5) are examples o f its codification.
5.3.2 Legal Applications to Water Allocations
A summary o f  the relationship o f  the various sources o f law operating in Yemen to the shari’a 
with respect to some o f the more prominent water rights as considered by those sources is
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given in Table 5.2 insofar as they can be tabulated. The table is intended to summarise Al- 
Eryani et al (1995 ;41-77) and provides some o f the basis of the plurality o f  legal stances in 
Yemen regarding water rights.
W ater Ownership
Major differences between the legal systems occur with respect to water ownership. “There 
are no customary rules which explicitly define the legal status o f  water” but there is a distinct 
contradiction between the constitution and the shari’a and also between the constitution and 
the civil law (ibid;46). The constitution uncompromisingly considers all water to be the 
property o f  the state (Haddash,1998). The constitution’s position appears untenable on this 
point. Although o f ‘state interest’, water in the view o f the civil law and the shari’a (and 
therefore customary law) is res nullius, ( ‘m ubah’, that is, ‘o f  nobody’).
Receptacles and Wells
A key issue in water ownership is whether the water is in a receptacle. Civil law considers 
water not in a receptacle to be state property whilst that in a container to be the property o f 
the owner o f  the container. Thus, once the water is contained it becomes private property and 
hence saleable. Although this contradicts the constitution, some legal apologists try to 
construe water ‘sales’ as simply compensation for the cost o f production. The second key 
issue stems from the question ‘at what point can water be considered to be contained?’ and 
specifically whether a well is a container. The Hanafi school and, for that matter the Law o f 
Gravity, do not consider a well to be a receptacle, though, hydrogeologically, it may be 
considered a leaky one. That is, to be an effective well water must be able to leak into it, and 
if water can leak in it must be able to leak out. This is the fundamental difference between a 
well and a cistern. The rest o f the Islamic schools and all the Yemeni sources o f  law do 
consider wells to be containers, and hence the water inside them to belong to the well owner. 
Hence, as a molecule o f  groundwater travels the 1mm across the seepage face o f  the well 
from the aquifer to the inside face o f the well surface, its legal status changes from ‘common’ 
to owned. Put another way, ‘an aquifer is freely accessible...to anyone who owns the 
overlying land’ (Haddash,1998). This provides a huge legal incentive to drill wells.
W ater Diversions
Haddash (1998) identifies a distinction between ancient water diversion rights and more 
recent rights o f ‘benefaction’ where water is declared as state property. The constitution 
regards water diversion rights as a concession (which should therefore be regulated) whilst 
other sources o f law submit to local custom. Civil law permits water from any source to be
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appropriated on the basis o f  seniority o f  claim and absence o f harm to existing users (ibid.). 
Regarding the linkage between water and land, one interpretation o f  the shari’a ties water to 
the land and not to the landowner, whilst the other separates them.
W ater Use and Administration
Common to all the sources o f  law is that for drinking purposes, all water is res nullius 
(common or mubah) providing the desperation o f one party does not annul the rights o f  the 
other party (AI-Eiyani et al;58). However, this stance is very minimalistic, as Ward and 
Moench (unpubl.) point out. It also directly challenges the practice o f selling drinking water. 
For instance, a prominent Yemeni water bottling company, when asked by supporters o f the 
shari’a why it sold water, replied that they did not sell water, just the bottle containing it. An 
interpretation o f the shari’a forbidding the sale o f water could also be an obstacle to 
intersectoral water transfers.
The free nature o f water does not apply to all uses, and water for irrigation is not mubah if the 
new user will harm the senior benefactor (Haddash,1998). Under the shari’a surplus well 
water is free to be exploited on-a seniority basis (Ward and Moench, unpubl.). The problem 
with this rule lies in determining what is a surplus. Surplus water could simply mean that 
water is present in a well irrespective o f  a long-term decline in water levels. If non-declining 
resources are to be determining the presence o f surplus then the need for monitoring is 
implied. At different times (Caponera, 1973;213) and in different places (TESCO, 1971;5) 
the generally ubiquitous ‘ala fil 'a la  (upstream first) rule for stream and flood flow has been 
reversed by local custom. Serjeant (1964;55-56) also gives examples o f  local jurisdictions 
regarding the operation and maintenance o f water channels based on customary law.
W hatever system o f stream and flood flow allocation operates, the supervision o f the system 
seems to be usually by locally appointed figures who become more necessary and more 
obvious in times o f shortage.
Regarding the protection area around a well, spring or flood course, the legal sources differ 
(Table 5.2). The oft-quoted 500m dug well and 1000m borehole spacing rule is a ministerial 
decree and not actually 'law ’ (Ward and Moench,unpubl.). Customary rules include the 
Document of Seventy that cites a protection radius around hand-dug wells equalling their 
depth.
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Rights o f  Servitude
Rights o f  servitude, o f which the irrigation right is a type (Haddash,1998), are defined as “the 
right o f  a certain property to obtain some kind o f service from another property” (Al-Eryani et 
al 1995;53). The four rights concerning water and the respective position o f the shari’a and 
the civil law are given in Table 5.2.
Five main outcomes o f  the rules described above are noted (developed from Ward and 
Moench unpubl.):
a) Free access to any source for individuals and livestock,
b) Upstream priority over spate flows
c) Landowners can drill anywhere on their land and abstract as much as they wish
d) Recognition o f protection against ‘harm ’ by new abstractors over existing ones
e) Some form o f  compensation to be expected for water traversing another’s land
5.3.3 Local Reality and The Problem of Law Enforcement
Local reality dawns the day a drilling rig turns up in the neighbour’s field. M echanisms for 
judicial conflict settlement are in place at national (Supreme Court), governorate (Appeal 
Courts) and local level (Primary Courts) as are arbitration systems, that is, civil (using the 
judiciary) and customary or tribal (using the local shayx, up to shayx al mashayix level). The 
prior well owner, correctly thinking there is a moratorium on drilling without permit, will 
typically approach the SURDU extensionists or the Agricultural Office. In order to get an
engineer to come out and confirm that there is a well being drilled, there is no permit and the
new well is too close to his own well, he has to pay. The engineer’s report is issued and 
strangely finds all these facts to be the opposite, because the new well owner has since paid a 
visit to T a’iz and ‘convinced’ the civil servants otherwise. The senior well owner is not then 
likely to approach any government court because he knows that government law, or rather 
judges, will lean to the highest bidder and will take a long time over it (Vincent, 1991). The 
disputing farmers may then seek a local shayx whom they both trust to give a fair jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction may involve supplying the senior well owner with water if his well is 
affected or promising to cease pumping if a certain water level is reached. Although both 
parties must agree to abide by this jurisdiction whether this happens once pumping begins is 
another matter, but the impasse over drilling may have been overcome. O ther would-be 
abstractors misuse their government contacts to simply conduct their drilling by military force 
with no attempt at a negotiated settlement. These accounts are intended as a ‘representative
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case history’ pieced together from several cases observed at different stages during fieldwork 
to the north-west o f  T a’iz some o f which are reported in Handley (1996a).
Another notable instance o f particular importance to T a’iz is where the ‘ju n io r’ well driller is 
the government. This case history was discussed in detail in section 5.2 but a legal aspect is 
worth mentioning here. The ability o f local well owners to block government drilling even 
when supported by military intervention demonstrates that the more local (bottom-up) the 
process o f arbitration (that is, local customary law, court location and arbitrator), the more 
likely an acceptable solution will be found and law enforcement will be possible. This 
observation is also borne out by the instances given for Lahj (Maktari, 1971; 131) and Wadi 
Dahr (Mundy, 1989; 109).
Similar accounts o f bribing government officials, injustice in the courts and local resistance 
to externally imposed rules are observed in most other areas o f life such as paying tax, 
building a house, finding a job  etc. The failure o f the public water supply utility, NWSA, to 
carry out its legal responsibility to collect revenue is not always an institutional failure but, as 
in the case o f powerful non-payers is sometimes a problem o f law enforcement. These 
problems underline the importance o f the presence o f an indigenous albeit rather ‘ad hoc’ or 
customary legal system. This locally-relevant, cheaper, quicker and probably more just 
alternative makes a far greater contribution to conflict settlement than does the government 
system and demonstrates that legal pluralism can be advantageous.
5.3.4 Legal framework implications for institutions, markets and water resources
Although the jurisdiction o f the Yemeni central government legal framework in conflict 
resolution may end at the San’a ringroad (Dresch,1989;16), it could have a major role in 
water resources protection. The effectiveness o f two types o f institution with respect to the 
Yemeni central government legal framework has particular significance for water resource 
sustainability. One is the institution that creates the law and the other is the institution(s) that 
monitors and enacts it. Despite many calls for a water law to regulate exploitation 
(Haddash,1998, Vincent 1991 ;201) and the writing o f several drafts (W orld Bank, 1993; 16), 
none has actually been forthcoming. The ineffective High W ater Council and its Technical 
Secretariat have been superseded by the creation o f NW RA which has been invested with 
responsibility for water resources strategy, planning and regulation (W ard, 1998). NW RA ’s 
ability to win the trust o f local well owners and involve them as stakeholders in the policing 
o f  their own resource is likely to largely determine whether a passed water law can actually 
be implemented.
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Where the national legal and institutional frameworks have failed to ensure allocatively 
efficient use o f  water the markets have fared better. Some question the legal validity o f 
markets, or at least suggest they need to be legalised (Dellapenna, 1995; 154) whilst others see 
their existence ipso facto  as sufficient validity (Ward; 1998). The latter view is perhaps more 
applicable in a weak state/ strong society such as Yemen where the legal validity o f an 
existing Government or formal institution may be perceived as a largely irrelevant issue.
The sale o f irrigation water at different prices for different crops may set a precedent for 
customary rules regarding water sales on which to base negotiations for water transfers (Ward 
and M oench,unpubl.). However, irregularities in operating procedures by markets beg the 
intervention o f some form of regulation. The urban public is particularly in need o f protection 
from over-pricing, poor water quality and public health threats from water supplied by tanker, 
water treatment companies and even by the public utility.
The exploitation o f water resources by operators within water markets does not protect the 
resource. In addition, it neither provides water for the poor at the demand end nor protects 
livelihoods o f those not directly involved in the transfers at the supply end. Access to water 
resources is controlled by a small, relatively wealthy portion o f the population (Ward and 
M oench,unpubl.) and well owner’s claims o f exclusive rights over groundwater abstractions 
meets with fierce opposition by other farmers (NWRA, 1998a). The legal incapacity to protect 
the environment where government law does not hold sway and to provide equity form a 
major obstacle to the sustainability o f  any allocatively efficient measures which might be 
implemented in the T a’iz area. This legal incapacity is a form o f second order scarcity 
(Ohlsson,1999).
The relevance o f the legal empowerment and validity o f institutions and markets for the 
potential to establish water transfers, particularly intersectoral transfers, are likely to depend 
most on the predominant social setting. Some role for central government regulation is 
envisaged, particularly in the provision o f equity in the urban setting. However, beyond the 
T a’iz ringroad, where any water transfers are to be sourced, the local customary legal 
framework is predominant and government civil law enforcement is limited.
Yemen is well known for its legal pluralism. This pluralism extends as far as water law. The 
players in the water allocation game not only face the moving goal posts o f development 
initiatives and technological change, but also different sets o f  rules under different referees.
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Some players use pluralism to advantage, and law aimed at providing equity and order may 
sometimes miss the mark in this plural environment. However, the fact that several water 
allocation games are being played at once means that there may at least be speedier and more 
just legal alternatives.
5.4 Institutional Appropriateness: Matters of Function and Scale
The plurality o f  legal frameworks in Yemen is reflected in a similar plurality o f institutional 
frameworks in which they operate. Several games o f water allocation and several sets o f 
players are involved. The problem o f water scarcity reveals itself to the public in the form of 
inadequate piovision o f services. Although some productively efficient solutions can be 
applied, these immediately peiceived problems are a subset o f  the wider issues o f  allocatively 
efficient solutions and, when food needs are included, o f virtual water solutions. Both the 
immediate and wider problems and solutions have an institutional context. As evidenced in 
section 5.1, the problems and solutions at all scales involve water transactions. Coase 
suggests there is Tittle sense....-to discuss the process o f exchange without specifying the 
institutional setting within which trading takes place’ (1992;718). In this section, some o f the 
institutions involved in water management in T a’iz are described and their contribution to the 
problems and solutions discussed. In conclusion, the possible future role o f institutions in the 
water sector is briefly considered in the context o f current development initiatives.
5.4.1 Introduction: Immediate Problems and Broader Issues
It is suggested that the immediate water related problems and issues facing the general public 
in T a’iz centre around the provision o f the following services:
a) urban domestic and industrial water supplies,
b) rural domestic water supplies, and
c) waste water disposal facilities.
In particular, these services need to be provided at cost recovery /  economic prices, whilst at 
the same time safe-guarding public health, and promoting productive efficiency so as to 
protect the resource from over-abstraction and pollution.
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In addition there is a problem o f enabling steps towards intersectoral, allocatively efficient 
water use, through water transfer arrangements negotiated with sufficient support o f the 
stakeholders to ensure conflict is minimised.
[Productive efficiency in the irrigation sector has not been included in the above list, partly 
because:
a) it does not serve to protect the resource, and
b) the institutions involved in irrigation are also involved in the problems mentioned 
above and are discussed in that context.
Also the water aspect o f  securing an adequate food supply is not discussed in this section 
primarily because it is a political issue rather than an institutional one. The institutions 
needed to ensure food provision, via virtual water, are in place and functioning reasonably 
welt.]
5.4.2 T he Institu tions
There are many institutions involved in the water sector in Yemen. However, in the context o f 
the specific problems o f water supply and disposal and allocative solutions, some institutions 
are much more relevant than others and greater emphasis is given to them here. The 
institutions which have overseen the emergence o f the problems and which have attempted to 
address them are described below with respect to:
a) their contribution to the problems and
b) to the solutions
c) their adequacy as service providers / reallocative enablers
d) the roles o f institutional plurality and
e) institutional adaptive capacity
These issues are discussed in the conclusions. In order to avoid a narrowness of scope it is 
helpful to divide the institutions into Government / non-Government and Traditional / non- 
Traditional. The government / non-government distinction is made in preference to a formal / 
non-formal division since the origin o f an institution is far more significant to the Yemeni, 
than its degree o f formality. Institutional formality is a function o f legal status which is 
discussed in section 5.3.
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Government Institutions
The relationships between central government ministries and their departments and the 
specific offices and projects found in T a’iz and externally derived donor involvement are 
summarised in Figure 5.4 and their responsibilities in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Responsibilities o f  government institutions involved in the T a’iz water sector 
(developed from Hansma and Hermans 1997,Table 5.1):
Institution Responsibility
Rural and Urban Role
Governor’s Office Government of Ta’iz governorate, including civil law and order.
NWRA Water resources policy and management.
TWSSP Financially, technically and institutionally facilitate water transfer to Ta’iz.
Rural Emphasis
Agricultural Office Execution of agricultural law; dams and irrigation schemes; other 
agricultural fields.
AREA Research and extension for agriculture.
CACB Provision of development finance for farmers.
GAREWS Rural water and electricity supply.
IDAS Enhance self-help capacity of fanners.
Local Councils 
(LC’s)
Promote and manage local, rural development including water supplies and 
irrigation.
LWCP Implementation of water monitoring, irrigation, and forestry projects.
SURDU Rural development including irrigation, extension, monitoring.
Urban Emphasis
NWSA Urban water and sewerage supply.
TSW SSSR Help NWSA branches towards a more autonomous and commercial basis, 
and encourage PSP in urban water supply and sanitation provision.
A chronological sequence o f involvement o f various institutions in aspects o f water 
resources management in the region may be discerned, and is reflected in the order in which 
they are described below. Some o f these institutions are only mentioned briefly below 
because o f their secondary involvement.
LD A’s -  LCCD’s -  L C ’s
The following comments are based on Joshi (1995). Development in rural areas and small 
towns has centred on Local Development Associations between 1973 and 1985, Local 
Councils for Co-operative Development from 1985 until the early 90’s and Local Councils 
currently. In North Yemen, over 200 LDA ’s were established by the early 80’s and were two- 
thirds locally financed, one-third government financed. During the period 1973-1984, 4,244 
water projects were constructed. Local finance included a considerable portion from 
remittances, and attempts by central government to control and co-ordinate the LDA activities 
led to mistrust, a decline in local contributions, and the LDA’s eventual demise. The LCCD’s
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were an attempt at reviving local development initiatives and were to be supervised by the 
governor and other central government officials. This arrangement again resulted in a well 
earned lack o f trust by the principals o f  the agents, and the LCCD’s, faced with no real power 
to create or administer projects beyond the firm control o f  the state, became completely 
paralysed and its members disenchanted and frustrated. The mistrust and paralysis, not to 
mention drying up o f remittances, is the legacy o f the current Local Councils, effectively 
disqualifying them as an acceptable player in water transfer negotiations, the provision o f 
water facilities or the management o f water resources.
CACB
The following comments are based on Ward et al (1998) and World Bank (1998a). The Co­
operative and Agricultural Credit Bank is the third largest branch network in Yemen and is 
the main credit institution for agriculture. It was established specifically to encourage 
development in that sector. With interest rates running typically above 30%pa, loans from the 
bank are particularly attractive at 7-9%pa. The LCCD’s are required by law to deposit their 
funds with the CACB. However, the CACB does far better placing these 'captive deposits’ in 
interest bearing accounts with other banks, than via providing loans to farmers. 43% o f the 
CACB’s funds are long term soft loans from external sources. M ost loans from the CACB to 
farmers are for the purchase o f irrigation wells or equipment. The CACB’s loan recoveiy rate 
is only 60%, and if it were not subsidised it would have to charge 59% interest. The bank is 
overstaffed (only 9 loans allocated per year per employee) and farmers accuse those 
employees o f principal-agent irregularities (Handley, 1996a). The result is that most small 
farmers would never want to approach the CACB for a loan. Outstanding debtors are the ‘big 
shots’. The courts refuse to adjudicate when land title is collateral and will not adjudicate 
interest because it is ‘unislam ic’. The result is that the only source o f credit for the 
agricultural sector, the CACB, provides the wrong signals to the farmer (with effective 
subsidy o f irrigation) and has provided scant investment in the sector very inefficiently and 
inequitably.
SURDU and GAREWS (LWCP, AREA and IDAS)
The Southern Uplands Rural Development Unit is passing over its responsibility for rural 
water supply to the General Authority o f Rural Electricity and W ater Supply. However, the 
latter organisation has a track record o f not completing the village water supply projects it 
began. Problems o f lack o f maintenance o f projects that were completed and o f constructing 
‘blueprint, top-dow n’ schemes without reference to village needs are also common 
(Handley, 1996a;26 and Handley, 1996b;Table3).
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The Land and W ater Conservation Project, the Agricultural Research and Extension 
Authority and the Innovation Development in the Agricultural Sector project, together with 
SURDU are all involved in irrigation projects, and IDAS has also been involved in some 
minor rural water supplies (Hansma and Hermans, 1997). These organisations all operate in 
the rural sector and there is considerable overlap and duplication o f responsibilities between 
them. 6.4% o f the rural population o f Yemen are provided with public piped water supplies 
and only 3.8% in the T a’iz governorate (Table 4.13) suggesting this key activity is very 
inadequately and inefficiently addressed.
SURDU and the Agricultural Office are accused by farmers o f principal-agent irregularities 
when determining whether a farmer can drill a well near his neighbours. The recommended 
500m spacing for dug wells and 1km for drilled wells appears to be flaunted or adhered to 
depending on who is the highest bidder.
NW SA
The National Water and Sanitation Authority was created in 1973 and is part o f the Ministry 
o f Electricity and Water. Some performance indicators are given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: National and T a’iz NW SA performance indicators, 1997. (NW SA data and 
Handley, 1999b).
Performance Indicators Nationally T a’iz Branch
W ater Sold m3/yr/employee 12,000 6,500*
Connections /  employee 63 78
Electricity as % of revenue 21 60%
Wages as % o f revenue 43 60%
Outstanding Accounts 14 months ? > 6 months
Unaccounted-for-W ater 31% > 44%
Losses $M/yr.** 1 0.34
* The T a’iz branch has 462 employees o f whom 46 are over the retirement age and 26 have 
died but whose families continue to receive salaries.
** No allowance for depreciation is included.
The table aptly demonstrates the consequences o f treating water as public good. Branches 
have been obliged to charge a national tariff too low for cost recovery and branch revenues 
are sent to head office and re-disbursed to branches through non-transparent budgetary 
processes (Davies and Sahooly,1996). Branches are overstaffed, there are no job  descriptions, 
standards or codes, and performance or merit play little part in rewards or promotion (ibid.). 
The knock-on effects are inadequate pay, lack o f job  satisfaction, a poor working
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environment and a declining skills base so typical o f weak institutions (Coopers & Lybrand, 
1992). M any staff need a second job and there is widespread ‘rent-seeking’ and increasing 
unaccounted-for-water. In addition, a fundamental change is needed in NW SA, if it is to 
become more consumer oriented and the ugly scenes at the NW SA offices o f consumer 
blaming supplier for shortages and vice versa are to be less frequent. Although these 
problems permeate most o f  NWSA, they are particularly acute in the T a’iz branch.
The provision o f sewerage connections in T a’iz has not kept pace with water connections 
(Figure 5.5), which in turn has not kept up with population growth (Figure 4.18). The 
declining water resource base has resulted in less water being pumped, and one advantage o f 
falling production is that losses are reduced. Contrary to B erkoffs recommendation to use 
rotational deliveries in water scarce situations (1994), reduced water supplies in T a’iz have 
been observed to result in a vicious circle o f  increased corrosion and hence increased leakage 
(Figure 5.6). W ater rationing causes pipes to be exposed to air and water alternately resulting 
in more rapid corrosion, low quality water produces more rapid corrosion o f storage tanks and 
lower flows in the sewerage network results in higher concentrations o f sewage which 
corrodes the sewer pipework. ■
The worst legacy o f NW SA, in the context o f potential water transfers, is that government 
institutions are perceived as having lied to the people o f Al Hayma regarding the affect o f 
abstraction for the city on the farm er’s wells. They are also accused o f having struck a dirty 
deal with the local shayx in order to drill the city wells. This reputation has spread throughout 
the Upper Wadi Rasyan catchment and beyond, and is immediately raised as an objection to 
any proposals for exploratory drilling for city supplies. Contrary to Dellapenna (1995; 155), 
state system sceptics are not only justified in doubting whether experts can acquire the 
information to arrive at the right conclusions, in the Ta’iz case they are not sceptical enough. 
Even if the right conclusions are reached, will the state fully inform the stakeholders o f the 
conclusions?
TSW SSSR
Because o f  the institutional problems faced by NWSA, the Technical Secretariat for Water 
Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform has, in consultation with NW SA, embarked on a 
programme o f sector reform. The programme has three main phases (Davies and 
Sahooly, 1996, Kalbermatten, 1998):
a) The establishment o f the branches on an commercially viable autonomous basis,
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b) The conversion o f the branches to fully autonomous Regional Corporations and
c) The encouragement o f private sector participation in water supply and sanitation 
activities.
The first phase includes branch autonomy in establishing cost-covering tariffs and salary 
incentives and in hiring and firing. Community participation in the operation o f the utility is 
also on the agenda, as well as reduction o f unaccounted-for-water and the promotion o f good 
customer relations and improvement in service quality. These aspects o f  the technical 
secretariat’s reform agenda are at present lacking in the T a’iz instance, and the branch has 
been singled out as being too difficult to reform until after most other branches will have 
entered the programme (ibid.).
The G overnor’s Office
With the failure o f the Al Hayma wellfield in the summer o f 1995, the Governor o f T a’iz 
embarked on an ‘emergency’ drilling programme within the city limits o f  T a’iz. Although 
local businessmen were prepared to pay for the drilling, the Governor demanded payment by 
central government for the most expensive item, the submersible pumps, under threat o f  his 
resignation. The Governor was advised to monitor well drilling and yields. However this was 
not done, and the rushed completion o f 18 wells resulted in an average well yield o f only 3.5 
lit/sec, which is still declining, (Dubay,1996) and derogation o f existing wells. Incorrect 
connection o f the pumps to the existing system and operational malpractice by NW SA has 
resulted in pumps running dry and overheating, wells pumping against each other and 
significant leakages. A more useful intervention by the Governor’s office has been in 
negotiations with rural communities and shayxs over the water transfers to the city discussed 
in section 5.2.
HWC - NW RA
Berkoff identified a typical historical development o f water entities (1994):
a) water agencies are established to meet a specific need,
b) activities related to that use are delegated to autonomous entities reporting to the parent 
department,
c) the agency covers all aspects o f the water use and acts according to its own needs and 
biases,
d) and the result is competition and inefficiency.
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Table 5.5: Traditional Yemeni Support Systems Relating to Water Use (after Joshi,1995):
Support System Description
Al-Ana or 
A 1-sham I a
Communal ‘voluntary’ work. Penalties for those not ‘volunteering. Well 
digging, bridges, dams, rebuilding after calamities.
Al-Muthaha Mutual support among neighbouring farmers -  irrigation equipment, labour etc
Al-Ta’awun fi 
Majal Al-ray
Co-operation in irrigation — one farmer is responsible for distributing water 
collected during rainfall.
In particular, co-operation in irrigation is apparent. Indigenous mechanisms o f water 
allocation relate not only to the distribution o f collected rainfall, but also in the allocation o f 
ghayl (stream-fed) irrigation observed throughout the T a’iz region (Handley, 1996a;23-4) and 
further afield (Varisco,1983). Usually ‘invisible’ to the observer, the ‘suruub al m iiyaah’ 
manager (water distributor) takes on a more prominent role as water becomes scarcer. 
Corporate response to water scarcity is an ancient feature o f Yemeni rural life, a fact reflected 
more recently in the harnessing o f remittances for water projects (for instance at Al Sina, 
World Bank, 1997) and also commercial ones (Handley, 1996a).
The Shayx
Probably the key institution in water management (and most other affairs o f  any importance) 
in the rural area is the shayx. This style o f informal self-government, although not as tribal as 
in the North o f  Yemen, typically runs in families until someone performs particularly poorly. 
The shayx is usually a senior member elected by local families on the basis o f  his knowledge 
o f customary law and shari’a and, ideally, for his maturity and impartiality. The literature and 
fieldwork are replete with accounts o f principal-agent and preference aggregation abuses 
(Johnson, 1996 terminology) by some shuyuux (see section 5.2) although others may better 
represent their principals (Handley, 1996a;24,26). In either case, and at all locations visited 
during fieldwork, the shayx’s word was final, a fact crucial to the success o f the more recent 
non-traditional initiatives described below. The shayx is the management domain 
(Manzungu, 1999; 164) and cannot be ignored or bypassed in any stage o f water management 
initiatives without the likelihood o f jeopardising the initiative. It is vital to recognise their 
power, the limits to it, to inform them, to win their confidence and to work through them.
They are the local political reality. Even with the recent trends o f democratisation in Yemen, 
the inability o f  central government to implement law and order and collect taxes points to a 
continuing role for the shuyuux in local government. Many o f the more prominent ‘shuyuux 
al-mashaayix’ (leaders o f shayxs) also get involved in national government (Joshi, 1995).
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Summary
The relevance and role o f these two non-Government, traditional institutions stand in direct 
contrast to that o f the Government institutions. Although there is a tradition o f co-operation 
this has been limited to irrigation and rural water supply. The shayx system is also open to 
principal-agent abuses, but can and must be worked through, rather than around.
Non-governmental, Non-traditional institutions 
TWSSP
The work o f the World Bank in the T a’iz region has demonstrated that there is a tradition o f 
self-help in local, indigenous rural development in general, and in water provision for 
agricultural and domestic purposes in particular (World Bank, 1998a;Annex 5). The relatively 
recent establishment o f indigenous co-operatives in the fields o f agriculture and irrigation but 
also for other purposes (Handley, 1996b, Ward, 1998), indicates the continuance o f that 
tradition, and provides a potential basis for future initiatives.
The T a’iz W ater Supply and Sanitation Project has been established by the World Bank in 
1997 to help facilitate relief o f the failing city’s water supply. It has considered the co­
operatives or such similar non-traditional institution as potentially capable o f negotiating 
rural-urban water transfers and distributing compensation equitably (W orld Bank, 1998b). 
Apart from supply side aspects and incorporation o f public utility reforms in co-ordination 
with the GTZ sponsored TSWSSSR, the project also seeks to promote stakeholder 
participation in rural-urban water transfers through the establishment o f committees /  water 
user associations perhaps formed from existing co-operatives. NW RA similarly seeks to 
promote the involvement o f stakeholder groups in building consensus over water resource 
management strategies in the area (NWRA, 1998b).
Private Sector Participation (PSP)
The major area o f indigenous initiatives in water supply has been in the private sector. The 
potential for private sector involvement in urban water supply and sanitation is currently 
being explored to varying degrees in many parts o f the world (Brook-Cowen,1997). Partly 
encouraged by the reality o f the water markets already operating, both the TSW SSSR and the 
TWSSP have recognised the potential o f PSP in Yemen and T a’iz specifically. As indicated 
in section 4.5, markets have responded quickly to demand and provide a much needed 
service. The markets have adapted, and function more efficiently than the public sector. 
However, there are limitations to the extent to which the private sector can take on large scale 
water provision. Apart from relatively small operations by individuals and small companies
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supplying tanker and treated water, the larger companies are reticent regarding involvement 
in the water sector. The two largest industrial groups in T a’iz have contemplated involvement 
in bulk water supply to the city, but, apart from needing technical assistance to do so, they 
also have the following reservations:
a) The shortage o f water resources (how can water resources be managed if there are 
none to manage?)
b) The water quality problems (the scale o f  investment in treatment makes it unattractive)
c) Current perceived management and operation problems in NW SA
d) The run down state o f the current facilities
e) Lack o f clarity regarding how company management, operation and objectives would 
be able to integrate with or adapt to NW SA branch management operation and 
objectives.
f) Fear o f  public opinion and reaction if any problems occur
g) M istrust regarding whether the government would truly give the private sector a free 
hand
h) No guarantee that they will be able to recover revenues
W ithin the scope o f PSP being discussed (ibid.), both groups envisaged their potential 
involvement being limited to service contracts, though the possibility o f a concession for 
specific areas o f T a’iz was contemplated. Options requiring any greater investment or 
involving more o f the city were considered too risky.
In addition to PSP in the urban sector, the largest company in T a’iz has provided water and 
electricity supplies to villages as compensation for environmental damage and livelihood 
deterioration, as a promotional tool, or simply as a form o f ‘zakaat’ to needy communities. 
Private businessmen working in the G ulf and Saudi Arabia have also made a considerable 
contribution towards providing water supplies in some rural home areas, on both commercial 
and philanthropic bases (see section 4.3). Despite these private initiatives in rural and urban 
areas, if  the utilities were privatised, questions o f  equity provision and the importance they 
would give to protecting the environment are still relevant (Hildyard, 1998; 18 and Allan,in 
prep;5.32).
Summary
Two major non-governmental, non-traditional institutions may be identified as currently 
involved in water supply in the T a’iz area. The World Bank initiative has established the only
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institution directed specifically at the problem o f reallocating water from rural to urban areas 
through stakeholder participation possibly via co-operatives or newly formed water user 
associations. Although the private sector has made some contribution to improving water 
supplies in rural areas, there is more reticence to get involved in large scale urban supplies.
5.4.3 Discussion -  the Combination of Scale and Function
Scale
It is suggested that the appropriateness o f institutional arrangements for the efficient 
provision o f w ater needs might best be examined from the viewpoint o f  the scale and function 
o f those arrangements. Regarding function, water provision may be divided into productively 
and allocatively efficient provision, with productive aspects subdivided according to sector. 
Regarding scale, institutions may be divided into village (or even Wadi), city (or regional) 
and national. Section 2.6.2 demonstrated that in the application o f institutional theories to 
Yemeni water problems, there is a distinction on the basis o f  the scale from local to national 
institutions (Table 2.3). These distinctions are related to the urban / rural location in which 
the institutions seek to address the water management problems described above.
The national (government) institution is perceived, not undeservedly, by the local pole as 
untrustworthy and as only being interested in ‘stealing our water -  and then wasting it’. Those 
who think that centralised institutions have good potential for co-ordination and integration 
(Guggenheim, 1991) obviously have not worked with NWSA. Similarly those who prefer the 
state systems, because they are supposed to deal with problems more rationally before they 
become crises than can the private sector (Dellapenna, 1995; 155), obviously have not lived 
through the T a’iz water crisis. The ‘participation pessimists’ correctly favour legal reforms to 
improve the efficiency o f formal institutions. However, if they discount the non-formal, local, 
institutions when it comes to the most important issue of water transfers, they will become 
non-participation pessimists. Part o f the solution, it is considered, is the scaling down or 
decentralisation o f the national, government institution towards something more amenable to, 
and perhaps even representative of, the local pole.
At the local pole, one o f the problems o f negotiating water transfers, or for that matter o f 
providing rural water supplies, is finding a ‘representative’ body with which to negotiate. 
Relative to the urban situation, rural societal structure and responsibility are more clearly 
demarcated. Even so, the ‘participation optimists’, who believe that non-formal institutions 
can transmit community demands, may prove to be participation over-optimists. As 
mentioned, both principal-agent and preference aggregation problems can occur when
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negotiating with some shayxs. Also, on a wellfield scale, the size o f local institution (shayx or 
whatever) is often too small, as in the Hayma-Habir example, to represent those stakeholders 
who would be affected by water transfers. As a result, the ‘mish-mash’ o f local web-like 
institutions and political borders have to be bridged in the negotiations, with considerable 
addition to transaction costs and the risk o f not arriving at any settlement negotiated with all 
interest groups. Part o f  the solution at this pole is the scaling up o f local institutions into a 
representative body with which to negotiate.
Both activities are needed, the scaling down or decentralisation o f the government institution 
and the scaling up o f the local micro-institutions into a representative body at a more 
‘catchment-based’ scale.
Function
T a’iz people relate differently to water; as users for drinking, domestic use, industrial use 
agricultural use and as traders (or potential traders) in water, and the institutions centre 
aiound these water functions. The existing government institutions have been inadequate in 
their provision o f drinking water and sanitation due to a combination o f institutional overlap 
(in rural areas), inefficiency and principal-agent irregularities. In providing for irrigators, they 
have tiansm itted the wiong economic signals in terms of allocative efficiency. The industrial 
sector has essentially met its own water needs without recourse to outside institutions, and 
small scale trade in water has also been self-regulating.
To enable larger scale water transfers from irrigation to allocatively more efficient uses 
Hansma and Hermans (1997) suggest the manipulation o f existing institutional webs which 
relate to the water functions. The World Bank experiment with water user associations in 
M iqbaba and Al Hayma is an alternative attempt at the creation o f new institutions, though 
based on traditions o f self-help and co-operation. Both these models are forms o f 
decentralisation away from Government institutional intervention. Regarding equity 
provision, the non-Government institutions, although still prone to principal-agent 
irregularities, are much more relevant, and trusted than government ones at least at the village 
scale.
Some suggest environmental protection is a central government function, however, self­
limitation o f  abstraction and pollution from below is likely to be much more effective than 
authoritarianism from above in a weak state/strong society. Although ‘u rf prevails over 
shari’a, the concept o f ijmaa’ and local consensus, rather than the imposition o f non-
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indigenous rules, are much closer to the cultural heart and is a more sustainable basis for 
decision-making. A key measure is therefore the involvement o f the informal local 
stakeholders via indigenous institutions for policing.
A more realistic and relevant function for central government is the provision o f  the right 
macro-economic signals instead o f the wrong ones (diesel and wheat price, subsidised loans, 
agency technical assistance etc.) to promote allocative efficiency. The reason they do not was 
explored in section 5.2. Also, determination o f safe yields and pollution limits, and 
instruction on how to monitor and interpret the observations may still best be provided by 
central government function via a regional agency.
5.4.4 Conclusion — The Potential for Local Water Management
The respective titles o f UNDP and World Bank projects in Yemen o f ‘Strengthening o f Water 
Resources Management Capabilities’ and ‘Decentralised M anagem ent’ reflects recent 
thinking in development involvement in the South. In both cases, institutional appropriateness 
is perceived as the target. I f  aid is not to result in even less being achieved and even more 
skimming o ff by bureaucrats, then the recipient institutions will need to be locally 
accountable. The TSW SSSR programme, aimed at decentralising the provision o f water and 
sanitation services, at least in the urban area, directly addresses the need to make more 
efficient use o f the water. The TWSSP initiative seeks to promote the equitable representation 
of the supply area communities in water transfer negotiations and attempts to bridge the 
urban-rural (and government agency-local community) gap between consumer and source 
areas. Both these projects seek local stakeholder participation in the entities they aim to 
reform / create.
Potential for Collective Action
By 1995 the historical legacy o f Al Hayma was a rightly placed mistrust o f  central 
government (via its agencies) which had spread far beyond the Upper Rasyan area. From 
1995 the TWSSP initiative has experimented with promoting grass-roots stakeholder 
participation in water transfers. In Steenbergen terminology the TW SSP is acting as a 
facilitator (and financier) o f  the second order transaction costs o f  institutional change 
(1996; 198). Those costs have been huge and time consuming (Ostrom,1999;201) and may yet 
prove too expensive to result in successful formation o f institutions. There may have been a 
critical moment (contrary to Steenbergen, 1996;202) in 1976, when the institutions needed to 
be in place to negotiate, or refuse, the planned end o f irrigated agriculture (Leggette et al, 
1977). Although critical moments can often only be detected with hindsight, near total
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depletion has resulted in the present reality o f relative water scarcity for most, bordering on 
absolute water scarcity for some.
Despite the comments o f  those who think that scarcity or resource depletion should galvanize 
people into collective action (Mahdi, 1986; 193, Thompson, 1988;67), at least in (new) water 
acquisition (U phoff et al,1990;30), cooperation has not been automatic (Lam,1994;282) in Al 
Hayma, or Al Malika (Table 4.3), or many other Yemeni water depletion situations. In the 
irrigation literature ‘new ’ water may be available through more efficient operation o f 
irrigation schemes, but not where there are limited and declining groundwater resources and 
inefficiencies are already recouped by recirculation.
Why doesn’t scarcity result in collective action in Yemen in general and in Al-Hayma / T a’iz 
in particular? In the TW SSP experiment, many o f the prerequisites for institutional change 
and operation (ibid,34-37,47,304-6, Mahdi, 1986; 192, Ostrom,1986;607-9,618) were pursued 
and constraints avoided (Mollinga,1998;246 et seq). It is difficult to imagine more investment 
in second order transaction costs in the pursuit o f  so little water. Perhaps never in the history 
o f development has so much been spent by so many to secure so little. Despite this, two 
crucial elements have been missing, it is suggested. The first relates to the purpose of 
collective action in terms o f supplying water to T a’iz. This activity is essentially perceived as 
an external imposition o f insufficient economic interest to the source area inhabitants. The 
second is the basic lack o f trust between potential co-operators. At the best o f times mistrust 
permeates Yemeni society, and is part o f  the underlying belief systems discussed in the next 
section, but in this instance, it has been reinforced very effectively by the Al Hayma 
experience.
Many writers note the importance o f ‘policy by process’ as opposed to ‘policy by 
prescription’ in water management (Mackintosh, 1992). The T a’iz case suggests the policy (if 
there has been any policy at all) has been ‘get water to the city by fair means or foul’. The 
means has contributed to the mistrust. Although this ‘policy by default’ approximates more 
closely to process than prescription, process has meant opportunism (Mollinga,1998;239) in 
which the actors have been few, consultation negligible, and contingency the order o f the day 
(ibid;242,263).
However, the irrigation literature is mono-sectoral and hence limited to the productive 
efficiency approach. Solutions to the T a’iz water shortage lie in allocative efficiency and 
have to address much wider issues. The present relationship between local and government
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institution (upper diagram), reflected in, is contrasted with a proposed model (lower diagram) 
in which most water management functions are managed locally (arrows indicate a cause- 
effect relationship):
Present Situation
Scale
F Local Institution Government Institution
U
N ‘Take’ mentality = = = = = = .^  inefficient water provision
C
T Conflict over ‘stolen water' ========-^. unacceptable reallocation
I allocative inefficiency ^«= = = = = = =  wrong economic signals
0
N Resentment o f Impact = = = = = = = .) . oversight o f  environmental
And blame o f  government disaster
Proposed Institu tional M odel
Scale
F Local Institution Government Institution
U
N Efficient Local Provision ^ - ========= technical help
C
T Acceptable Reallocation 4 - = = = = = = = = =  r ight economic signals
1
O Environmental Policing 4 - = = = = = = = = =  policy guidelines
N
For equitable water resources management, the development community will have to ensure 
that decision-making roles by stakeholders reflect the level o f  the latter’s stake in water rather 
than simply the current power asymmetries. For instance, Ward (1998) identifies drinkers 
with a basic need stake, users with livelihood stakes and owners with rights at stake. These 
stakes reflect the different roles and levels o f importance water holds in their lives. If local 
communities are to heed calls for water resource protection from derogation and pollution 
they, according to their stake, and nobody else, need to own and police it. Otherwise the 
curtain is likely to rise on the next scene o f the ‘tragedy o f the com m ons’. Establishing stake- 
weighted institutions that have hydraulic control and responsibility will be a severe test.
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At the national level, the task o f providing the right macro-economic signals to promote 
allocatively efficient water transfers remains the key central government role, whether or not 
there is political will to adopt it. The government institution with the closest mandate to 
identifying and effecting allocatively efficient policy is NWRA. The non-transparent 
performance o f central government institutions in the removal o f water from rural areas to the 
city in the past has placed the NW RA fledgling under the communities’ microscope.
5.5 The Contribution of Knowledge and Belief Systems to the Degree of
Sanction of Discourse on the Allocation of Water and some Implications 
for Development
W hether politicians really have a free hand in policy determination has been questioned 
(Foucault, 1971, M ollinga,1998;20). An alternative model in which interacting and competing 
interests o f the powerful define and legitimise acceptable discourse has been proposed 
(Tripp, 1996 in Allan, 1999a). Within these boundaries, discourse is termed ‘sanctioned’ or 
permitted, beyond which lies the wilderness o f ‘unsanctioned’ discourse. The boundaries are 
blurred, vary for different communities and may change with time given an appropriate crisis 
or ‘window o f opportunity’. This section seeks to demonstrate that belief systems and 
knowledge define those boundaries, directly influencing the degree o f  sanction discourse on 
the allocation o f water receives, and hence directly affecting the extent to which allocative 
measures can or cannot be introduced.
Beliefs about some issues that relate to water allocation commonly held in Yemen are briefly 
considered together with beliefs regarding related issues o f the state, equity and the 
environment. The extent to which beliefs and knowledge can influence water policy is 
discussed, and from this vantage-point, various water-allocative issues in development are 
examined and the influence o f beliefs and knowledge on the degree to which discourse on 
them is sanctioned is considered.
5.5.1 Belief Systems: Facts vs. Truths
The importance o f belief systems in determining what is politically feasible in water 
allocation has been argued by Allan (in prep;chapter 6). Before considering the prevailing 
belief systems in Yemen regarding water, and in order to avoid confusion over terminology it 
is important to make some distinctions. There seems to be a confusion in the literature
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(Atkinson, 1991;53) between facts and truths. It is not surprising that this confusion may also 
be found amongst Arabic speakers, where ‘haqaa’iq’ is commonly used to cover both terms. 
To improve the objectivity o f the following analysis and discussion it would be appropriate to 
define these terms.
Fact: an observable (often measurable) phenomenon that could be verified by witnesses e.g. it 
rained here today or water flows downhill.
Truth: an opinion adhered to. For convenience we will subdivide truths into true truths and 
false truths:
True Truths: opinions based on a reasonable interpretation o f the facts e.g. water has value 
(an interpretation o f the fact that tanker drivers pay x riyals for water at the well), or the 
national food deficit is made up by the import o f virtual water (an interpretation o f national 
food statistics)
False Truths: opinions not based on an interpretation o f the facts or based on an unreasonable 
interpretation o f  the facts e.g. water out o f  the tap should be free. (This interpretation is based 
on a combination o f an unreasonable interpretation o f the fact that rainfall is free and/or 
failing to interpret the fact that costs are involved in the installation, operation and 
maintenance o f  infrastructure needed to get rainfall fit for consumption from the tap).
By definition false facts are termed lies, and when interpreted may yield false truths.
The difference between true truths and false truths is, o f  course, gradational. The truthfulness 
of a truth is also confused when truthfulness is based on the strength o f adherence to the truth, 
rather than reasonableness o f the interpretation or the extent to which facts support the 
interpretation. The problem for water managers is that most o f the truths they deal with lie 
towards the middle o f  the spectrum where the interpretations become more tenuous, mainly 
due to the absence o f complete scientific fact and unknowns in the method o f  interpretation 
(Thompson, 1995;25). The resulting uncertainty provides scope for the certitudes (ibid;27,28). 
There are also some instances o f unreasonable interpretation o f the facts, reasonable 
interpretations o f false facts etc. Despite the problems o f interpreting information, it is hoped 
that the distinctions between facts, true truths and false truths will aid the debate.
There are also types o f truth with origins not related to the interpretation o f  observations. 
These include religious truths (derived from holy writings or revered interpretations thereof) 
and social norms and traditions. It is also useful to distinguish conscious truths, which are 
verbalised, and unconscious truths and partly conscious motivations (Giddens,1984;chapter 
2), which are assumed, and can often only be detected by outsiders. These latter forms are
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often the most powerful because they are not perceived. They can therefore only be 
challenged with difficulty and tend to be excluded from the sanctioned discourse. They are 
often ubiquitous, invisible and have been in place for as long as people can remember.
An issue distinct from categories o f ‘truths’ is the impact o f truths on human behaviour. In 
some instances behaviour may bear no resemblance to the truths expressed or, put another 
way, be termed ‘voting with one’s feet’, or hypocrisy. For example, the motto “God, the state, 
the revolution” versus the reality “me, my family, my tribe”, or depending on grain imports 
whilst emphasising food self-sufficiency.
5.5.2 Some Water-Related Truths
Starting with religious truth, curiously omitting air, it is stated that “people are partners in 
three (things): water, fire and grass” (translation, Haddash;1998). The interpretation o f this 
verse has formed a firm ‘belief status’ basis for establishing the unreasonable perception o f 
water as a free public good by some (ibid.). This position stands in stark contrast to the 
emerging view (at least amongst the intellectuals) o f water as an economic good.
The absence o f discourse over virtual w ater’s national security role is maintained by several 
commonly held truths including national food security based on indigenous agricultural 
output, the social elevation o f meat-eating and the necessity o f procreation for the provision 
o f labour and income now and in one’s old age. Respectively, these truths obscure the facts, 
and increase the demand for agricultural and domestic water. Also, the assumption that 
agriculture has prior right to water over industry is fostered by the unconscious truth o f 
having one’s heart in the soil and the village (Dresch,1989;133,306-7).
There are many traditional belief systems regarding water which apply particularly to village 
life that caution the romanticism surrounding indigenous knowledge, which currently 
emanates from the belief systems o f some branches o f Northern academia. Drinking too much 
water is generally believed to be harmful, particularly for pregnant women and for children 
with diarrhoea, and skin with boils, sores or measles is not washed (Ansell,1980). The belief 
that men should get priority access to clean drinking water over women, and that women 
should collect water when there is no motorised transport and men when there is 
(M clagan,1994) raises the question o f whether male politicians and policy makers hold a 
smaller stake in water issues than women.
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Related to the need for clean water for religious ceremonial ablutions in Islam, there is 
widespread reticence in the Middle East regarding the use o f waste w ater that has been 
recycled in a sewage treatment plant for domestic purposes. Other than highly expensive 
desalinisation o f seawater, the recycling o f wastewater would provide the greatest potential 
future source o f water for T a’iz (Handley, 1999b). Although the domestic use o f  waste water 
is a necessity for the inhabitants o f St John’s Wood and the rest o f London, this option has 
been rejected by T a’iz people on religious grounds, a clear example o f  belief systems 
determining water policy.
Views o f  the State
The state is not me, nor my family nor my tribe and therefore is to be avoided or manipulated 
for the purpose o f society, my society. The belief that corruption and bribery, taught from 
childhood by the ubiquitous cheating in exams, are a necessary part o f life particularly when 
dealing with government appears to be one o f the ‘unconscious tru ths’ o f  Yemen. Coupled 
with a poor track record o f government handling o f local water issues, it is not surprising that 
surveys o f public opinion find a poor estimation o f government (Hansma and Hermans, 1997, 
Handley, 1996a). Migdal (1988;40) states that government earns the right to rule by providing 
services / meeting needs. In Yemen there is an expectancy that the government should 
provide infrastructure (Lackner, in World Bank, 1998b;Annex 8) and piped water supplies in 
particular. Dresch links this to the historical pattern o f northern tribal extraction o f wealth 
from the south, commenting “the more one takes, indeed, the more one expects” (1989;373). 
The ‘take mentality’ has been the experience o f many who work in development, leading 
some to conclude that Yemen is not ready for that development (Chaudhry, pers comm.). 
Although the expectancy for government to provide is prevalent, contrary to Migdal 
(I988;30,40) that provision does not seem to impart the right to rule. This phenomenon 
appears to be closer to the weak state that expects little o f its citizens (M yrdal,1968).
Views o f Equity
W hether equity in water allocation and provision is everyone’s goal must not be assumed 
(Mahdi, 1986; 194):
“And we raise some of them above others in ranks”
and:
“with respect to sustenance, Allah has favoured some over other”
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(Al-Zukhruf 43:32 and Al-Nahl 16:71, respectively, Lichtenthaler, 1999,19-20). The widely 
accepted interpretation o f this verse (ibid.) amounts to a passive acceptance, even 
expectation, o f  divinely appointed poverty, or the divine lack o f right o f  commoners and 
opens the way to the institutionalisation o f inequality (Mollinga,1998;238,
Thompson, 1995;31).
A farmer drilled a well right over a spring source and then sold the water from a pipe to the 
same downstream users who used to get it free by right from the stream. The drilling took 
place by military force because the farmer had good contacts in the army. This is one o f many 
instances o f  inequitable changes in water allocation in the T a’iz area in which oppressed and 
oppressor accept the new status quo. Although conflict over water resources and allocative 
measures is extremely common in Yemen (e.g. A1 Wahdawi, 17/3/98), once resource capture 
has occurred the injured parties seem all too readily to accept the new status quo. Because o f 
gravity this tends to be the downstreamers losing out to the upstreamers (Varisco,1983).
Views o f Environment
Despite the comments o f  some (Hansma and Hermans, 1997;35), there is a considerable 
awareness o f many May’ people regarding environmental issues. Low quality water and the 
pollution that causes it is a sore point amongst those who have to use it, although they often 
feel powerless to take corrective action. Similar awareness is evident amongst those faced 
with declining water levels, most o f  whom show a better grasp o f hydrogeological principles 
than their Northern counterparts, although there are a few Mimitless underground lake’ 
believers and awareness o f how much water is lost in the reticulation system is low. Even 
urban domestic water consumers know when tap water is o f insufficient quality to make a 
good cup o f tea. Like their rural counterparts they are very particular about which water 
source is used for which purpose (Ansell,1980) and have at least some awareness o f declining 
water availability and increased pollution. Because these impacts can be seen, smelt and 
tasted, the layman is not totally disqualified from analysing the situation and commenting on 
it (Hajer,1995;10). However, the cause o f  water shortages is mostly blamed on declining 
rainfall (Handley, 1996a) rather than on human activity. Although shortages are felt more 
acutely in dryer years no long-term climatic trend is apparent over the monitored period, 
although the increased abstraction pattern is very apparent. At least declining rainfall is 
politically easier to accept than increased abstraction, since one has less responsibility for 
vengeance against the offender (God) than if one’s neighbour were the cause (Allan,in 
prep;6.5).
2 5 6
There is wide adherence to the belief that the construction o f dams is the solution to the 
country’s water resources problems (Handley, 1996b) a concept which even gains 
Piesidential voice (Yemen Times 11/3/96). This belief may be related to images o f Yemen’s 
former greatness during the time o f the original Marib dam which even has Q ur’anic support. 
However, there is a tendency for dams to favour upstreamers over downstreamers, silt up, and 
encourage malaria and bilharzia. Small, already silted-up ‘dam s’ distributed equitably down 
the valley, where crops could be grown on the silt and the water does not remain on the 
surface long enough to breed the larvae and snails, would be much more effective. The 
Yemenis certainly believe in these structures -  they are called terraces.
5.5.3 Types of Knowledge and their Roles
Reasons why the foreign expert’s advice may be ignored (Morton, 1994;45) are part o f  a 
wider debate concerning knowledge which might best be introduced by an example. At an 
IDAS workshop, in T a’iz in December 1995, a group o f local experts and stakeholders were 
asked about the major water-related problems facing agriculture and the possible solutions. 
They had to first nominate the problems and then cast two votes for the most serious in their 
opinion, all by secret ballot. Because some o f the wider causes (diesel prices, lack o f drilling 
regulation, population growth) and initial steps to solution (monitoring, policing) were not 
included in the first ballot, a foreign development worker nominated them. However, they 
still attiacted no votes, which all went to water use efficiency measures. This confirms the 
observation o f Allan (in prep;6.18) that productive efficiency is politically the cheapest form 
of discourse. The reason it is politically cheap is that it does not challenge the old knowledge 
or belief systems. The new knowledge, aspects o f which were put forward by the 
development worker, is politically too expensive to consider and remained firmly 
unsanctioned at the workshop. Although the new knowledge can become ‘m utual’ in that 
foreign and local expert can share it, (Giddens,1984) that change has not yet occurred 
significantly in Yemen where belief systems prevail. A return to the post-colonial ‘developer 
knows best’ is not being proposed here, but rather a hybridity o f  the best o f  new and old 
knowledge (Bryant, 1998; 14). A further complication arises because o f the belief systems 
concerning knowledge. The accumulation o f knowledge through monitoring does not seem 
important and knowledge gained is guarded closely. Attempts to obtain information, either 
primary or secondary, are treated with deep suspicion, particularly when Yemenis are 
requesting it. This does not bode well for development goals o f  institutional capacity 
building.
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Since power and knowledge are synonymous (Atkinson, 1991 ;6 1) an issue o f equity aspects o f 
knowledge is raised. Like most o f  the Middle East, the virtual water issue is publicly 
maintained as a Yemeni blind spot (A llan,1997, Golman,1997, see also section 5.1.5) and the 
topic o f sustainability remains the enclave o f the enlightened rich (Chambers, 1986; 10) in 
San a, if it is anyone s. The absence o f action over the polluted Wadis o f Hidran and Rasyan 
leflects the absence o f any environmental discourse to which their representatives could 
contribute. Adequate policy-changing discourse does not exist because the problem is in an 
area o f new knowledge, it is unsanctioned and it is not perceived by those involved in 
discourse. Within the ‘risk society’ terminology o f Beck (1999), the risk for T a’iz is that there 
is insufficient water to keep everyone fed, watered, clean and in jobs in the current status quo. 
The earlier chapters have demonstrated the ‘scientific’ factuality o f this ‘risk statement’ 
(ibid;76), however the political value o f the statement lacks an adequately ‘new knowledge- 
informed’ audience to facilitate the risk becoming a threat. No policy change will occur 
because the discoursers do not feel the risks.
5.5.4 Implications for Development
This chapter has proposed thatthe  water shortage o f T a’iz can be explained by successive 
layers o f causation physical, economic, institutional, legal, and political and this section 
proposes that belief systems directly influence them. Into this context the developer enters 
(Manzungu, 1999; 159) with her ‘new knowledge’. The development o f development in the 
post-colonial era has followed a sequence roughly similar to these layers. Morton (1994) and 
Jewitt (1994) note a shift in emphasis from a) industrialisation/modernisation to b) 
agriculture/integrated rural development, then c) structural adjustment o f macro-economics to 
d) institutional/human capabilities, and now, in the irrigation literature, e) policy reform 
(Manzungu, 1999; 10). Although the environment is missing from this list, Serageldin (1994) 
points out a shift in emphasis in the water sector from the old agenda o f providing household 
services to the new agenda o f environmentally sustainable development, but wonders if the 
old agenda is still on the table.
The history o f development in T a’iz can be related to M orton’s and Serageldin’s models but 
is less complete. The provision o f the Kennedy scheme in the mid 1960’s and emphases on 
agriculture, evidenced by the plethora o f donor supported agricultural institutions in the city, 
are old agenda. M ore recent structural adjustment o f macroeconomics is seen in the activity 
o f the World Bank at national level, and the latest development o f  institution/human 
capabilities is an emphasis o f  UNDP, World Bank and GTZ initiatives at national and 
regional level. One might ask, however, what happened to industrialisation, why is agriculture
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still on the agenda and why hasn’t the new agenda o f environmental sustainability appeared 
on the table? The answers, it is suggested, relate to the extent to which discourse about these 
issues is sanctioned. These questions and related issues are discussed below in an 
approximate order o f decreasing sanction, beginning with the sanctioned and ending with 
issues unsanctioned even in Northern discourse on development.
Irrigation, Diesel Prices and W ater Law
Irrigation has been the direct recipient o f  development aid in the past, via import subsidies, 
cheap loans, fruit import bans and diesel subsidies and indirectly through the government 
agencies in the irrigation sector. It also continues to be supported, at least locally by the 
World Bank negotiated compensation package in Habir, which includes wells and dams for 
irrigation (World Bank, 1998b). In fact, Yemen’s proportion o f total World Bank lending for 
irrigation is second only to Egypt’s (Berkoff, 1994;5). Yemen is much more likely than Egypt 
to use up the loans, and the groundwater the loans enable to be mined, growing 
amphetamines. The economic nonsense o f irrigation and the extent to which subsidised diesel 
pi ices give the wrong economic signals to irrigators have already been demonstrated (sections
4.1.4 and 5.2.4). Government support o f this status quo is reinforced by the absence o f a 
water law, facilitating enhanced nest-feathering for the land-owning ruling elite in accordance 
with the prevailing belief systems regarding equity.
Water and Sanitation Supply Projects
Even though such projects are ‘old agenda’ the development agencies seem to commit 
themselves to them easily enough in T a’iz, as well as in many other towns and cities in 
Yemen (Gitec Dorsch,1989, SAWAS,1997, Dar A1 Handasah,1997). The predetermining 
allocative logic (Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1995 ;2 14) o f these schemes has certainly led to 
inequitable access. Although the trend towards commercialisation and privatisation in the 
name of institutional development may lead to improved operational efficiencies (Davies and 
Sahooly,1996), it remains to be seen whether equity is addressed (Allan,in prep;5.33). 
Discouise legaiding whether the provision o f urban services creates jobs and attracts more 
people from the countryside, or put another way, urbanisation breeds urbanisation, seems to 
fall in the unsanctioned category. The high cost o f sanitation provision (Serageldin,1994) 
often ensures that it remains only a nominal appendage to project titles, is the first item to be 
dropped when budgets are threatened, and the environmental consequences o f that decision 
are ignored.
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Industry
Industrial development and modernisation have been out o f  fashion in development circles for 
some time. On the surface this would place A llan’s plea (1992;12) for water to be transferred 
from uneconomic irrigation to hard currency ea rn in g /jo b  creating industries firmly in the 
unsanctioned category, at least in Northern development discourse. The fact that T a’iz 
industry earns 275 times more capital and provides 21 times more jobs than the irrigation 
sector supports A llan’s plea (section 4.2.2). The historical levels o f industrial pollution in 
Ta iz are the m ajor drawback to this argument. However, with several o f  the major industries 
looking seriously at waste water treatment and the only treatment in the city at the moment 
being by industry, there is significant potential to overcome this objection. Government 
legislation, with monitoring and enforcement, regarding industrial pollution is still much 
needed, but should also be targeted at domestic waste. Urban domestic wastewater accounts 
for around 50% more pollutants entering the surface water and groundwater than industrial 
wastewatei does. This stands in marked contrast to the development literature reporting on 
T a’iz which seems to spot the speck in the eye o f industrial pollution and miss the plank o f 
domestic pollution on the few occasions it does mention the environment. Perhaps this is 
because the development recommendations also want to avoid commitments to domestic 
wastewater treatment, and they do it by pointing the finger at industry.
Virtual Water
Closely related to the irrigation/industry debate is the issue o f food self-sufficiency versus 
virtual water. The argument runs that widening the economic base (particularly through the 
development o f industry) will not only provide livelihoods but will also earn the country 
moie cunency with which to buy food staples from the world market. In the case o f Ta’iz, 
industrial development would pay for food imports even if the latter had no subsidies either 
from the Northern exporters or from Yemen. However, the siege mentality o f national food 
self-sufficiency remains one o f the most unmoveable beliefs for Yemenis, whose hearts are in 
the village and the soil as much as the Israelis’ were in the kibbutz forty years ago.
Demography
Perhaps the most limiting factor for sustainable development is the population growth rate 
(Allan,in piep). The population problem is not simply a fixation o f the environmental 
movement (Jewitt, 1994). Yemen is still in the steepest part o f  the demographic transition 
(Figure 4,29). The national average is 3.5% pa and the city growth rate over double that 
figure. At that growth rate, even if all the potable water (<1500pS/cm) were to be abstracted 
from all the major wadis in a 50Km radius and unaccounted for losses reduced to 20% a
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population o f  1.1M people (by 2013) could be provided with only 30 lit/day. This abstraction 
would have a similar impact on irrigation to that which occurred in Wadi A1 Hayma, that is, 
its teimination. Every other factor related to water transfers mentioned up to this point in the 
discussion pales into insignificance if the demographic issue is not faced. However birth 
conti ol, or children by choice, remains firmly in the realms o f very unsanctioned discourse 
(Allan,in piep;6.4). One can only assume that before long people will seek employment 
elsewhere and that the pressure to migrate to other parts o f  the Arabian Peninsula will 
increase. Government could consider offering industry incentives to establish new factories 
on the coast and use their returns to water to pay for desalination.
Tax, Corruption, Law and Order
Morton (1994) notes that the failure to collect tax, deal with corruption and enforce law and 
order (see section 5.3.3) are root causes o f  the poverty o f Southern nations, and yet that these 
issues are not allowed to be challenged by the development process. These failures are 
chaiactei istic o f  the politically powerful (Ostrom, 1999; 199) o f weak states, and have a 
similar debilitating affect in Yemen. For instance, Saqqaf (1985) reports that only 38% o f  tax 
due is collected. Although the World Bank has raised the issues o f  tax collection and 
corruption (Hildyard,1998;43), since Al-Haindi there has not been much sign o f  progress in 
Yemen.
M easures o f Economic Development: GDP, Remittances, and National Budgets 
W hether GDP is an accurate measure o f economic development is questioned by World 
Wildlife Fund (1996). Assessing Yem en’s economic development is also difficult. There is a 
significant smuggling economy and over 60% o f foreign currency transactions never enter the 
banking system (Yemen Times 12/6/95). Prior to the G ulf War (1990), the scale o f  
iemittances not banked was huge. Much o f these funds were invested rather in irrigation and 
houses in the villages and towns and in setting up small businesses. From the urban 
household water use survey (Handley, 1999a) it was possible to estimate the value o f the land, 
houses, vehicles and a few major household items belonging to the T a’iz householders. The 
average value o f  these things alone, not including any other items such as business assets, was 
$62,000/household if land in the village was included and $47,000/household if  it was not. 
When it is also considered that 40-50% o f the budget is spent on defence (Saqqaf; 1985,
Yemen Times; 17/4/95) it must be questioned whether aid to Yemen is equitable for the rest 
o f  the world, that is, whether other nations might not be more worthy recipients.
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Education
Dixon and Hamilton (1996) found the human asset capital stock o f countries to directly 
correlate with the mean years o f education per capita. Investment in education is no doubt 
laudable, and M ilroy’s hypothesis that education was a cause o f terrace degradation (1994) is 
rejected (emigration was a much more likely cause). In the search for water for T a’iz, the 
failure to conduct pumping tests correctly raises the question o f the role o f education in 
development. Although this particular example contributes directly to the on-going water 
problem, it is symptomatic o f institutional failure resulting from indigenous educational 
weaknesses. It is suggested that the potential for institutional reform and improved social 
adaptive capacity are ultimately limited by the quality o f the staff within those institutions, 
which in turn is largely determined by the educational system to which the staff have been 
exposed.
The Yemeni education system should be examined, particularly if development funding in the 
water sector is to be channelled through education and training. Firstly the rote memory 
system mentality which is developed as a first stage o f  education in the Q ur’anic schools 
seems to permeate to the highest levels o f  education. This results in a lack o f ability to apply 
knowledge on the basis o f  principles. Secondly the extent o f cheating in exams raises 
questions legal ding the value o f qualifications. This leads on to the rarely perceived problem 
o f having a higher respect for qualifications over experience (contrast Manzungu, 1999; 159 
and Berkoff, 1994,47) than occurs in the North. Fourthly, having invested in the education o f 
tom orrow’s forward thinking hydraulic scientific community, some o f the most able emigrate 
(Morton s brain diain, 1994;47) whilst others find there are no jobs through which to turn 
qualifications into experience (ibid.). Fifthly, the educational content imparted by the North 
to the South is becoming so high-tech that it is creating a screen-glued elite o f  technocrats 
who disdain dirty grass roots field work and indigenous knowledge and become even more 
detached from the problems than did the old style ‘technology transfer’ development method.
The Development Process
In terms o f the layered model o f  water shortage causation (section 1.3), the focus o f 
development seems to have moved progressively closer to the core, through successive 
emphases on the physical supply o f water, macro-economics and now institutional issues. 
However, it must be questioned whether Southern governments will allow development 
agencies to encroach any further, that is, whether legal frameworks, political interests or, 
ultimately inherent belief systems will be allowed to be challenged.
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Faced with 25-30 1/c/d o f  low grade water in T a’iz and the consistent plea for spare parts for 
rural supply schemes, it would appear that most consumers need Serageldin’s old agenda 
(1994) o f  household services provision. The existence o f the World Bank’s T a’iz Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project also recognises this need. Although needful, Allan considers 
that comprehensive pipe water schemes can only be introduced sustainably into strong and 
diverse economies’ where the institutions can ‘deliver a flow o f  funds to operate and sustain 
them (in piep,5.32). Because this does not yet exist in Yemen and because urbanisation 
continues apace, it might be suggested that in pursuing piped water schemes development is 
only cieating the need it seeks to meet. This raises perhaps the most unsanctioned topic for 
discourse o f all; the development process itself.
Knee-jerk emergencies and windows o f  opportunity for what?
Winpenny (1994;83) commented that short term development measures introduced, for 
example in an emergency, might have a strong immediate, positive impact which would be 
likely to tail off. Such has been the case in T a’iz, where lurching from one ‘emergency’ to the 
next has been the norm. With the provision o f inadequate quality water once every three 
weeks undei noimal ciicumstances, it could be contested that water provision in T a’iz is in 
a continual state o f emergency. However, the coincidence o f a low rainfall year and a 
political opportunist in power tends to result in an ‘emergency’ or ‘window o f  opportunity’ 
(Kingdon, 1984). Thus it is difficult to discern whether the window is an opportunity for 
economic/scientific common sense to prevail, or is a ‘window o f political opportunity’. To 
date, the emeigencies seem to have resulted in panic drilling, that is, jobs and money for 
whoever can get involved, and the irrational nature o f  handling the emergency ensures there 
will be another one in a few year’s time. The short-termist attitude which seems to 
accompany the emeigencies has resulted in a new scheme o f some kind every seven or eight 
years on average, a point which some development agencies seem to ignore when planning 
the next one.
State -  Development Agency Symbiosis
Migdal (1988;21) links the role and effectiveness o f the state domestically to its place in the 
world o f states. This especially proves true in the T a’iz development arena, if development 
agencies align themselves with central government, which they have to work through at least 
to get their residence permits, giving the government legitimacy (Vincent, 1991;210). Making 
field visits in one o f the President’s layla ‘alawis both confirms the allegiance and dangles 
World Bank dollars before the locals, winning at least superficial allegiance to those 
associated. All political levels from the local shayx to the President and his party will want to
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be seen to be a vital part o f  the mechanism that results in development funding ending up in 
the locality. How much slips through the nets o f  those involved and arrives at the intended 
destination is another matter, but as long as a large enough amount does, then both political 
and financial mileage can be made by those involved, and aid can remain part o f  the problem 
as well as part o f  the solution (Hildyard,1998;48).
Jobs for the Boys
Lastly, it must be questioned who gets involved on the donor side and why. In the pursuit o f 
m oie appropiiate development, Northern academia seem happy to keep moving the goalposts. 
The fact that this provides opportunity for publications and attracting research grants or 
‘academic consum ables’ (Yoshida,1999) is not coincidental (Bryant, 1998; 13). It is curious 
that on the basis o f lucrative data intensive studies (Chambers and Carruthers,1986;2), 
consultants piopose schemes that can fail (e.g. A1 Hayma) without being sued for getting their 
numbers wrong. Perhaps this is because the water runs out five years later instead o f two 
weeks later as in the dewatering sector. Even in the name of institutional capacity building 
there has still not been a well-conducted pumping test in the Ta’iz area. It is not surprising 
that development workers give-up, when they know their advice will be ignored 
(Morton, 1994, Allan,in prep;6.17), the infrastructure will not be maintained whatever is done 
with the institutions, and funds and equipment will continue to find their way into the wrong 
hands.
Summary
This section has demonstrated that deeply held beliefs, conscious and sub-conscious, 
contribute to determining what can be discussed and what cannot in the field o f water 
allocation. Many facets o f  Yemeni life impinge on the water allocation nexus and the degree 
to which discourse on them is sanctioned or unsanctioned determines what contribution they 
can make, if any, to keeping the population fed and watered.
The inability to sanction discourse on existing/potential water shortage causes/solutions is not 
only a Yemeni problem. Northern development discourse can also exclude key issues. The 
next section examines some o f  the limitations o f Northern sustainable development models in 
the T a’iz context.
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5.6 Equitably, Environmentally and Economically Sustainable Development
The history o f  water allocation and use in T a’iz provides a useful context against which to 
test the ielevance o f the different schools o f thought regarding the theory and practice of 
sustainable development.
5.6.1 Introduction: Getting Things in Perspective: Environment and Equity
‘The poor and needy search for water, but there is none’
Isaiah 41:17
In chaptei thiee, the extent o f degradation o f the water environment was investigated and it 
was demonstrated that water levels had declined between Habir and AI Burayhi, in Hawban, 
Wadi Hidi an and beneath the city o f T a’iz. The result has been declining wadi flows, 
declining well yields and in many instances the drying up o f wells. The area affected accounts 
for around one third o f the total stream / groundwater irrigated land o f the Upper Wadi 
Rasyan catchment that was irrigated at the height o f  groundwater development in 1985. A 
further quarter o f this total has been polluted directly by urban domestic and industrial waste 
watei. The two portions do not coincide, resulting in over half the stream /  groundwater 
irrigated land becoming environmentally degraded.
Chambei s (1983) identifies a deprivation trap into which the powerless, vulnerable, 
physically weak, poor and isolated downwardly spiral. He notes that the rural and urban poor 
aie paiticulai ly susceptible to this process and Berkoff (1994) also suggests that 
underprovision o f water and sanitation is typically skewed towards the urban poor. The 
following summary demonstrates that both these observations are applicable to T a’iz. In 
chaptei foui, the provision o f water and sanitation services, and also the contribution water 
makes towards providing livelihoods, were examined. In these contexts, it is worth raising the 
equity telated questions o f whose livelihoods and whose quality o f living are affected by 
either water allocation practices or degradation o f the water environment.
W ater and sanitation services
In over 80% o f rural areas, women continue to carry water distances averaging 1.7 Km and 
spend two hours per day doing it. In the city, the poorer 60% o f the population spend 50% 
longer fetching water (around 10 hours per week) and twice as many poorer children are 
involved compared with the wealthier 40% o f the population. The poorer 60% spend an 
average o f 6% o f  their income on water compared with 2% for the wealthier 40%. Two-thirds 
o f the urban community cannot afford tankers and one-quarter have to drink water o f  lower 
quality than recommended by WHO because they cannot afford treated drinking water. Water 
tankeis are more expensive for poorer families, and those recently moved into the city, who
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have to build their houses at the city edges face higher tanker charges, have less access to 
public water supply and sanitation services. The wealthy also benefit more from the 
subsidised public supply and sanitation because they have far more water consuming facilities 
and gardens. Poor sanitation facilities are also beginning to affect the growing rural
population and those downstream o f the city and the factories are forced to use polluted 
water, and know it.
Livelihoods
The agricultural sector has been especially affected by water level declines. The wealthier, 
more powerful landowners can deepen wells to chase the retreating resource, hence stealing it 
from under the feet o f  the poorer ones. Principal-agent problems prevail in negotiations for 
compensation for water reallocation and 3rd party interests tend to be underprotected. The 
pollution o f groundwater and soil in once fertile wadis has affected all downstream o f the 
city, and poorer farmers adjacent to industrial plants have had to abandon land or sell 
cheaply. Although returns to water in terms o f livelihood provision are far better in industry 
than in agriculture, pay differentials are rather inequitable in the sector.
Choosing a Model; The Sustainable Development Triangle
Current discourse on development appears to revolve around three basic aims; economic 
progress (or growth measured in some manner such as per capita GDP), equity provision (a 
more even distribution o f goods, or, less often mentioned, ‘bads’) and environmental 
protection (fiom resource depletion or, taking it further, even resource reconstruction). These 
aims can be envisaged as separate axes or poles (Figure 5.7). The emphases o f two distinct 
schools o f  thought or debate can also be related to these axes; the political ecologists and the 
Karshenas /  EKcurve camp. The practice o f the international donor community operating 
within the Yemeni water sector can be viewed against this theoretical background.
5.6.2 Theoretical Background; Political Ecology;
Envii onmental Protection, Equity Provision but no Economic Progress 
Political Ecology has contributed the concept o f a politicised environment and demonstrates 
that environmental problems cannot be understood in isolation from their political and 
economic contexts (Bryant and Bailey, 1997:28). Shadowing the shift in development 
rationale, veiy similar trends can be traced in the political ecology debate. Eckersley (1997) 
traces three phases; Participation, Survival and Emancipation. In the first phase, excluded 
gioups sought to ensuie a more equitable distribution o f environmental goods (ibid;9). This 
‘more for a ll’ approach was displaced by the ‘survival5 phase o f ‘no more for som e’ as the
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worldview moved away from a ‘cowboy’s new frontier’ view o f  limitless environmental 
resources (Pearce, 1993 ;2). Instead o f ‘participation’ in taming the water resources o f the new 
frontier by the ‘hydraulic m ission’, a ‘survivalist’ ‘spaceship-type-earth’ worldview o f limited 
finite resources became ascendant (ibid.). The shift to ‘emancipation’ involved a change in 
the perception o f the institution capable o f implementing ‘no more for all’ from Leviathan 
top-down enforcement (Lam, 1994;15) to bottom-up self-applied restriction on consumption 
by an conserver society aware o f its responsibilities to future generations. The emancipation 
stage has also questioned the very notion o f material progress (Eckersley,1997;17) and 
because N oithern rates o f consumption are so high, it is implicitly suggesting ‘less for some’. 
The thiee stages ate conceived schematically in Figure 5.7. Although the participation stage 
embraced economic progress, the survivalist stage viewed economic progress and 
enviionmental protection as opposites and the emancipation stage completed their antithesis.
5.6.3 The Karshenas / EKcurve Debate:
Economic Progress and Perhaps Environmental Protection but no Equity Provision 
The cunent stance o f the political ecologists, or at least o f  the deep ecologists, assumes that 
economic progress is simply incompatible with protecting the environment. This assumption 
is directly questioned by Karshenas (1992;iii and 22). In essence following the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) model, Karshenas observes ‘an unmistakable complementary relation 
between employment generation and environmental generation’ so that ‘the more advanced a 
countiy and the higher its technological level, the cleaner its environment becomes’ (ibid.).
On the basis o f  Northern post-industrial nations Karshenas’ hypothesis states that it is 
possible to reconstiuct a cleaner environment, but that it is first necessary to undergo some 
environmental degiadation (theoretical curve, Figure 2.1b) as the economy is strengthened.
He contrasts the political ecology view that economic progress and environmental protection 
are mutually exclusive and traded-off against each other versus his own view that the two 
can be complementary . As discussed in section 2.7, others strongly contest the theory that 
the history o f development in Northern nations supports the validity o f  this view (World 
Wildlife Fund, 1996). Many countries do not seem to have ‘turned the curve’, that is, their 
environments are still deteriorating. This forms one major objection to the Karshenas 
hypothesis. Howevei, the fact that he places environment on one axis and economic growth 
on an axis perpendicular to it, rather than the political ecologists’ polarisation o f these 
variables, at least gives some hope, if not scope, for the development that some economies 
(such as Yemen’s) need. However constructing axes without data indicating that there is a 
turn on the ‘EKcurve’ does not prove anything.
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Southern countries in particular show no signs o f turning the curve, however, Karshenas 
specifically addresses this issue by differentiating between Northern and Southern 
development. The latter is hampered by what he terms ‘forced environmental degradation’ 
observed as an ‘unambiguous complementarity between economic underdevelopment and 
environmental degradation (ibid. 14). The cause is identified as a ‘low rate o f increase o f 
man-made capital stock, technological backwardness and stagnation, combined with a 
population growth which eats into the natural capital stock’ (ibid.). In this situation, he 
prescribes a rate o f  economic growth which should be ‘sufficient to cater for the basic needs 
o f  the population (ibid. 10), and on this basis defines sustainable development as a ‘feasible’ 
minimum socially desired rate o f long-term growth’, ‘Long-term’ means tolerating the 
shorter-teim enviionmentai deterioration now in anticipation o f turning the curve in the 
future. The curve may be the donkey’s carrot always lying tantalisingly ahead and maintained 
there by population growth. Catering for the basic needs o f the population is a rather 
ambiguous teim. Where do basic water needs stop? Drink, food, domestic water, livelihoods? 
Each o f  these stages needs more water.
At this point it is worth evaluating T a’iz in terms o f Karshenas and vice versa.
Fiistly, the watei situation in Ta iz is unsustainable. The 1995 water crisis proved that the 
system could not maintain its productivity when subject to stress or shock (Conway’s 
definition o f  unsustainability, 1986).
One would expect Ta iz to fit Karshenas’ definition o f forced environmental degradation 
(above). However, two different situations are apparent: the rural areas where environmental 
degiadation is measuied primarily in terms o f declining water levels, and the city together 
with its downstream impacted areas which are characterised by polluted surface and 
groundwaters. In the rural areas, rather than environmental degradation being a result o f  the 
put suit o f  maximising agricultural production to feed an increasing population 
(Kaishenas, 1992,23), more and more irrigation has been used for growing cash crops such as 
qat, whilst virtual water in imported wheat has made up the deficit and fed the growing 
population. This is not forced environmental degradation but chosen environmental 
degiadation by Hardin s selfish hedonists (1968). In the city, urbanisation has bred 
urbanisation and concentrated population, resulting in a deteriorating environment o f 
increased pollution. The fact that increasing pollution remains unchecked is considered to be 
piimarily due to the absence o f institutional and legal frameworks to make the polluter pay.
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This is a reflection o f Yem en’s limited (social) institutional adaptive capacity (Ohlsson,1999 
and Turton, 1999c).
Karshenas asserts that dealing with the root cause o f population increase is less amenable to 
policy intervention than are technological change and employment provision (1992;24). 
Technological change has certainly contributed to the cause o f environmental degradation in 
T a’iz with the development o f tubewells and pumps. In contrast, on the basis o f  the huge 
differences between agriculture and industry in returns to water, it can be emphatically stated 
that technological change in the form o f a growing industrial base, is a more viable solution to 
the problems o f ‘forced environmental degradation’, since:
a) Industry addresses the problems o f a stagnant economy, underemployment, 
technological backwardness and low levels o f man-made capital (ibid.) by providing 
employment which has higher returns to water and technological levels than other 
existing forms o f employment. It also employs more people and creates more wealth 
in absolute terms than the alternative livelihoods and increases the level o f 
infrastructure (man-made capital).
b) Industry feeds the population in an indirect way by underpinning a stronger and more 
diverse economy (Allan,in prep;6.5) which could facilitate the purchase o f  grains from 
the world market.
If handled badly, however, industrial development causes, and in T a’iz has caused, further 
environmental degradation, just as the political ecologists suggest. If handled well, with 
enfoiced iegulation, industry can be made to return used water to the environment at 
acceptable quality, and hence follow the Karshenas model. Indeed there are many signs that 
at least the major industries o f T a’iz are willing to adequately treat waste water without being 
forced to. The political ecologists in rejecting industry (the veiy soul o f  capitalism,
Atkinson, 1991;5) may in fact have thrown out the baby with the dirty bath water.
Economic signals and preferences emanating from central government do not seem to 
encourage the T a’iz domestic sector to treat its waste water. There are therefore two 
problems. One problem is the handling by government (with or without legislation) o f  both 
industiial water users and especially domestic water suppliers. It is precisely this point that 
Ohlsson’s (1999) and Turton’s (1999c) comments regarding ‘social adaptive capacity’ o f 
politicians and governments addresses. The observations regarding the failure to pass a water 
law and the failure o f government to enforce law begs the question whether low ‘social
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adaptive capacity’ is synonymous with a weak state/strong society such as Yemen. The 
second problem is that the donors have also largely failed to acknowledge the contribution 
industry makes to intersectoral allocatively efficient water use and to the solution o f 
enviionmental degradation. Relative to support for irrigation, the donors have provided little 
if any encouiagement towards industrial development, and government and donor incentives 
to industry to treat waste are lacking. Together with their emphasis on irrigation, this suggests 
they too may be lacking the ‘social adaptive capacity’ to embrace environmental issues. The 
two problems o f inadequate legislation / enforcement and ignoring the contribution industry 
could make to cleaning up its act together with the role the private sector plays in providing 
watei suggests the authoritarian state and free-market allies o f the emancipatory theorists 
should not have been totally rejected (Eckersley,1992;28).
Finally, there are two facets o f the Karshenas model which remain unclear. Regarding the 
reconstruction o f environmental capital there is the ‘Problem of Historical Datums’.
What abstraction rates should we be aiming at? Allan (1994a;3) asks whether past patterns o f 
use should be taken into account. In A1 Hayma, donors, government and farmers alike talk 
about consumption levels o f  15 years ago, when groundwater abstraction for irrigation was at 
its height. Surely, for environmental recovery in T a’iz, levels of 30 years ago would be more 
appropriate? If the Hittite race still existed, the Palestinian — Israeli argument over the West 
Bank might be solved — or at least have another contender from a few thousand years earlier. 
The historical datum issue also isolates the fundamental problem for T a’iz. W ater scarcity is 
such that it is impossible to return to any previous levels o f agricultural water use because the 
population has increased so much in the mean time. We cannot reproduce the past because o f 
today s population level. Virtual water and modern medicine to a large extent mitigate against 
the ancient means o f population control o f famine and plague, leaving war as the alternative.
If  we accept the level o f  population growth and seek to feed and water it, then we must look 
to technological change for a solution (Karshenas, 1992;24). Indeed in T a’iz technological 
development in the form o f industry has done most to meet the population’s livelihood needs.
The second, and more serious flaw in the Karshenas model, is that although the model finds a 
harmony for environmental protection and economic development, it ignores equity. 
Falkenmark and Lundqvist (1995) and Laird (1991; 17) also raise the issue o f economic 
progress and equity provision. In particular the population o f T a’iz demonstrates that the 
haves can invest the fruit o f their economic progress in water transfers (by tanker or 
whatever) and create their mini-paradise, whilst the have-nots downstream experience 
declining water availability and quality and rising water prices. This phenomenon reflects the
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power asymmetries o f  actors controlling the environments o f others which Redclift points out 
(1987;49) to be a particularly Southern feature. The Karshenas/EKcurves may hold true for 
the haves, but for the have-nots it moves towards the minimum environmental capital and 
minimum economic well-being quadrant o f  the graph (Figure 2.1b). World Wildlife Fund 
(1996;25) says ‘if  the benefits from economic growth accrue to a small minority o f the 
population, only this small minority will be in the position to demand a cleaner environment’. 
Such is the case in T a’iz.
There are also indications in T a’iz that the EKcurve haves/have-nots split is not ju st local. 
Whether Proctor and Gamble, Shell, Rothmans, Crown Paints etc will be as rigorous upon 
themselves regarding their impact on the environment as they have to be in their home 
countries is not yet apparent. W ealthier countries may prove to be exporting the 
unsustainability effects viz. negative environmental impact o f  their consumption patterns to 
T a’iz (World W ildlife Fund; 1996; 10).
5.6,4 Conclusions: Can you have your water and drink it? Donor Agency Practice:
Economic Progress and Equity Provision, but only Lip-Service to Environmental Protection 
Since initial development drives for modernism and industrial and agricultural development, 
envii onmental issues have come to the fore, contributing to adding the word ‘sustainable’ to 
the development debate. Development then shifted to a bottom-up participatory / stakeholder 
institutional emphasis. However the development community does not seem to be as radical 
as the deep ecologists and still assumes material progress where there is ‘all for some and 
some for a ll’, at least in the water sector (Delft, 1991). Donor activity in T a’iz, even today, 
comprises dams and wells for irrigation in the compensation packages for rural-urban water 
transfers. Irrigation productive efficiency measures are proposed, despite the fact that these 
will only produce ‘efficient unsustainability’, and treatment o f sewage continues to be 
dropped from the agenda. The reality o f  donor activity causes one to question whether the 
‘environmental b it’ is really ju st an ‘add on’ o f secondary importance (Redclift, 1987; 14).
Within the sustainable development debate three camps, and their biases, have been identified 
(Figure 5.7) and can be related to the Hippocritical-style cultural theorist approach 
(Thompson, 1995;32). Political (deep) ecology promotes environmental protection at the 
expense o f economic progress. For a region with the economic limitations o f T a’iz, that 
expense may be excessive. Karshenas (1992) tries to reconcile economic progress and 
envii onmental protection, but at the same time ignores the inequitable distribution o f both the 
environmental and economic goods and bads (Thompson’s Bauer?). W hether there will be a
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turn in the curve for the majority o f the population remains to be seen. To date, industry has 
been the technological innovation to address the problems o f a stagnant economy, 
undei employment, technological backwardness and low levels o f  man-made capital as well as 
provide food by facilitating an economy which can pay for virtual water. In rejecting 
industrial development, the political ecologists may have thrown out the baby with the bath 
w atei. Pei haps economic progress and environmental enhancement can go together 
(Serageldin; 1994;94) but we still need to clean up in order to survive rather than postponing 
the clean up until we are surviving more comfortably. To initiate the clean up some economic 
signals from government and donors would be welcome. Donor agencies (Thompson’s FAO 
planner?) appear to shy away from environmental protection, despite paying it lip-service.
5.7 Conclusion: Individual, Economic, Institutional, and Political ‘Social’ Adaptive 
Capacity to water shortage and The Integrated Holistic Model
The ability to innovate in the face o f complex challenges such as the water shortage o f T a’iz 
is a reflection o f social adaptive capacity (Turton, 1999b; lOfrom Ohlsson,1998 and 1999). 
Allan (1999a,3) finds the required innovation in water policy reform, needed to improve 
water use efficiency via institutional reform lacking in ‘weak states’. The failure o f  Yemeni 
government institutions to cope with water shortage defines its ‘weak state’ status. However, 
this chaptei has demonstrated that political self-interest at all scales, from shayx to central 
government ministries, and above, have also been a fundamental obstacle to water use 
efficiency. In contrast, there are also several indications of significant social adaptive 
capacity to water shortage in Yemen.
Firstly, there is the enormous adaptive capacity demonstrated by the change in behavioural 
patterns o f individuals in response to water shortage in the city (Section 4.4). In this instance 
the extent o f  adaptation is the greatest, the scale is the smallest (individual households) and 
the incentives to adapt are the strongest (survivalist, need-driven adaptation). Secondly, the 
preparedness o f individuals to sell water to tankers and industry with the formation o f 
markets (section 4.5) and the development of private rural water supply schemes are forms o f 
economic response to water shortage and reflect economic adaptive capacity. Thirdly, the 
establishment o f water user associations and water related initiatives (such as irrigation co­
operatives and community supply schemes) in some rural areas (section 5.4) represent a more 
communal response to water shortage or institutional adaptive capacity. Fourthly, the 
negotiations o f  community representatives with government over water transfers such as has 
occurred in A1 Hayma and Habir, is a form o f political adaptive capacity to an external
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shortage. The degree to which the community or ju st the representatives benefit from the 
outcome may reflect the democracy o f the process, but in either case there was capacity to 
adapt (section 5.4). These four examples form a sequence o f increasing institutional scale 
and, necessary to that inciease, an increase in political profile and, perhaps not incidentally, 
volume o f water involved.
The teim social adaptive capacity is intended to cover a range o f contributing factors 
including economic (Turton, 1999c; 13), socio-political (Allan,1999b) and institutional 
(Allan, 1999a;3). Discussion is typically in the context o f central government initiatives 
whereas the Ta iz examples o f adaptation to water shortage mentioned above are all 
facilitated by individuals apart from central government. (Even in the fourth example water 
transfer is facilitated by local shayxs not central government). The solution to this 
contradiction lies in Turton’s assertion that social adaptive capacity is a function o f 
government legitimacy (1999c; 13). In T a’iz, and probably many other strong society -  weak 
states, the local indigenous, informal mode o f government is simply more legitimate than 
more centralised forms. In conclusion, there can be some measure o f social adaptive capacity 
in a weak state pioviding the process o f allocative reform starts as a bottom-up process at the 
local informal level o f  real politik and uses those equally indigenous institutional and legal 
frameworks in which it has traditionally operated. Central government will have to be 
politically more transparent if it is to earn the trust to enable it to play a more significant role 
in water transfers as negotiator or even buyer, in the form o f NW SA, in the future. In order to 
facilitate institutional change it has been suggested that central government should not 
become a bargainer at all (Steenbergen,1996;204).
In the context o f  Yemen, the holistic model o f  layered causation in the allocation o f water 
proposed in the introduction:
Political => Legal => Institutional => Economic => <= Social => <= Physical
fails at a number o f points. In the strong society -  weak state o f Yemen, it is discovered that 
state-originated legal frameworks and institutions become irrelevant at the local level. The 
very level at which water reallocation is most needed. Instead, local and/or traditional legal 
and institutional arrangements are the main vehicles o f allocation. Indeed the political 
interests which underlie or work through those arrangements are themselves a reflection o f 
specific local individuals rather than any Northern party-political model. Perhaps so 
pervasive and obvious they can be overlooked are the belief systems which drive the political
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inteiests and determine the political possibilities. The local political reality is embodied in the 
shayx, who is also the dominant institutional reality. This duality o f function can be traced to 
an extent up to national level ( the state is part o f the tribes”, The President, in 
Dresch, 1989,7). Alongside this traditional structure is a fledgling bureaucracy under a civil 
code created by the parliamentary process. This is the more typical Northern model described 
in the introduction and shown above. It is suggested that in Yemen there lies a spectrum 
between these two models (Figure 5.8). Opportunity for principal agent abuses are greatest in 
the Taw-less’ middle. Yemen may also be considered as in a transition from the Southern to 
the Northern model. It must be hoped that in attempting to transfer, Yemen does not get 
caught in the middle. Finally, the lack o f action on protecting the water environment suggests 
this aspect only exists in rhetoric.
The two co-existing Yemeni models are depicted another way in Figure 5.9. The political 
decision maker has various inputs (four are shown, with belief systems coming from the 
Tieart’). There are two main means o f providing economic signals (or determining the 
economically possible) to direct. The questions o f which mechanism will prevail locally in 
the futuie, and which economic signals the political decision maker will give, remain. At the 
moment indigenous mechanisms prevail and agricultural water use is economically favoured.
Figure 5.10 is an attempt at an alternative conceptual model for sustainable development. It 
proposes that the environmentalists are essentially correct in assuming that economic 
progress, if available to all, would result in environmental degradation. Each situation has a 
different starting point with respect to the Malthusian limit. If there is no social adaptive 
capacity to change the environmental consequences (water scarcity for instance) o f 
development, then the trajectory continues into further degradation. Social adaptive capacity 
(Ohlsson,1999 and Turton, 1999c) via whatever form of regulation, such as economic signals, 
and via whatever means o f enforcing it, participation pessimist top-down, or participation 
optimist bottom-up variety, is vital if there is to be any hope o f environmental reconstruction.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
A summary o f the problems causing the water shortage in Ta’iz points clearly to the need for 
an integrated holistic approach to water resources management. By the end o f  the 1990’s, it 
had become clear that ‘integration’ was not an easy process; contention is the norm in user 
relations over water (Allan et al 1999). Integrated water resource management has proved to 
be an extremely alien concept, though vital to the understanding o f the T a’iz story of 
combined resource and management failure. The history o f the shortage so far necessarily 
ends with the completion o f fieldwork in the Upper Rasyan Catchment in 1998. In 
concluding, some consideration is given to the significance o f the shortage and the lessons 
derived from it beyond these temporal and spatial points.
6.1 Key Issues
W ater Reallocation: the need for economic diversity
Perhaps the most important point arising from this study is the small amount o f water that 
could be made available for reallocation. A mere 30Mm3/yr is the best estimate o f renewable 
groundwater from the Upper Rasyan Catchment to meet the drinking, domestic and livelihood 
needs o f around 3/4M people. The food needs are mainly being met by a reallocation o f water 
from overseas in the form o f  grain imports. Their virtual water content accounts for over three 
times the amount o f  water found in T a’iz’s renewable groundwater. Economic diversity 
towards allocatively more efficient uses o f water provides the capacity to afford grain 
imports. In the debate over whether to produce cash crops or industrial output with the little 
water available (Otchet,1999) the deciding factor in an economist inspired world is the 
relative returns to water. In T a’iz, industrial use o f water brings 2300 times more income and 
over 300 times more jobs per in3 o f  water than does irrigation. The cessation o f irrigation in 
the area is not advocated. It would not solve the problem. A reallocation o f a small part of 
irrigation’s 75% share o f the renewable resource to industry would help, however. A 10% 
reduction in irrigation water use could produce a 250% increase in industrial use if 
reallocation were feasible (section 4.2.2).
Strong Society -  Weak State Implications: the need for political credibility and institutional 
appropriateness
The reallocation o f water has been feasible on a small scale through water markets, but 
transfers from rural areas to meet the growing urban demand by government has met with 
armed conflict and produced significant environmental impact. The armed conflict was
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fostered by mistrust o f  government on the part o f  the source area communities, which in turn 
was brought about by abuses o f their agent-principal relationship. Although such abuses also 
sometimes characterise local traditional indigenous power structures, these structures operate 
on the basis o f customary law via traditional non-formal institutions that are, respectively, 
more enforceable, and considered more appropriate and efficient in the local context. Political 
leadership at the local level is individualistic and family-based rather than tribal, and the 
adoption o f  national party-politics by those individuals is on a purely pragmatic basis. Local 
political leadership wins greater credibility than government because o f the latter’s poor track 
record and ‘distance5 from the issues. Yemeni North - South relations also play a part in this 
distancing. The government also fails in the role it could fulfil -  in providing the right macro- 
economic signals to promote reallocation to higher value uses o f water. Traditions o f 
community co-operation in rural areas have, in a few instances, paved the way for the 
establishment o f co-operatives involved in water related activities and, with some donor 
input, water user associations. The tendency towards local rather than government based 
power structures reflects and demonstrates that the region is characterised by a strong society 
and a weak state. In fact, BrumfiePs definition o f a state ‘in which governmental institutions 
monopolise the use o f legal force5 (1980) suggests Yemen is not a state. To be effective, 
water reallocation initiatives have to operate within this non-state context.
Population Growth: still on the agenda
If  unaccounted-for-water was reduced to 20%, and all the renewable groundwater in a 30km 
radius were brought to T a5iz, only 30 1/c/d water could be provided in 2013 if all irrigated 
agriculture were to cease. The impossibility o f such a plan both physically and socio- 
politically underlines the fact that the most onerous factor affecting the area’s water needs is 
the city’s 8%p.a. population growth rate. Any supply side development o f  those meagre 
renewable water resources is only buying time (Turton, 1999d;l). The only other supply 
alternatives are desalination at over $2.5/m3 and/or domestic water recycling, which is 
unacceptable on religious grounds.
The Sustainable Development Balance:
Economic Progress, Environmental Protection and Equity Provision
The people o f T a’iz receive less water than the WHO guideline (28 1/c/d), and the water they 
do receive is o f  poorer quality than the WHO recommended minimum (that is, it is in excess 
o f 1500 pS/cm). Such circumstances demand development initiatives. Economic progress, in 
the form o f infrastructure renewal and utility reform, are necessary ingredients. The pollution 
o f over half the catchment’s groundwater and surface water, and declining water levels in key
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aquifers, demand environmental protection initiatives. The poorer 60% o f  the population 
spend more on water than the World Bank recommended maximum. The result is an average 
o f half an hour per day queuing for free water in the city and carrying it 1.7 km in rural areas. 
This price is mostly paid by children and women respectively. Equity provision is therefore 
on the agenda. The need for a balance o f all three; equity provision, economic progress and 
environmental protection is apparent.
Summary: the shortage o f social adaptive capacity
Water shortage in T a’iz has forced many individuals to change their water use practices. The 
modifications o f demographic and religious practices demanded by the shortage are a severe 
challenge to an individual’s belief systems, and hence, social adaptive capacity. On a larger 
scale, the underlying belief system o f political self-interest, which constrains reallocative 
initiatives and silences the role o f virtual water, is also unlikely to adapt to the shortage.
6.2 Beyond T a ’iz
T a’iz Tomorrow
The observations o f the T a’iz water crisis were snapshots in an evolving situation. Whilst 
belief systems may change very slowly, population levels, the amount o f imported grain to 
feed it, and technology development and the extent o f environmental degradation it causes 
have changed rather quickly. Optimists hope there is a demographic transition. There is no 
sign o f a decline in the birth rate to date. The growth in tubewell/diesel driven pump 
technology was fuelled financially by remittances from Saudi and the G ulf and literally by the 
discovery o f some local oil. The environmental consequences suggest black gold brings a 
mixed blessing. The problem o f trying to return to the environmental condition before 
significant groundwater development occurred is that the damage has already been done. At 
current trends, population growth is likely to prevent the EKcurve being turned. Beyond the 
ten year horizon, the sectoral reallocation issue becomes irrelevant because it cannot find 
enough water. The only solutions after that lie in virtual water for staples provision, industrial 
development (with regulated waste disposal) for livelihood provision, and, in the absence o f 
waste water treatment, desalination for industrial and domestic needs. The latter measure 
would require a regional economic strength that can give one million people in the city the 
capacity to afford water at over $2.5/m3. That cost could be halved if industry moved to the 
coast since this would avoid the 1400m water lift and 100km pipeline needed. However, even 
then it is doubtful that the water would be affordable to most Yemenis.
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T a’iz’s struggle to achieve a balance in the water allocation nexus o f  economic growth, 
environmental protection and equity provision can also be viewed from the vantage point o f 
Northern development models o f society and the state.
In the North, failure to protect the environment began to be noticed after a centuiy o f  
industrial modernity had damaged it (Giddens,1990, Allan, 1999b;2). Since then the 
environment issue has ascended to the point where, today, Northern industry, in the fight o f 
perceived ‘risks’ to the environment, has started to take a more precautionary approach to the 
use o f natural resources (ibid.). This shift in perception and policy has been termed ‘reflexive 
m odernity’ (Beck, 1992). The social theory o f Beck and Giddens is relevant to the North, 
where Northern awareness o f ‘risks’ has resulted from assimilation from the media by 
communities and their politicians o f the ‘new knowledge’.
W here does T a’iz lie within this scheme? Allan (1999b;3) gives four reasons why the South 
will find it difficult adapting to the message o f the ‘new water knowledge’ that takes its 
inspiration from principles o f economic efficiency and environmental sustainability, o f which 
water reallocation and birth control are a part:
a) Deeply held beliefs and expectations about water that contradict the message
b) Lack o f susceptibility to the notions o f environmental risk
c) Lack o f political, social, economic and technical capacities to respond to the message
d) Awareness by the government policy makers o f the economic and technical 
impediments and, more importantly, political prices to be paid in applying.the 
message.
Although all four points are true o f Yemen, they assume central government initiatives in 
water policy reform will have an impact. The limited institutional capabilities o f  central 
government, and the limit o f its rule at the San’a ringroad, indicate that the processes o f state 
building involving the development o f a bureaucracy and the disarmament o f  the people 
(W eber,1978) have not yet taken place. Yemen lies at least as far from applying the ‘new 
knowledge’ than any other polity in the South. Besides the incongruity o f encompassing 
Southern state development within Northern models, is the fact that those models are 
themselves part o f  an evolving literature that forever moves the goalposts where today’s 
solution for yesterday’s problem is the cause o f  tom orrow’s problem.
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T a’iz Elsewhere
How relevant is the example o f T a’iz to other situations, or, put another way, how typical is 
T a’iz? If only six main features could be chosen to describe T a’iz they would be:
a) The Problem - The non-availability o f  w ater is extreme (around 25 1/c/d)
b) The M ain Cause - The population growth rate is particularly high (around 8%p.a.)
c) An Evaporating Hope - The annual rainfall though slightly greater than London’s 
(around 600mm/yr) is still inadequate.
d) The Current Food Solution - The population is highly dependent on virtual water 
(equivalent to around 75% o f all the water used in all sectors) and is unaware o f  the 
real water deficit
e) A Short-term Solution - reallocation - The proportions o f industrial and domestic 
sector water use are small at only 2% and 4% o f total water use, respectively.
f) A Potential Long-term Solution - desalination -  is likely to prove too costly because o f
the lift needed (1400m).
It is hoped that the extremity o f the T a’iz predicament makes T a’iz sufficiently different from 
other cities that its experience remains a slim risk rather than a real threat. The lessons are 
still worth learning.
W ater stress in T a’iz has suppressed the demand for water, nullifying the potential 
contribution o f  demand management methods. The population distribution within Yemen (or 
for that matter, the Arabian peninsula) approximately matches the rainfall distribution. 
Yemen, and particularly the regions o f Ibb and T a’iz receive the most rain and are the most 
populous. Theoretically, there is no major maldistribution o f people relative to water, and 
although there is plenty o f  rainfall, it occurs over too small an area and evaporates too fast, ' 
resulting in little runoff. Within the context o f  such natural shortage relative to the 
population, human activity has greatly aggravated the problem. For the time being, virtual 
water provides the silent solution to the food requirement whilst Yemen and cheap grain still 
have access to the world market. Although this could free up water for reallocation to higher 
value uses, currently only intrasectoral transfer to qat is evident in any significant quantity. 
W ithout a demographic transition, even the reallocation issue is only a short-term solution, 
and is exacerbated by the problem o f unchecked pollution. If  pursued, the push-pull o f 
livelihood provision by developing industry at the coast could be good news for T a’iz water 
supply (and bad news for the voiceless corals).
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6.3 H201ism: Our Man in Habir
This study sought to demonstrate that water allocation ‘has too many component parts to be 
understandable if one limits oneself to one o f the many established academic dom ains’ 
(Hajer,1995;2). In the light o f the lessons from the water situation in T a’iz, it is suggested that 
a ‘poverty o f disciplinary narrowness’ (Atkinson, 1991 ;21) would prevent an analysis 
adequate to address the problems and solutions o f water allocation. Although successive 
physical, economic, institutional, legal, political and belief system layers contribute 
increasing complexity to an understanding o f the water problems, they do provide a fuller 
one. A succession o f experts would undoubtedly provide an academically sounder set o f 
reports. It is suggested, however, that the gaps between the disciplines bring incoherence to 
the message.
So it seemed as we returned from our field visit to the farmer in Habir on World W ater Day. 
The encounter had a specific spatial and temporal context. The farmer irrigated his crop 
within a few hundred yards o f the most productive exploration borehole in the area that could 
supply T a’iz. Permission to drill had taken almost a decade o f negotiations, compensation, 
and bloodshed because the government had previously ‘stolen’ the water from the adjacent 
aquifer, and farmers, immediately downstream. Government misuse o f  information and 
corruption, and opportunism by the locally powerful were all involved. The borehole is still 
not connected to the T a’iz pipeline. The farmer, unlike any o f the visiting experts, was well 
aware o f  all o f this. Although his water came from an entirely different source than that o f the 
drilled well, the arrival o f a group o f ‘developers’, some o f who were foreigners, in an 
expensive vehicle largely determined the farmer’s tactics.
On our return from the field we sat down to eat (some virtual water) and drink (some o f the 
locally privately purified water) with the Governor. Before the meal we washed our hands in 
water brought by private tanker from a (polluted) wadi and stored in locally made tanks. The 
complete absence o f a single drop o f ‘government’ water on the premises reflected the water 
shortage described in this study. The fact that neither we, nor the rest o f  the 400,000 
inhabitants either starved or died o f thirst that day reflects the adaptive capacity o f a society 
left to its own devices. (Some might have had water borne tummy bugs). It is difficult to 
understand these watery realities without an H2OIistic approach.
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Photographs
Photo 1: Domestic Use o f Untreated Sewage Effluent. Washing clothes in 
Wadi Malih at the confluence with Wadi Hidran in full knowledge that the 
source is the untreated T a’iz domestic sewage outfall.
3 0 6
Photo 2 Inequitable W ater Allocation. Shayx Sadiq’s qat irrigated via open channel
from one o f the wells obtained from the agreement to allow the government to 
drill others for the T a’iz water supply. One environmental impact was the 
dessication o f the rest o f the valley as the fields beyond the qat testify.
30 7
Photo 3: Water Diversion Structure Tapping Sub-Surface Wadi Flow. Wadi 
Nibaq irrigation source.
Photo 4: Wadi Terrace Erosion. Wadi Nibaq. Wadi flow has eroded the 
terraces revealing the intervening walls between three terrace levels.
308
Photo 5 Artesian Flow from Fault-Bounded Tawilah Sandstone. Shar’ab. The hill to
the right is composed o f volcanics, whilst that to the left Tawilah Sandstone. 
The field to the left is 15cm deep in water which emanates from the contact. 
The pipe (lower right) supplies 4000 houses from a well drilled in the Tawilah 
Sandstone outcrop.
Photo 6 Environmental Degradation: Factory waste-water lagoon and T a ’iz dump.
3 0 9
Appendices
Appendix A Urban Survey Questionnaires
Appendix B Urban Survey Sampling and Analys
Appendix C Newspaper Articles
Appendix A
English and Arabic versions o f Urban Survey Questionnaire
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Appendix B
Urban Domestic Water Use Survey -  Sampling and Analysis 
Sampling
Three stages o f sampling were used. Firstly, population-based blocks o f  the city were 
selected, then sample points were areally selected within those blocks, and lastly a cluster 
comprising the nearest eight houses around the sample point was selected.
Population-Based Block Selection
The random selection o f houses to be included in the survey could have been done by a single 
stage areally-related method but would have biased the sample towards less densely 
populated, wealthier areas. It was therefore decided to base the first stage o f sampling on 
population density. Census data o f Dec 1994 were obtained for the city o f T a’iz, including 
maps defining the areas used for the census. One number was assigned to each 100 houses 
(masaakin) in the block, which resulted in nearly 500 numbers being allocated. The groups o f 
100 houses were selected for the next stage o f the sampling by using random numbers and the 
blocks in which these hundreds were located noted. The random selection ensured that more 
populous blocks had more sampling points and the less populous fewer.
Sample Point Selection Within Blocks
Because the boundaries used.by the 1994 census defined small and reasonably homogeneous 
blocks in terms o f population density the second stage o f sampling was by areal methods. 
Location points were chosen by random selection o f co-ordinates, within the blocks.
Cluster Sampling at Location Points
Location o f sampling points in the field was facilitated by the census maps and a GPS. Time 
and resources constraints made it unfeasible to individually locate over one thousand houses 
and cluster sampling was used. During the pre-test, sampling included five houses per cluster 
and 72 people were interviewed. In the main survey eight to ten houses were included per 
cluster at 125 location points. The cluster comprised a sample o f the houses immediately 
adjacent to the location points. In the main survey a total o f 1028 houses were visited and 
1250 interviews carried out, (since in two houses per cluster interviews were conducted with 
a male and female respondent). Those houses to be included were identified and field team 
leaders were shown the location point which was also identified by spray paint. Missing out 
houses was not permitted unless no suitable interviewee could be found after two visits.
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There was rarely a need to find an alternative house due to absence o f interviewees. Sketch 
maps o f the houses to be included were prepared during the first visit and used by the team 
members on subsequent visits. Effects due to clustering were analysed.
NWS A Coverage
In order to check that the sample would proportionately represent the areas covered or not 
covered by the public utility (NWS A) water supply network, a check was kept o f the number 
o f houses with and without NW SA connections as the survey progressed. NW SA coverage 
was, according to NW SA in 1997 about 75%. Maps o f the locations o f water mains were 
obtained from the CES office to identify areas o f coverage. The maps were rather out o f date, 
however. Initial indications suggested about 90% o f the selected sample points were located 
in areas served by NW SA, and 90% o f the houses included in the survey were, in fact, 
connected to NWSA. There is also a discrepancy between NW SA estimates o f sewerage 
coverage (48%) and those recorded in this survey (68.5%). Reasons for the difference in 
water supply and sewerage coverage estimates between those o f the NW SA and this survey 
are discussed in section 4.5.1. It is statistically unlikely that the difference is due to 
unrepresentative sampling.
Interviewees
Interviewees had to be old enough to answer the questions and not so old that they were ‘out 
o f  touch with the issues addressed in the questionnaire. The decision regarding whether the 
interviewee was suitable was made by the enumerator. After the practice o f the pre-test the 
enumeiators appeared to be able to make this decision more easily. In order to investigate the 
difference between male and female responses, it was decided to interview a male and female 
icspondent at two houses in every location. Men conducted the male interviews and women 
the female. Despite this plan, at 138 houses a woman was the only adult at home at the time 
o f the visit and was willing to be interviewed by a man. It was therefore possible to increase 
the proportion o f female respondents and carry out further gender analysis.
Surveys
The pre-test was conducted during late July 1997 and facilitated testing o f the questionnaire, 
the enumerators and the survey method. Immediately prior to the pre-test a training day was 
held for the enumerators. The questionnaire was revised in the light o f the pre-test and the 
main survey was conducted during August and the first half o f September 1997. It was 
preceded by another training day in which the revised version o f the questionnaire was 
discussed and practised. A survey o f actual expenditure on the items included in the
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expenditure ranking question o f the questionnaire was conducted after the main survey was 
complete. One household at each location included in the main survey was visited during 
December 1997. W ithout continued monitoring, the estimate o f  expenditure on each item can 
only be regarded as rather crude although expenditure ranking and estimated actual 
expenditure agreed sufficiently to warrant using the expenditure estimates in establishing 
broad income categories as described below.
Analysis
‘Income’ assessment - ‘I found God in Yem en’...
was a quotation heard from several Yemenis interviewed during the course o f  the survey. It 
was appaiently the salient finding o f a previous study o f incomes and expenditure carried out 
in Yemen. Although it has not been possible to trace the reference, the study apparently found 
that household expenditure exceeded income. When asked how this was possible 
householders replied ‘Aal allah’ meaning ‘its upon G od’, that is, month after month He 
miraculously coveis the deficit. This observation highlights the problem o f  assessing income. 
For instance, o f  the 1250 interviews carried out in this survey, not a single household 
acknowledged having a second income. The reality o f moonlighting is apparent to anyone 
who has mixed with the inhabitants for even a short time. Due to a fear o f taxation 
assessment, or other reasons, householders only record their ‘officiaI’(usually morning) job.
In order to analyse the survey data on the basis o f income a way o f determining the elusive 
income was needed. The first step towards establishing income brackets incorporated a basic 
wealth assessment (based on possessions) and an estimate o f income from job  titles.
Wealth Assessment
Along the same vein as the Arabic proverb ‘wealth cannot hide itse lf  possessions, vehicles, 
property holdings and trips abroad, were recorded as wealth indicators. In the absence o f 
more exact information on the value o f the possessions and properties owned by the 
respondents included in the survey, and in an attempt to produce an indication o f their 
relative wealth, various means o f deducing prices were used.
Consumer Items
Prices o f various consumer items were obtained from dealers. The prices obtained were for 
new purchases o f  medium quality, most popular models. Relatively little price variation was 
noted. Items comprised washing machines, water heaters, water storage tanks, TV, and 
satellite dishes.
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Vehicle prices were also obtained from dealers. Although there is a large range in price 
depending on age and to a lesser extent exact model, current prices o f 10 year old average 
quality mid-range models were used. This seems to correspond with the average age o f 
vehicles on the road in Ta’iz, which is also the approximately the height o f  the pre-Gulf War 
boom when remittances and vehicle purchase peaked. Although this valuation method is 
rather crude, it is still considered useful in calculating a household wealth parameter because 
the major differences between households are the presence or absence o f a vehicle and, after 
that, the type o f vehicle, particularly 4WD vehicles.
Property
The survey questionnaire distinguished the property types o f apartments, detached houses, 
villas and temporary housing. It became apparent from interviewer entries that the distinction 
between apartments and detached houses was different from that intended when the 
questionnaire was designed. Detached houses in T a’iz typically comprise between 2 and 4 
floors. The ground floor is usually for commercial purposes (hence the difference in value in 
land cost throughout most o f  the city depending on whether the property is on a main road or 
not). An extended family often owns the whole building and sub-families may rent 
apartments within it or they may live in the apartment rent-free because it is owned by a near 
relative.
The expenditure survey indicated that rents in most o f the city are approximately 
500YR/month less than those quoted by estate agents, although their estimates were more 
accurate in the expensive areas. A reason for the difference could be that people interviewed 
in the expenditure survey had been living in their houses for some time without rents being 
increased whilst the estate agents were giving rents for new tenants. In estimating household 
expenditure for the main survey sample, rents were calculated from those given for the 125 
households included in the expenditure survey, rather than using those from the estate agents, 
and were applied on a pro rata basis to the whole sample o f 1250 dependent on the size o f 
property and its location.
The often emotional response to the question o f land ownership, and, in some instances, 
refusal to answer (taken as acknowledgement o f ownership), suggests the significance o f this 
parameter. Ownership o f agricultural land was found to correlate with expenditure and has 
been included as a variable in calculating the income factor o f the households. Very roughly, 
a value o f  4M YR (31,000$) was assigned, based on non-irrigated land prices o f 3000YR 
(23$) /qasaba and a mean landholding o f 3 hectares indicated by estate agents. The latter
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figure seems rather high. Handley (1996a; 16) indicates typical holdings o f a little over lha. 
Although absentee landlords tend to have larger holdings, it is unlikely they would be very 
much larger than the mean. Conversely, landowners may purposely underestimate holdings 
for tax reasons, whereas estate agents may have a more accurate picture. W hatever the mean 
size o f holding, the price per hectare used was slightly below the mean, and the main 
differences in household wealth are at the more basic level o f whether they own land or not.
The household wealth calculated from the above methods is less than the actual total wealth 
o f  the households for the following two main reasons: only a few consumer durables were 
included, and no business assets belonging to members o f  the household were included.
Trips Overseas:
196 households reported family members having travelled overseas since the G ulf War and 
did not record the current job  as being ‘m ugtarib’ (emmigrant worker). Travel overseas was 
costed according to distance travelled and purpose and then multiplied by the number o f trips 
and the number o f members o f the household travelling. Trips for work (resulting in income) 
were distinguished from study,'medical or tourist purposes (resulting in expenditure). Again 
the fundamental difference was between those who travelled overseas and those who did not, 
although a rudimentary costing o f the trips was also made.
Income Estimates:
Nearly all the households interviewed reported jobs falling into the descriptions given below. 
For most o f these jobs it is possible to estimate approximate incomes. Broad estimates were 
obtained by carrying out a small survey (sample 50) o f government employees in education 
and military and also o f employees with Hayel Said company. A few shayxs were interviewed 
regarding likely salaries o f  tribal members for the less common occupations.
Army and police ranks receive less basic salary than this, but it is supplemented by 
backhanders etc. Similarly officer salaries can be as high as indicated when income 
supplements are taken into account and the higher figure has been assumed. Although the 
earning potential o f building contractors and money changers is high, their incomes are 
reduced at the moment due to the depressed market. The lower figure for doctor’s incomes is 
the basic government salary and may be multiplied many times by private practice. The term 
trader may refer to the owner o f the largest business or be a euphemism for the boy selling a 
few wares out o f a wheelbarrow. Shayx incomes similarly vary greatly, generally depending
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on whether they serve their community or sponge from it. For doctors, traders and shayxs a 
range o f incomes was used depending on their wealth indicators.
Table B l: Salaries o f occupations encountered in the survey. (For US dollar conversion 
divide by 130).
Job Title Salary ‘000 
YR/month
Job Title Salary ‘000 
YR/month
M ost F requen tly  E ncountered  Jobs Guard 5-10
Labourer 5-10 Nurse 5-10
Employee(govt & 
private)
8-15 Supervisor 10-15
Trader 5-50+* Secretary 5-10
Clerk 10-15 Emigrant Worker 50+
Teacher 10-15
Shopkeeper 5-10 R arely  E ncountered Jo 3S
Engineer 10-15 Surveyor 10-15
Army 10-15* Lawyer 50+
Police 10-15* Mechanic 20-30
Driver 10-12 Seller 20-30
Shayx 0-50+*
Less F requen tly  E ncountered  Jobs Carpenter 20-30
Doctor 15-50+* C hef 10-15
Accountant 15-20 Journalist 20-25
Axdaam 0-5 Farmer 5-10
Officer (police/army) 10-50+* Moneychanger 0-50+*
Building Contractor 0-50+* Judge 50+
Butcher 20-30 Tailor 30-50
Chemist 50+ Blacksmith 15-20
Electrician 15-20 Headmaster 10-15
Company Director 50+ Baker 15-20
Deputy Director 30-50 Welder 15-20
* See comments below
Although the assumptions involved in determining wealth and basic income are in some cases 
subjective and approximate and may not meet the agreement o f all readers, their accuracy is 
considered adequate for their purpose here o f determining broad income brackets.
Regression Analysis, Income Factor and Income Bracket
As a second step towards establishing income brackets, a group o f 125 households (one at 
each location) was interviewed to determine expenditure on major items in the monthly 
family budget. A correlation was then carried out between total four-monthly expenditure vs. 
income and wealth determined on the basis o f the assumptions described in the preceding 
section. [It was considered reasonable to include wealth indicators in the determination o f the 
income factor because they were either a) obtained via previous income or inheritance, or b)
327
in the case o f more durable items they require current income for operation, maintenance or 
replacement. The most important justification for including the wealth indicators in deriving 
income factors was the positive correlation obtained between the indicators and expenditure.]
The four month period was chosen arbitrarily and, initially, monthly expenditure and income 
were accordingly multiplied by four whilst current values o f m ajor capital items, such as 
property, vehicles, foreign trips and major household items were divided by various factors. 
These factors depend on the life expectancy o f the item so as to give the amount they would 
depreciate in four months or, in the case o f property, the time taken to inherit them (assuming 
25 years per generation) or a similar time to pay o ff a loan to purchase them or to accumulate 
the wealth to purchase them outright. The four-monthly cost o f foreign trips was related to 
trip frequency. The sum o f the four-monthly income/wealth parameters was termed an 
‘income factor’.
Initially, demographic data o f  numbers o f women and children was included in the income 
factor (as an effective four-monthly cost per individual). Although a best fit o f  R=0.533 was 
obtained when demographic data were included, the causative effect o f  these data on 
expenditure but not on income precluded its use in establishing the income factor, so this 
‘demographic cost’ was excluded from the income factor. Although rent directly contributes 
to expenditure and is strongly correlated in the sample o f 125, income is considered to be 
more strongly causative o f rent rather than vice versa and rent was therefore included.
Table B2: Multipliers in Regression Equation.
Item Multiplier 
/ Divider
Error Margin 
+/-
Land Ownership /100 20
House Ownership /100 20
W ashing Machine /15*
Television /15*
Car 16 0 5
Overseas Trips since G ulf War /10 2
Rent x 4months 0.5
Salary x 6months 1
* Best fit values not used, see below
The initial ‘four-monthly’ values o f the different items proved to be quite close to the values 
required for giving a best-fit in the rudimentary regression analysis o f expenditure against 
income factor, although some needed adjustment and an error margin which still permitted 
the fit was established. The values of the multiplying and dividing factors which gave a best
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fit, and their error margins are given in Table B2. The best fit obtained (R=0.35, income 
factor^ 2.77 x expenditure + 133000, t ratio=4.1) reflects the quality o f the responses and the 
relevance o f a ‘one-off expenditure survey, however, for the purpose o f establishing coarse 
income brackets, the methodology is considered adequate.
A life cycle aspect o f inheritance was not apparent in the expenditure patterns (that is, there 
was no correlation between ownership, or value, o f inherited items and age o f head o f 
household. Apart from washing machines and TVs, the derivation o f the multipliers arose 
directly from the regression analysis. A cross-confirmation that the wealth assessment 
methodology is reasonable is indicated in that the best fit regression was obtained using 
approximately the same time period (viz. four months). Estimated salaries had to be increased 
by 50% just to cover expenditure on the items included in the expenditure survey. This 
confiims a multiplier o f 6 months rather than 4 months in the regression and suggests that real 
total incomes including moonlighting are 50% more than respondents are prepared to admit.
Other wealth indicators included in the survey (radio, satellite dish, water heater) showed 
little to no correlation with expenditure and were not used in constructing the income 
brackets.
Fouithly, and finally, on the basis o f the above methodology, income factors were calculated 
for the whole sample in order to place them in ‘income’ brackets. Seven income brackets 
were constructed. The income brackets are intended as a coarse classification considered 
commensurate with the quality o f the data used.
Income factors varied from 0 to 1,900,000 in a markedly skewed distribution (Table B3).
Table B3. Household income brackets.
Bracket Income Factor Range Sample (No of Households)
1 0-100,000 149
2 100,000-200,000 442
3 200,000-300,000 215
4 300,000-400,000 80
5 400,000-500,000 52
6 500,000-600,000 40
7 >600,000 50
Analysis Methods
Data sub-sets were prepared for different types o f analysis (Table B4).
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Table B4: Data sub-sets.
Data Sample Analysis
All data 1250 Source File
All unpaired data plus paired data, male 
(uneven locations) female (even 
locations)
1028 Main Analysis 
Income Analysis
As above, but with some records removed 
to ensure equal weighting for cluster 
effect analysis
1000 Cluster Effect Analysis
All Unpaired data, divided into male and 
female respondents
668m 
13 8 f
Gender Analysis a)
Paired data, divided into male and female 
respondents
222m
222f
Gender Analysis b)
The main analysis comprised determining the mean, standard deviation and standard error at 
the 5% level for each quantitative variable in the questionnaire and frequency percentages for 
categorical variables. Statistical significance is defined at the 5% level. Statistical parameters 
were based on n=number o f  respondents as in most instances a few respondents either refused 
to answer the question or did not know the answer. The income analysis comprised 
comparing the means for each income bracket.
Analysis was carried out to determine the extent o f  the cluster effect (due to the clustered 
sampling) by comparing the standard error when the cluster effect is taken into account and 
when it is not using the Csample and Analysis parts o f  the Epi-info (version 6) WHO 
statistical software. Although many sampled clusters o f houses comprise a large variety o f 
housing and incomes, cluster effects were noted for many parameters. In particular strongly 
income related variables showed marked differences between different locations. The wealthy 
areas along the southern edge o f the city were the most obviously different from other areas.
Many o f the variables did not show a normal distribution but were skewed, so tests for 
significance involved using the following non-parametric methods. Gender analysis 
comprised examining if  male and female respondents answered significantly differently. 
Unpaired data were analysed using Student’s t test at the 5% level (analysis a), and paired 
data using Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Swinscow, 1983;58), (analysis b). The comparison of 
male and female responses yielding categorical variables was carried out using the standard 
error o f difference between percentage responses. Gender comparisons mentioned in the 
following sections are only given where differences were statistically significant at 5% or less 
or for percentage differences where the difference was greater than one standard error 
(Swinscow, 1983;28-30).
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,Taiz Goyernor 
Resigns, u n less...
T aiz Governor Abdul-Rahman  
M oham m ed A li Othman, wrote 
to Prime M inister Abdulaziz  
Abdulghani resigning Jrbm ;Jus 
post. Reason: “I am u n a b le .io  
fu lfill m y obligations, based ..oh 
the oath I had made when I t o o k . 
o ffice .” U  . • ' .  '■
T he Governor com plained o f ; 
m eager and falling allocations. 
T aiz city with alm ost One m illion  
residents, suffers from shortages 
o f  vital needs including water.
A l-A yyam , A den, 7 /6 /1995  
Independent.
H eadlines: ' *''* >
1) V isitin g  Saudi A rabia  W ill C ontribute to 
Stability  in  the R egipn and Resum ption o f  
Special N eighborly  R elations. s * * -
2) L eakage o f F inal E xam s Leads to Delay 
in H old ing  E xam s in  A den and their C an­
cellation  in  Lahej.V '
f  3) T aiz G overnor R esigns. ]
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r No Foreseeable End to the Water A 
Shortage in Taiz 7 '
Al-Shoura( Opposition paper) April 17
The;' Sheikti^ffid^hoitables of Dhi-Sifal 
districty 6 ^ ^ ^ £ f e l ^ b y w  Sheikh Sadiq 
Ameert y ^ u fe s y y la ^ M in is te r  of Agri- ]E  
culture relu<red- ib^allow drilling of more 5; 
water wells at their area to supply Taiz. 
According to an agreement in 1972 The 
Water Authority in Taiz is allowed to take 
8 million liters of water’p'ef-'day from Dhi- 
Sifal area but it is taking now, more the 18 
‘million liter p e t-d a y } '^ ; V 
Dhi-Sifal district Citizens argue that the 
water resources are already exhausted and 
that they are afraid that the area may dry up soon, j
Al-Thawra {Official Government Paper)
14 October (Official - Aden): 21-6-95 
Headlines:
1) Bajam inal H old s D isc u ss io n s  W ith  M in ­
istries o f  E con om ic C oop eration  and F oreign
ftffn irs in a r m n n v
2 )  T he M in ister o f  E lectr ic ity  and W ater says: 
" T h e! President H as G iv en  the F inal Instruc­
tion s That R eso lv e  T he W ater S u p p ly  P roject
i P roblem  In T aiz _
3) t he M inister o t K inance S ays: "Sl)7c o i  Uie
A l-W ahdah, Sanaa, 7/6/95  
(O fficial)
H eadlines:
1) Bajam inal G oes to G erm any Soon.
2) The V ice M in ister O f Interior, "The 
Security H ave Been P ursu in g  Joh an s Since 
1991. He W as A pprehended  A lone .”
3) D eputy o f  C ivil A viation  A uthority  Says 
that the A irbus D eal W as C oncluded  
W ithout the A uthority 's K now ledge. He 
Says R eform ing th e 1^- T w o y A irlines 
(Y E M EN IA  and A L Y E M E N ) C an O nly  
X o m e  hv M erging them.■ r  ■  . .  . ■« m  , ■ ^
4) G overnor o f T aiz S a y s /  "The W orld  
Bank W ill Cancel the $30 M illion  C red it/ 
Soon, It the Dili Sufal W ater W ell D rillin g*  
Is Not Im plem ented.
A L A Y Y A M 7A dcn730-8-95 J
(Independent)
M ain H eadlines:
1) Abdul-rahman Al-Jifry Denies Requesting Post­
ponement o f his Trial in Order to Send D efense 
Lawyers.
2) Large Fire Ball in Al-M ukalla But Fire Fighting 
Equipment Not Prepared for the Job.
3) Danger Threatens Aden Airport Because o f  Abun­
dance o f  Too Many Army Vehicles Using the 
Runway.
4 ) Tai/ Waier_rmihlem on in. Wnv «o n Solution
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I I ttodeidah (1)3)21/490; Mukalla (05)354844 
For reservation ,'p lease  c a ll 2 3 7  5 0 0  Seiyoun: 0984-4288/3208
 “ —   “ T O O T
Taiz Is in for H i f
“I w ill not visit you until you  
have com pleted the water project 
for the people to drink." That was 
President A li Abdullah Saleh  
responding to the invitation o f  
the Governor o f  Taiz, Mr. 
Ahmed Abdullah Al-Hajri. The 
President w as making a point. He 
wanted to em phasize the Urgency 
and need getting on with the city  
water project. The President’s 
pressure paid off.
The National W ater and Sanita­
tion Authority had set up an 
em ergency team, headed by Mr. 
Abbas Al-M utaw akkil, under the 
direct supervision o f  Dr. 
M oham med A l-Saeedi, the
newly-appointed General 
Manager. The m ission  
was also g iven  som e cash 
on hand to get on with the 
job. "The team has been  
working even  through the 
eid holidays, and w e have 
nearly com pleted half the 
work," A l-Saeedi said. 
Governor Al-Hajri visits 
the site o f  the project 
every other day. "Three 
o f  the new  water w ells  
have been hooked on to 
the distribution network, 
and we shall be able to 
double the quantity o f  
water to be pumped to the 
city by m id-M ay,” the 
governor said.
In other words. President 
Ali Abdullah Saleh will 
be spending the next anni­
versary o f  M ay 22  
(Y em en’s U nification  
Day) in Taiz.
In an exclu sive interview  
with the governor, to be 
published^ by Yem en  
Tim es next w eek, Mr. Al- 
Hajri also indicated that 
there w ill be other goods
awaiting the President and the 
people o f  Taiz.
The President w ill also inau­
gurate the flood  control drainage 
system  in T aiz. This has alw ays 
been a major problem  as the rain­
water floods and torrents have  
m enaced the people and property. v 
The A den-based General Corr 
poratioh for B uild ing and C on­
struction executed  this' project. 
The President w ill further inau­
gurate the T aiz ring-road. “Other 
projects w hich  are being vigor­
ously  pursued are the^German- 
financed V ocational and T ech­
nical Institute o f  Taiz, as w ell as 
the electric ~gridTirik-up betw een
Taiz and A d en ,” the Governor 
indicated. T he latter tw o projects 
w ill probably be com pleted for 
inauguration ”- during the 
Septem ber/O ctober Revolution  
celebrations. ?'
The G overnor, o f  T aiz Has been 
able to cut through the bureau­
cratic hurdles a n d ' speed up 
im plem entation o f  long-dorm ant 
projects/- A li N aji : A l-R a’awi; 
C hief Editor o f  the Taiz-based  
daily A l-G um hurriyah newspaper 
co m m en ted " on the governor 
saying, “H e d o es a lot o f  leg- 
work. H e is a lw ays on the m ove, 
inspecting projects and m eeting 
with the p eop le .”
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World Bank Provides $10 m. 
to Taiz Water Project
The International D evelopm ent A ssocia­
tion, the soft-loan  arm o f  the World Bank, 
approved last w eek  an SD R  71 m illion) 
(U S $ 10.238 m illion ) credit to finance the 
T aiz W ater Project. The loan is on 
standard ID A  terms with a maturity o f  40  
years, and a grace o f  ten years.
The 4 0 0 .0 0 0  inhabitants o f  Taiz have 
been suffering from water shortages over 
the last tw o years. Piped water to less than 
half the residents is pumped only once 
every month.
“A ctually  the water com es along with the 
b ill,” stated on resident.
The ID A  credit, along with a governm ent 
contribution o f  U S$ 847,000, will help  
m itigate the im mediate water shortage by 
doubling supply in 1997. N ew  sources to 
m eet project demand to the year 2000  will 
also  be identified and tapped.
T aiz G overnor Ahmed Al-Hajri, and Dr. 
M oham m ed A l-Saeedi, Chairman o f  the 
N ational W ater and Sanitation Authority, 
have worked hard to execute this project.
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expensive and inefficient a Free Zone 
cannot attract any industry.
James Leonard - Williams, 
Aden.
President Saleh Enlists Service of Public 
Figures in Construction of Dams 
in Land Reclamation Drive
General Ali Abdullah  
Saleh, President o f  the 
Republic, is pushing  
forward with a land 
reclamation drive.
Towards that end, he 
is pursuing many 
p olicies. One such  
policy is to build more 
dams all over the 
country.
T o succeed in this 
effort, he is by-passing  
the governm ent
machinery, which has 
proven its in­
effic ien cy , and has 
asked public figures 
and locally influential 
individuals to •'take 
charge.
One such instance 
in vo lves the construc­
tion o f  the Zallaq Dam  
in the southern 
periphery o f  Hugarriah 
in Taiz G ovem orate.
The individual assigned to oversee the 
implem entation o f  this project is Sheikh  
Abdul-Rahman Nom an, M em ber o f  Parlia­
ment. Sheikh Nom an com es from an illu s­
trious and w ell-know n fam ily which  
com m ands the respect o f  the people in th e t 
region.
“W e are not really thinking o f  dams in the 
sense o f  large m odem  structures. W e are 
looking into m ediuin-size projects which  
use local material,” explained Sheikh  
Nom an.
Other dam projects fo llow ing the sam e 
format include tw o dams in Ibb, and two  
more in Lahej.
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Land reclamation is seen as a solution to 
the rising food gap in the country, as w ell 
as a source o f  productive em ploym ent for 
the job less hordes o f  people. President 
Saleh has given specific instructions to 
the M inistry o f  Agriculture on this 
matter.
In the sam e way, dam construction is 
seen as providing an answer to more than 
one problem. W hile they w ill help  
reclaim new land, dams are also expected  
to help in resolving the increasingly  
acute problem o f  water supply in the 
country.
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